In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, William J. Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses it to propose a new way of understanding rational belief that can be applied to pressing social and political issues. This framework is used to articulate a new theory of prejudice and a new diagnosis of the sources of inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, as well as insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth.
In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, William J. Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses it to propose a new way of understanding rational belief that can be applied to pressing social and political issues. This framework is used to articulate a new theory of prejudice and a new diagnosis of the sources of inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, as well as insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
William J. Talbott is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington, Seattle. He teaches and has published articles in epistemology; moral and political philosophy, including the philosophy of human rights; rational choice theory; and the philosophy of law. He is the author of a book on reliabilist epistemology, The Reliability of the Cognitive Mechanism and two books in the philosophy of human rights: Which Rights Should Be Universal? and Human Rights and Human Well-Being (both OUP).
Inhaltsangabe
* Part I. The Proof Paradigm and the Causal Revolution in Epistemology * Introduction * Chapter 1. The Proof Paradigm * Chapter 2. Two Crises for the Proof Paradigm in the Enlightenment * Chapter 3. The End of the Proof Paradigm? * Chapter 4. The Causal Revolution in Epistemology * Part II. A New Way of Understanding Epistemic Rationality * Chapter 5. An Alternative to the Proof Paradigm for Ground-Level Rationality * Chapter 6. Two More Principles of Epistemic Rationality * Part III. And Epistemic Irrationality * Chapter 7. Epistemology for the Real World: Prejudices and Other Kinds of Epistemically Irrational Biased Beliefs * Chapter 8. Internally Inconsistent, Self-refuting, and Self-Undermining Views * Part IV. More on Epistemic Rationality * Chapter 9. Bayesian Accounts of Epistemic Rationality * Chapter 10. An Alternative to the Proof Paradigm for Metacognitive Rationality * Chapter 11. Necessity and Universality * Chapter 12. The Evolutionary Naturalist Challenge to the Reliability of Particular Epistemic Judgments * Part V. Clarifications, Responses to Objections, and Conclusion * Chapter 13. Clarifications and Objections * Conclusion * Appendix A * Appendix B * References
* Part I. The Proof Paradigm and the Causal Revolution in Epistemology * Introduction * Chapter 1. The Proof Paradigm * Chapter 2. Two Crises for the Proof Paradigm in the Enlightenment * Chapter 3. The End of the Proof Paradigm? * Chapter 4. The Causal Revolution in Epistemology * Part II. A New Way of Understanding Epistemic Rationality * Chapter 5. An Alternative to the Proof Paradigm for Ground-Level Rationality * Chapter 6. Two More Principles of Epistemic Rationality * Part III. And Epistemic Irrationality * Chapter 7. Epistemology for the Real World: Prejudices and Other Kinds of Epistemically Irrational Biased Beliefs * Chapter 8. Internally Inconsistent, Self-refuting, and Self-Undermining Views * Part IV. More on Epistemic Rationality * Chapter 9. Bayesian Accounts of Epistemic Rationality * Chapter 10. An Alternative to the Proof Paradigm for Metacognitive Rationality * Chapter 11. Necessity and Universality * Chapter 12. The Evolutionary Naturalist Challenge to the Reliability of Particular Epistemic Judgments * Part V. Clarifications, Responses to Objections, and Conclusion * Chapter 13. Clarifications and Objections * Conclusion * Appendix A * Appendix B * References
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826
