Federico Luzzi
Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Federico Luzzi
Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
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Challenges the idea that knowledge of a conclusion requires knowledge of essential premises, a widely accepted concept in epistemology.
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Challenges the idea that knowledge of a conclusion requires knowledge of essential premises, a widely accepted concept in epistemology.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 212
- Erscheinungstermin: 8. Januar 2019
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 16mm
- Gewicht: 467g
- ISBN-13: 9781108491914
- ISBN-10: 110849191X
- Artikelnr.: 55320875
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 212
- Erscheinungstermin: 8. Januar 2019
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 16mm
- Gewicht: 467g
- ISBN-13: 9781108491914
- ISBN-10: 110849191X
- Artikelnr.: 55320875
Federico Luzzi is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen.
1. Knowledge from knowledge
1.1 The default view
1.2 Knowledge counter-closure
1.3 A schema for KCC failures
2. Inferential knowledge from falsehood
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Warfield on inferential knowledge from falsehood
2.3 Warfield against the 'proxy-premise' strategy
2.4 Montminy's defense of the proxy premise strategy and his attack on KFF
2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge
2.6. Against the proxy premise strategy
2.7. Schnee on KFF
2.8 Accounts of knowledge from falsehood
2.9 Conclusion
3. Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth: 3.1. Introduction
3.2. KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge
3.3. Agoraphobia
3.4 The breadth of the challenge
3.5 DeRose's attributor contextualism
3.6 Birthday
3.7 Stanley's interest-relative invariantism
3.8 Coral
3.9 Knowledge from essential falsehood?
3.10 Conclusion
4. How to abandon knowledge counter-closure
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Epistemic 'hocus-pocus'?
4.3 Replacing KCC
4.4 Murphy on justification and belief
4.5 Denying KCC: costs?
4.6 Multi-premise inference
4.7 Conclusion
5. Testimony and knowledge from non-knowledge: 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
5.3 Testimony and inference: a defeater asymmetry
5.4 Second-hand knowledge
5.5. Safety-based testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
5.6 Conclusion
6. Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Lackey's cases against KPS
6.3 Señor's objections
6.4 Factual-defeater-based case
7. Knowledge from non-knowledge in inference, testimony and memory: 7.1 Inference, testimony and memory
7.2 Conclusion.
1.1 The default view
1.2 Knowledge counter-closure
1.3 A schema for KCC failures
2. Inferential knowledge from falsehood
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Warfield on inferential knowledge from falsehood
2.3 Warfield against the 'proxy-premise' strategy
2.4 Montminy's defense of the proxy premise strategy and his attack on KFF
2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge
2.6. Against the proxy premise strategy
2.7. Schnee on KFF
2.8 Accounts of knowledge from falsehood
2.9 Conclusion
3. Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth: 3.1. Introduction
3.2. KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge
3.3. Agoraphobia
3.4 The breadth of the challenge
3.5 DeRose's attributor contextualism
3.6 Birthday
3.7 Stanley's interest-relative invariantism
3.8 Coral
3.9 Knowledge from essential falsehood?
3.10 Conclusion
4. How to abandon knowledge counter-closure
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Epistemic 'hocus-pocus'?
4.3 Replacing KCC
4.4 Murphy on justification and belief
4.5 Denying KCC: costs?
4.6 Multi-premise inference
4.7 Conclusion
5. Testimony and knowledge from non-knowledge: 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
5.3 Testimony and inference: a defeater asymmetry
5.4 Second-hand knowledge
5.5. Safety-based testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
5.6 Conclusion
6. Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Lackey's cases against KPS
6.3 Señor's objections
6.4 Factual-defeater-based case
7. Knowledge from non-knowledge in inference, testimony and memory: 7.1 Inference, testimony and memory
7.2 Conclusion.
1. Knowledge from knowledge
1.1 The default view
1.2 Knowledge counter-closure
1.3 A schema for KCC failures
2. Inferential knowledge from falsehood
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Warfield on inferential knowledge from falsehood
2.3 Warfield against the 'proxy-premise' strategy
2.4 Montminy's defense of the proxy premise strategy and his attack on KFF
2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge
2.6. Against the proxy premise strategy
2.7. Schnee on KFF
2.8 Accounts of knowledge from falsehood
2.9 Conclusion
3. Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth: 3.1. Introduction
3.2. KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge
3.3. Agoraphobia
3.4 The breadth of the challenge
3.5 DeRose's attributor contextualism
3.6 Birthday
3.7 Stanley's interest-relative invariantism
3.8 Coral
3.9 Knowledge from essential falsehood?
3.10 Conclusion
4. How to abandon knowledge counter-closure
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Epistemic 'hocus-pocus'?
4.3 Replacing KCC
4.4 Murphy on justification and belief
4.5 Denying KCC: costs?
4.6 Multi-premise inference
4.7 Conclusion
5. Testimony and knowledge from non-knowledge: 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
5.3 Testimony and inference: a defeater asymmetry
5.4 Second-hand knowledge
5.5. Safety-based testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
5.6 Conclusion
6. Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Lackey's cases against KPS
6.3 Señor's objections
6.4 Factual-defeater-based case
7. Knowledge from non-knowledge in inference, testimony and memory: 7.1 Inference, testimony and memory
7.2 Conclusion.
1.1 The default view
1.2 Knowledge counter-closure
1.3 A schema for KCC failures
2. Inferential knowledge from falsehood
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Warfield on inferential knowledge from falsehood
2.3 Warfield against the 'proxy-premise' strategy
2.4 Montminy's defense of the proxy premise strategy and his attack on KFF
2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge
2.6. Against the proxy premise strategy
2.7. Schnee on KFF
2.8 Accounts of knowledge from falsehood
2.9 Conclusion
3. Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth: 3.1. Introduction
3.2. KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge
3.3. Agoraphobia
3.4 The breadth of the challenge
3.5 DeRose's attributor contextualism
3.6 Birthday
3.7 Stanley's interest-relative invariantism
3.8 Coral
3.9 Knowledge from essential falsehood?
3.10 Conclusion
4. How to abandon knowledge counter-closure
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Epistemic 'hocus-pocus'?
4.3 Replacing KCC
4.4 Murphy on justification and belief
4.5 Denying KCC: costs?
4.6 Multi-premise inference
4.7 Conclusion
5. Testimony and knowledge from non-knowledge: 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
5.3 Testimony and inference: a defeater asymmetry
5.4 Second-hand knowledge
5.5. Safety-based testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
5.6 Conclusion
6. Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Lackey's cases against KPS
6.3 Señor's objections
6.4 Factual-defeater-based case
7. Knowledge from non-knowledge in inference, testimony and memory: 7.1 Inference, testimony and memory
7.2 Conclusion.