Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
Herausgeber: Kendler, Kenneth S; Zachar, Peter; Parnas, Josef
Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
Herausgeber: Kendler, Kenneth S; Zachar, Peter; Parnas, Josef
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This book establishes an interdisciplinary dialogue between leading experts in psychiatry, philosophy, and psychology to explore the range of explanatory approaches for understanding the nature psychiatric disorders both in research and practice. It uses these perspectives to advance etiologic theories, classification, and treatment in the field.
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This book establishes an interdisciplinary dialogue between leading experts in psychiatry, philosophy, and psychology to explore the range of explanatory approaches for understanding the nature psychiatric disorders both in research and practice. It uses these perspectives to advance etiologic theories, classification, and treatment in the field.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 582
- Erscheinungstermin: 4. August 2022
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 30mm
- Gewicht: 826g
- ISBN-13: 9781108719254
- ISBN-10: 1108719252
- Artikelnr.: 64359736
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 582
- Erscheinungstermin: 4. August 2022
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 30mm
- Gewicht: 826g
- ISBN-13: 9781108719254
- ISBN-10: 1108719252
- Artikelnr.: 64359736
Introduction; Part I. Neuroscience, Mechanisms and RDoC: 1. Introduction
Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical
networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of
mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S.
Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix:
lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and
mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff;
7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems:
neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel
S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological
Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11.
Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher;
12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or
dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14.
Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15.
Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise?
Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a
disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for
psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the
psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler;
20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological
phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew;
21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about
a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy,
Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef
Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or
not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big
data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27.
Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and
nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an
a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double
black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32.
Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and
how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William
Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and
what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in
Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter
Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological
causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler;
39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of
psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology'
Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric
discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan
Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific
reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction
Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels
Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at
different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.
Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical
networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of
mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S.
Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix:
lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and
mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff;
7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems:
neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel
S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological
Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11.
Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher;
12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or
dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14.
Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15.
Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise?
Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a
disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for
psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the
psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler;
20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological
phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew;
21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about
a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy,
Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef
Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or
not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big
data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27.
Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and
nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an
a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double
black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32.
Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and
how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William
Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and
what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in
Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter
Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological
causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler;
39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of
psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology'
Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric
discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan
Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific
reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction
Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels
Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at
different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.
Introduction; Part I. Neuroscience, Mechanisms and RDoC: 1. Introduction
Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical
networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of
mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S.
Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix:
lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and
mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff;
7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems:
neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel
S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological
Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11.
Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher;
12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or
dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14.
Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15.
Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise?
Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a
disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for
psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the
psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler;
20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological
phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew;
21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about
a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy,
Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef
Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or
not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big
data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27.
Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and
nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an
a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double
black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32.
Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and
how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William
Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and
what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in
Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter
Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological
causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler;
39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of
psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology'
Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric
discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan
Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific
reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction
Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels
Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at
different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.
Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical
networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of
mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S.
Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix:
lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and
mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff;
7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems:
neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel
S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological
Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11.
Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher;
12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or
dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14.
Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15.
Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise?
Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a
disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for
psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the
psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler;
20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological
phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew;
21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about
a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy,
Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef
Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or
not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big
data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27.
Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and
nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an
a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double
black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32.
Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and
how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William
Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and
what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in
Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter
Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological
causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler;
39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of
psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology'
Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric
discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan
Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific
reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction
Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels
Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at
different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.