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Since September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Special Operation Forces (SOF) and Conventional Forces (CF) have be increasingly working together throughout the world against numerous asymmetrical threats. However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that there are many situations where SOF and CF do not fully leverage each other's capabilities because they operated along parallel lines of operations, where neither force had any degree of certainty of what the other was doing. In 2009, General McChrystal adopted a strategy for Afghanistan that focuses on the needs of the populace and putting Afhan forces in the lead of every effort. If SOF and CF are going to succeed in implementing General McChrystal's new strategy, as well as in future conflicts where both forces are operating jointly then both forces must learn to leverage each other's capabilities. Specifically, SOF and CF must learn to take an integrated approach to joint operations so that both forces will be able to leverage each other's capability strengths to compensate for their own internal capability limitations, which will allow both forces to operate in the most efficient and effective manner possible. In order to ensure that this transpires changes must occur in how both forces conduct joint operations and be institutionalized in doctrine, education, training, and leadership. Through a DOTMLPF comparison of both forces and two case studies, this monograph shows how both forces should leverage each other's capabilities, as well as provides recommendations for the implementation of General McChrystal's new strategy for Afghanistan.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.