Edward Craig

Knowledge and the State of Nature

An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

The standard philosophical project of analysing the concept of knowledge has radical defects in its arbitrary restriction of the subject matter, and its risky theoretical presuppositions. Edward Craig suggests a more illuminating approach, akin to the 'state of nature' method found in political theory, which builds up the concept from a hypothesis about the social function of knowledge and the needs it fulfils. Light is thrown on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, about its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis (such as the counter-examples of Edmund Gettier), and on the debate over scepticism. It becomes apparent why many languages not only have such constructions as 'knows whether' and 'knows that', but also have equivalents of 'knows how to' and 'know' followed by a direct object. Thus the inquiry is both broadened in scope and made theoretically less fragile.

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In this illuminating study Craig argues that the standard practice of analyzing the concept of knowledge has radical defects--arbitrary restriction of the subject matter and risky theoretical presuppositions. He proposes a new approach similar to the "state-of-nature" method found in political theory, building the concept up from a hypothesis about its social function and the needs it fulfills. Shedding light on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis, and the debate over skepticism, this compelling work will be of interest to students and scholars of epistemology and the philosophy of language.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press (UK)
• Seitenzahl: 182
• Erscheinungstermin: 28. Februar 1991
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 224mm x 148mm x 18mm
• Gewicht: 413g
• ISBN-13: 9780198242437
• ISBN-10: 0198242433
• Artikelnr.: 21385649

Inhaltsangabe

Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes,
comparison with state-of-nature theory in political philosophy.
Evolutionary epistemology; Derivation of first condition; the problem
whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable
format. The prototypical case; Need for third condition. Discussion of the
Nozick - Dretske analysis; Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all
good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation.
Comparison with Grice; Distinction between informant and source of
information; its nature and point. Application to putative 'knowledge
without belief' cases; and to comparitivism: Goldman; Being right by
accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle;
Local v. global reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn; Externalist and
internalist analyses. The first-person case. Knowing that one knows;
Insufficiency of the various analyses. The 'No false lemma' principle. Its
rationale -- and its effect; Objectivisation. The 'cart before the horse'
objection -- and the response; Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull
towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws; Objectivisation and
scepticism. Unger's first account; Two explanations of scepticism: the
first-person approach, and the absolute perspective; Knowledge and
involvement. What makes truth valuable?; Testimony and the transmission of
knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker; Other locutions: Knowing Fred.
Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London -- and
German; Other locutions: Knowing how to. The inquirier and the apprentice.
'Knows how to' compared with 'can' and with 'knows that'; Appendix Unger's
semantic relativism; References; Index