How does the idea of public justification and adjacent concepts figure in the work of John Rawls? This book offered a detailed study which allows for an interpretation of how A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism converge and diverge. It also offers a systematic appraisal of the different strands and genealogy of legitimacy theory, both descriptive and normative. In so doing, it brings a fresh new perspective to this important element of Rawls's theory.
How does the idea of public justification and adjacent concepts figure in the work of John Rawls? This book offered a detailed study which allows for an interpretation of how A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism converge and diverge. It also offers a systematic appraisal of the different strands and genealogy of legitimacy theory, both descriptive and normative. In so doing, it brings a fresh new perspective to this important element of Rawls's theory.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Introduction Thinking about legitimacy The liberal perspective on legitimacy The challenge of pluralism and public justification Legitimacy as public justification in Rawls's work The structure of the book Part I - Liberal legitimacy in context 1. The concept of legitimacy 1.1 The elements of political power 1.2 Concepts and conceptions of legitimacy 1.3 Empirical conceptions of legitimacy 1.4 Normative (especially liberal) conceptions of legitimacy 1.5 Conclusion of the chapter 2. Liberal legitimacy and public justification 2.1 Two ideas of consent 2.2 Voluntarist accounts and their shortcomings 2.3 Hypothetical agreement and contractualism 2.4 Legitimacy as public justification 2.5 Conclusion of the chapter Part II: Liberal legitimacy in a Rawlsian framework 3. Justice and legitimacy before the political turn 3.1 The nature of justification and reflective equilibrium 3.2 The contractualist argument for justice as fairness 3.3 Democratic politics and legitimacy in Theory 3.4 The stability of a well-ordered society as a justificatory condition 3.5 Conclusion of the chapter 4. The challenge of reasonable disagreement 4.1 Reasonable disagreement and the burdens of judgment 4.2 Reasonable disagreement and the fundamentals of Theory 4.3 The problems with reasonable disagreement and pluralism 4.4 Conclusion of the chapter 5. Liberal legitimacy in Political Liberalism 5.1 The political conception of justice 5.2 (Un)Reasonable citizens and the limits of public justification 5.3 The role of overlapping consensus 5.4 Public reason and the legitimate exercise of political power 5.5 Conclusion of the chapter 6. Beyond legitimacy as public justification 6.1 The duties of citizens who reject political liberalism 6.2 The normative authority of partially illegitimate legislation 6.3 The political and philosophical status of political liberalism 6.4 Conclusion of the chapter
Introduction Thinking about legitimacy The liberal perspective on legitimacy The challenge of pluralism and public justification Legitimacy as public justification in Rawls's work The structure of the book Part I - Liberal legitimacy in context 1. The concept of legitimacy 1.1 The elements of political power 1.2 Concepts and conceptions of legitimacy 1.3 Empirical conceptions of legitimacy 1.4 Normative (especially liberal) conceptions of legitimacy 1.5 Conclusion of the chapter 2. Liberal legitimacy and public justification 2.1 Two ideas of consent 2.2 Voluntarist accounts and their shortcomings 2.3 Hypothetical agreement and contractualism 2.4 Legitimacy as public justification 2.5 Conclusion of the chapter Part II: Liberal legitimacy in a Rawlsian framework 3. Justice and legitimacy before the political turn 3.1 The nature of justification and reflective equilibrium 3.2 The contractualist argument for justice as fairness 3.3 Democratic politics and legitimacy in Theory 3.4 The stability of a well-ordered society as a justificatory condition 3.5 Conclusion of the chapter 4. The challenge of reasonable disagreement 4.1 Reasonable disagreement and the burdens of judgment 4.2 Reasonable disagreement and the fundamentals of Theory 4.3 The problems with reasonable disagreement and pluralism 4.4 Conclusion of the chapter 5. Liberal legitimacy in Political Liberalism 5.1 The political conception of justice 5.2 (Un)Reasonable citizens and the limits of public justification 5.3 The role of overlapping consensus 5.4 Public reason and the legitimate exercise of political power 5.5 Conclusion of the chapter 6. Beyond legitimacy as public justification 6.1 The duties of citizens who reject political liberalism 6.2 The normative authority of partially illegitimate legislation 6.3 The political and philosophical status of political liberalism 6.4 Conclusion of the chapter
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