Stephen Hetherington is Professor of Philosophy at the University of New South Wales, Sydney. His publications include Epistemology's Paradox (1992), Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge (2001) and How To Know (2011).
Inhaltsangabe
Part I. Introducing Gettierism: 1.1. The year of Gettier 1.2. Gettierism introduced 1.3. Gettier cases introduced 1.4. Gettierism refined 1.5. Gettierism finalised: individual-Gettierism versus property-Gettierism 1.6. Gettieristic responses to Gettier cases 1.7. Supporting Gettierism Part II. Explicating Gettierism: A General Challenge: 2.1. Introduction 2.2. The fallibilism underlying Gettierism 2.3. A general anti-Gettierism argument 2.3.1. The strategy 2.3.2. The argument 2.3.3. Objection: merely definitional? Part III. Explicating Gettierism: A Case Study: 3.1. Introduction 3.2 Veritic luck 3.3. The argument 3.4. The argument, more metaphysically 3.5. An alternative Gettieristic interpretation of safety? 3.6. Belief-forming methods 3.7. The backward clock 3.8. The anti-luck intuition supplanted Part IV. Explicating Gettierism: Modality and Properties: 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Objection: modal fallacy? 4.2.1. The objection 4.2.2. The property of being Gettiered 4.2.3. Property preclusion 4.2.4. Predicates for the property of being Gettiered 4.2.5. Property analysis 4.3. Objection: another modal fallacy? 4.3.1. The objection 4.3.2. The objection's failure 4.3.3. Individual-Gettierism versus property-Gettierism, again Part V. Explicating Gettierism: Infallibility Presuppositions: 5.1. A question 5.2. Some Gettieristic reasoning 5.3. Realistic possibilities? 5.4. A case study: virtue-theoretic manifestation 5.4.1. Sosa/Turri's Gettieristic proposal 5.4.2. Fallibilism within Gettier's challenge 5.4.3. Turri's unwitting infallibilism 5.4.4. A methodological moral 5.4.5. Manifestation clarified 5.5. Conclusion Part VI. Gettierism and its Intuitions: 6.1. Intuitive support? 6.2. Gettier's fallibilism, again 6.3. A methodological moral, again 6.4. A methodological question about Gettieristic assessments 6.5. A methodological problem for Gettieristic assessments 6.6. An objection and two replies 6.7. Conclusion Part VII. Gettierism Improved: 7.1. A compatibilist aim 7.2. An old-fashioned account of not being Gettiered 7.2.1. An internalist condition 7.2.2. A fallibilist condition 7.2.3. A non-reductive condition 7.3. A non-reductive justified-true-belief conception of knowledge.
Part I. Introducing Gettierism: 1.1. The year of Gettier 1.2. Gettierism introduced 1.3. Gettier cases introduced 1.4. Gettierism refined 1.5. Gettierism finalised: individual-Gettierism versus property-Gettierism 1.6. Gettieristic responses to Gettier cases 1.7. Supporting Gettierism Part II. Explicating Gettierism: A General Challenge: 2.1. Introduction 2.2. The fallibilism underlying Gettierism 2.3. A general anti-Gettierism argument 2.3.1. The strategy 2.3.2. The argument 2.3.3. Objection: merely definitional? Part III. Explicating Gettierism: A Case Study: 3.1. Introduction 3.2 Veritic luck 3.3. The argument 3.4. The argument, more metaphysically 3.5. An alternative Gettieristic interpretation of safety? 3.6. Belief-forming methods 3.7. The backward clock 3.8. The anti-luck intuition supplanted Part IV. Explicating Gettierism: Modality and Properties: 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Objection: modal fallacy? 4.2.1. The objection 4.2.2. The property of being Gettiered 4.2.3. Property preclusion 4.2.4. Predicates for the property of being Gettiered 4.2.5. Property analysis 4.3. Objection: another modal fallacy? 4.3.1. The objection 4.3.2. The objection's failure 4.3.3. Individual-Gettierism versus property-Gettierism, again Part V. Explicating Gettierism: Infallibility Presuppositions: 5.1. A question 5.2. Some Gettieristic reasoning 5.3. Realistic possibilities? 5.4. A case study: virtue-theoretic manifestation 5.4.1. Sosa/Turri's Gettieristic proposal 5.4.2. Fallibilism within Gettier's challenge 5.4.3. Turri's unwitting infallibilism 5.4.4. A methodological moral 5.4.5. Manifestation clarified 5.5. Conclusion Part VI. Gettierism and its Intuitions: 6.1. Intuitive support? 6.2. Gettier's fallibilism, again 6.3. A methodological moral, again 6.4. A methodological question about Gettieristic assessments 6.5. A methodological problem for Gettieristic assessments 6.6. An objection and two replies 6.7. Conclusion Part VII. Gettierism Improved: 7.1. A compatibilist aim 7.2. An old-fashioned account of not being Gettiered 7.2.1. An internalist condition 7.2.2. A fallibilist condition 7.2.3. A non-reductive condition 7.3. A non-reductive justified-true-belief conception of knowledge.
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