In this illuminating study Craig argues that the standard practice of analyzing the concept of knowledge has radical defects--arbitrary restriction of the subject matter and risky theoretical presuppositions. He proposes a new approach similar to the "state-of-nature" method found in political theory, building the concept up from a hypothesis about its social function and the needs it fulfills. Shedding light on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis, and the debate over skepticism, this compelling work will be of interest to…mehr
In this illuminating study Craig argues that the standard practice of analyzing the concept of knowledge has radical defects--arbitrary restriction of the subject matter and risky theoretical presuppositions. He proposes a new approach similar to the "state-of-nature" method found in political theory, building the concept up from a hypothesis about its social function and the needs it fulfills. Shedding light on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis, and the debate over skepticism, this compelling work will be of interest to students and scholars of epistemology and the philosophy of language.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with state-of-nature theory in political philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology; Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case; Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick - Dretske analysis; Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice; Distinction between informant and source of information; its nature and point. Application to putative 'knowledge without belief' cases; and to comparitivism: Goldman; Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle; Local v. global reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn; Externalist and internalist analyses. The first-person case. Knowing that one knows; Insufficiency of the various analyses. The 'No false lemma' principle. Its rationale -- and its effect; Objectivisation. The 'cart before the horse' objection -- and the response; Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws; Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account; Two explanations of scepticism: the first-person approach, and the absolute perspective; Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?; Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker; Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London -- and German; Other locutions: Knowing how to. The inquirier and the apprentice. 'Knows how to' compared with 'can' and with 'knows that'; Appendix Unger's semantic relativism; References; Index
Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with state-of-nature theory in political philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology; Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case; Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick - Dretske analysis; Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice; Distinction between informant and source of information; its nature and point. Application to putative 'knowledge without belief' cases; and to comparitivism: Goldman; Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle; Local v. global reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn; Externalist and internalist analyses. The first-person case. Knowing that one knows; Insufficiency of the various analyses. The 'No false lemma' principle. Its rationale -- and its effect; Objectivisation. The 'cart before the horse' objection -- and the response; Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws; Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account; Two explanations of scepticism: the first-person approach, and the absolute perspective; Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?; Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker; Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London -- and German; Other locutions: Knowing how to. The inquirier and the apprentice. 'Knows how to' compared with 'can' and with 'knows that'; Appendix Unger's semantic relativism; References; Index
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