Richard Downie

Learning from Conflict

The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Why have militaries so often failed to learn from conflict and war? Why, for example, despite years of unsuccessful counterinsurgency experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador and repeated recommendations from official Army studies, has the U.S. Army not changed its doctrine for counterinsurgency? Writing for scholars as well as military professionals and policymakers, Downie examines the sources of doctrinal change and innovation from a theoretical perspective and derives practical and relevant policy recommendations. Contrasting with other findings in this field, Downie provides case studies showing that neither external pressure on a military nor institutional recognition of the requirement for doctrinal change is sufficient to explain the process of doctrinal change. A military innovates when it learns, by proceeding through a learning cycle that includes achieving an organizational consensus that permits adoption of new approaches that respond to factors that make existing doctrine deficient. When that process is blocked, militaries are left with outmoded doctrinal approaches that constrain military performance and lead to defeat. This is an important study for military leaders, civilian policymakers, and scholars and researchers dealing with contemporary U.S. military issues.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Praeger
• Seitenzahl: 310
• Erscheinungstermin: 18. Juni 1998
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 21mm
• Gewicht: 631g
• ISBN-13: 9780275960100
• ISBN-10: 0275960102
• Artikelnr.: 21176217

Autorenporträt

Richard D. Downie

Inhaltsangabe

Preface and Reader's Guide Abbreviations Introduction and Theoretical
Overview Overview and Background The Sources of Doctrinal Change:
Structuring Contending Explanations Development and Evolution of U.S.
Doctrine for Counterinsurgency and LIC Case Study 1: Analyzing Change to
Published Doctrine for Counterinsurgency in the Post-Vietnam War Era
Official Army Studies on Counterinsurgency and Identifying Shortcomings
Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam War Era: Has There Been
Conceptual Change? Did the U.S. Army Learn?: Assessing the Doctrinal
Evidence Case Study 2: Testing for Doctrinal Continuity: The U.S.
Counterinsurgency Assistance Effort in El Salvador "Drawing the Line" in
Central America: U.S. Counterinsurgency Assistance in El Salvador
Counterinsurgency from Vietnam to El Salvador: Testing for Doctrinal
Continuity Why Didn't Counterinsurgency Doctrine Change After the Vietnam
War: Testing Hypotheses Case Study 3: Testing for Doctrinal Change or
Continuity: The Drug War in the Andean Ridge Fighting The Drug War on the
Andean Ridge Explaining Doctrinal Change: The Drug War on the Andean Ridge
Conclusions and Recommendations Theoretical Conclusions Recommendations:
LIC and Military Organizations as Learning Institutions Appendix: Measuring
Change in Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Selected Bibliography Index