- Gebundenes Buch
- Merkliste
- Auf die Merkliste
- Bewerten Bewerten
- Teilen
- Produkt teilen
- Produkterinnerung
- Produkterinnerung
The different sciences furnish us with a wide variety of explanations: some work at macroscopic scales, some at microscopic scales, and some operate across different levels. How do these different explanations fit together? This book looks at levels of explanations across different sciences, as well as at levels of explanation in philosophy itself.
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
- E. Br. DaviesScience in the Looking Glass49,99 €
- Marc LangeLaws and Lawmakers162,99 €
- Yafeng ShanAlternative Approaches to Causation125,99 €
- Peter AchinsteinSpeculation59,99 €
- Giora HonFrom Summetria to Symmetry: The Making of a Revolutionary Scientific Concept311,99 €
- Robert W BattermanA Middle Way116,99 €
- Peter G O FreundA Passion for Discovery53,99 €
-
-
-
The different sciences furnish us with a wide variety of explanations: some work at macroscopic scales, some at microscopic scales, and some operate across different levels. How do these different explanations fit together? This book looks at levels of explanations across different sciences, as well as at levels of explanation in philosophy itself.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 432
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Januar 2025
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9780192862945
- ISBN-10: 0192862944
- Artikelnr.: 73110480
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 432
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Januar 2025
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9780192862945
- ISBN-10: 0192862944
- Artikelnr.: 73110480
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Katie Robertson is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Stirling. After completing the BPhil in Philosophy in Oxford, she did her PhD in Cambridge on the philosophy of thermal physics. She was then a postdoc with the FraMEPhys project at the University of Birmingham, before being awarded a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship exploring the relationship between thermodynamics and black holes. Her research has focused on questions about how different sciences, or levels, fit together. She has also worked on how non-fundamental theories such as thermodynamics and their quantities like entropy are related to more fundamental quantities in quantum mechanics. Alastair Wilson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Leeds, specializing in metaphysics, philosophy of science (especially physics), and epistemology. Before joining Leeds, he spent 11 years at the University of Birmingham and 18 months as a postdoc at Monash University. His doctoral thesis was on the metaphysics of Everettian (many-worlds) quantum mechanics; this line of thought culminated in his book The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism (OUP, 2020). More recently he has focused on explanation and dependence in physics; he has also worked on grounding, laws of nature, chance, and the epistemology of self-locating belief.
* Introduction: Levels of Explanation
* Part I: Foundations of Explanatory Levels
* 1: Christian List: Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A
General Framework
* 2: Angela Potochnik: Antireductionism Has Outgrown Levels
* 3: Alexander Franklin: How the Reductionist Should Respond to the
Multiscale Argument, and What This Tells Us About Levels
* Part II: Levels of Explanation in Causal Modelling
* 4: Brad Weslake: Exclusion Excluded
* 5: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the
Challenge of Mixed Models
* 6: David Yates: From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation
* Part III: Levels of Explanation in Higher-Level Sciences
* 7: William Bechtel: Explanatory Levels in Living Organisms
* 8: Mazviita Chirimuuta: From Analogies to Levels of Abstraction in
Cognitive Neuroscience
* 9: Harold Kincaid: Messy but Real Levels in the Social Sciences
* Part IV: Levels of Explanation in Physics
* 10: Eleanor Knox: Levels Worth Having: A View from Physics
* 11: Karen Crowther: Levels of Fundamentality in the Metaphysics of
Physics
* 12: Kerry McKenzie: No Grounds for Effective Theories
* Part V: Levels of Explanation in Mathematics and Metaphysics
* 13: Carolin Antos and Mark Colyvan: Explanation in Descriptive Set
Theory
* 14: Elanor Taylor: A Dormitive Virtue Puzzle
* 15: Nina Emery: The Explanatory Role Argument and the Metaphysics of
Deterministic Chance
* Part VI: How are Explanatory Levels Possible?
* 16: Harjit Bhogal: Why Are There High-Level Regularities?
* 17: Michael Strevens: Why High-Level Explanations Exist
* 18: Michael Townsen Hicks: A Democracy of Laws
* Part I: Foundations of Explanatory Levels
* 1: Christian List: Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A
General Framework
* 2: Angela Potochnik: Antireductionism Has Outgrown Levels
* 3: Alexander Franklin: How the Reductionist Should Respond to the
Multiscale Argument, and What This Tells Us About Levels
* Part II: Levels of Explanation in Causal Modelling
* 4: Brad Weslake: Exclusion Excluded
* 5: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the
Challenge of Mixed Models
* 6: David Yates: From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation
* Part III: Levels of Explanation in Higher-Level Sciences
* 7: William Bechtel: Explanatory Levels in Living Organisms
* 8: Mazviita Chirimuuta: From Analogies to Levels of Abstraction in
Cognitive Neuroscience
* 9: Harold Kincaid: Messy but Real Levels in the Social Sciences
* Part IV: Levels of Explanation in Physics
* 10: Eleanor Knox: Levels Worth Having: A View from Physics
* 11: Karen Crowther: Levels of Fundamentality in the Metaphysics of
Physics
* 12: Kerry McKenzie: No Grounds for Effective Theories
* Part V: Levels of Explanation in Mathematics and Metaphysics
* 13: Carolin Antos and Mark Colyvan: Explanation in Descriptive Set
Theory
* 14: Elanor Taylor: A Dormitive Virtue Puzzle
* 15: Nina Emery: The Explanatory Role Argument and the Metaphysics of
Deterministic Chance
* Part VI: How are Explanatory Levels Possible?
* 16: Harjit Bhogal: Why Are There High-Level Regularities?
* 17: Michael Strevens: Why High-Level Explanations Exist
* 18: Michael Townsen Hicks: A Democracy of Laws
* Introduction: Levels of Explanation
* Part I: Foundations of Explanatory Levels
* 1: Christian List: Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A
General Framework
* 2: Angela Potochnik: Antireductionism Has Outgrown Levels
* 3: Alexander Franklin: How the Reductionist Should Respond to the
Multiscale Argument, and What This Tells Us About Levels
* Part II: Levels of Explanation in Causal Modelling
* 4: Brad Weslake: Exclusion Excluded
* 5: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the
Challenge of Mixed Models
* 6: David Yates: From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation
* Part III: Levels of Explanation in Higher-Level Sciences
* 7: William Bechtel: Explanatory Levels in Living Organisms
* 8: Mazviita Chirimuuta: From Analogies to Levels of Abstraction in
Cognitive Neuroscience
* 9: Harold Kincaid: Messy but Real Levels in the Social Sciences
* Part IV: Levels of Explanation in Physics
* 10: Eleanor Knox: Levels Worth Having: A View from Physics
* 11: Karen Crowther: Levels of Fundamentality in the Metaphysics of
Physics
* 12: Kerry McKenzie: No Grounds for Effective Theories
* Part V: Levels of Explanation in Mathematics and Metaphysics
* 13: Carolin Antos and Mark Colyvan: Explanation in Descriptive Set
Theory
* 14: Elanor Taylor: A Dormitive Virtue Puzzle
* 15: Nina Emery: The Explanatory Role Argument and the Metaphysics of
Deterministic Chance
* Part VI: How are Explanatory Levels Possible?
* 16: Harjit Bhogal: Why Are There High-Level Regularities?
* 17: Michael Strevens: Why High-Level Explanations Exist
* 18: Michael Townsen Hicks: A Democracy of Laws
* Part I: Foundations of Explanatory Levels
* 1: Christian List: Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A
General Framework
* 2: Angela Potochnik: Antireductionism Has Outgrown Levels
* 3: Alexander Franklin: How the Reductionist Should Respond to the
Multiscale Argument, and What This Tells Us About Levels
* Part II: Levels of Explanation in Causal Modelling
* 4: Brad Weslake: Exclusion Excluded
* 5: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the
Challenge of Mixed Models
* 6: David Yates: From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation
* Part III: Levels of Explanation in Higher-Level Sciences
* 7: William Bechtel: Explanatory Levels in Living Organisms
* 8: Mazviita Chirimuuta: From Analogies to Levels of Abstraction in
Cognitive Neuroscience
* 9: Harold Kincaid: Messy but Real Levels in the Social Sciences
* Part IV: Levels of Explanation in Physics
* 10: Eleanor Knox: Levels Worth Having: A View from Physics
* 11: Karen Crowther: Levels of Fundamentality in the Metaphysics of
Physics
* 12: Kerry McKenzie: No Grounds for Effective Theories
* Part V: Levels of Explanation in Mathematics and Metaphysics
* 13: Carolin Antos and Mark Colyvan: Explanation in Descriptive Set
Theory
* 14: Elanor Taylor: A Dormitive Virtue Puzzle
* 15: Nina Emery: The Explanatory Role Argument and the Metaphysics of
Deterministic Chance
* Part VI: How are Explanatory Levels Possible?
* 16: Harjit Bhogal: Why Are There High-Level Regularities?
* 17: Michael Strevens: Why High-Level Explanations Exist
* 18: Michael Townsen Hicks: A Democracy of Laws