This volume offers a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation and learning.
This volume offers a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation and learning.
Preface 1. Feasibility Isaac Levi 2. Elicitation for games Joseph B. Kadane, Isaac Levi and Teddy Seidenfeld 3. Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions Joseph B. Kadane and Teddy Seidenfeld 4. Rational choice in the context of ideal games Edward F. McClennen 5. Hyperrational games: concept and resolutions Jordan Howard Sobel 6. Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation Brian Skyrms 7. Tortuous labyrinth: noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz 8. On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation Stefano Vannucci 9. Algorithmic knowledge and game theory Ken Binmore and Hyun Song Shin 10. Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara 11. Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic Giovanna Corsi and Silvio Ghilardi 12. Epistemic logic and game theory Bernard Walliser 13. Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses Vittorioemanuele Ferrante 14. Representing facts Krister Segerberg 15. Introduction to metamoral Roberto Magari 16. The logic of Ulam's games with lies Daniele Mundici 17. The acquisition of common knowledge Michael Bacharach 18. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under 'almost common knowledge' Ariel Rubinstein 19. Knowledge-depentent games: backward induction Cristina Bicchieri 20. Common knowledge and games with perfect information Philip J. Reny 21. Game solutions and the normal form John C. Harsanyi 22. The dynamics of belief systems: foundations versus coherence theories Peter Gärdenfors 23. Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games Hyun Song Shin.
Preface 1. Feasibility Isaac Levi 2. Elicitation for games Joseph B. Kadane, Isaac Levi and Teddy Seidenfeld 3. Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions Joseph B. Kadane and Teddy Seidenfeld 4. Rational choice in the context of ideal games Edward F. McClennen 5. Hyperrational games: concept and resolutions Jordan Howard Sobel 6. Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation Brian Skyrms 7. Tortuous labyrinth: noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz 8. On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation Stefano Vannucci 9. Algorithmic knowledge and game theory Ken Binmore and Hyun Song Shin 10. Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara 11. Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic Giovanna Corsi and Silvio Ghilardi 12. Epistemic logic and game theory Bernard Walliser 13. Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses Vittorioemanuele Ferrante 14. Representing facts Krister Segerberg 15. Introduction to metamoral Roberto Magari 16. The logic of Ulam's games with lies Daniele Mundici 17. The acquisition of common knowledge Michael Bacharach 18. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under 'almost common knowledge' Ariel Rubinstein 19. Knowledge-depentent games: backward induction Cristina Bicchieri 20. Common knowledge and games with perfect information Philip J. Reny 21. Game solutions and the normal form John C. Harsanyi 22. The dynamics of belief systems: foundations versus coherence theories Peter Gärdenfors 23. Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games Hyun Song Shin.
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