Cristina Bicchieri / Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.)

Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction

Herausgeber: Bicchieri, Cristina; Dalla Chiara, Maria Luisa; Chiara, Maria L.

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction between game theorists, philosophers, and logicians with respect to certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation, and learning and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity. This is very much a "state-of-the-art" collection, of particular interest to philosophers (in logic, epistemology, and the philosophy of science), economists, and political scientists.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 432
• Erscheinungstermin: 8. April 2004
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 30mm
• Gewicht: 848g
• ISBN-13: 9780521416740
• ISBN-10: 0521416744
• Artikelnr.: 21738326

Inhaltsangabe

Preface
1. Feasibility Isaac Levi
2. Elicitation for games Joseph B. Kadane, Isaac Levi and Teddy Seidenfeld
3. Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions Joseph B. Kadane and Teddy Seidenfeld
4. Rational choice in the context of ideal games Edward F. McClennen
5. Hyperrational games: concept and resolutions Jordan Howard Sobel
6. Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation Brian Skyrms
7. Tortuous labyrinth: noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz
8. On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation Stefano Vannucci
9. Algorithmic knowledge and game theory Ken Binmore and Hyun Song Shin
10. Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara
11. Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic Giovanna Corsi and Silvio Ghilardi
12. Epistemic logic and game theory Bernard Walliser
13. Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses Vittorioemanuele Ferrante
14. Representing facts Krister Segerberg
15. Introduction to metamoral Roberto Magari
16. The logic of Ulam's games with lies Daniele Mundici
17. The acquisition of common knowledge Michael Bacharach
18. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under 'almost common knowledge' Ariel Rubinstein
19. Knowledge-depentent games: backward induction Cristina Bicchieri
20. Common knowledge and games with perfect information Philip J. Reny
21. Game solutions and the normal form John C. Harsanyi
22. The dynamics of belief systems: foundations versus coherence theories Peter Gärdenfors
23. Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games Hyun Song Shin.