Daniel Star presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling normative ethics with ordinary virtue¿for while ethical principles seem worth defending, it is not plausible to suggest that virtuous people in general follow them. He presents a new account of virtue, and rethinks the role that knowledge plays in deliberation and action.
Daniel Star presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling normative ethics with ordinary virtue¿for while ethical principles seem worth defending, it is not plausible to suggest that virtuous people in general follow them. He presents a new account of virtue, and rethinks the role that knowledge plays in deliberation and action.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Daniel Star is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. He completed his BPhil and DPhil at the University of Oxford in 2007, and was a Research Fellow at the Australian National University for two years. He has published several articles in peer-reviewed journals, such as Analysis , Ethics, Hypatia, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and Ratio. He is the editor of the Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (OUP, forthcoming).
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Acknowledgements 1: Two Levels of Ethical Thinking 2: The Authority of Reasons 3: Virtue 4: Knowing Better References