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![The Functions and Structure of Nuclear Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World]( "The Functions and Structure of Nuclear Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World")
The Functions and Structure of Nuclear Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World60,99 €![Theater Nuclear Forces and Extended Deterrence in a Multipolar World]( "Theater Nuclear Forces and Extended Deterrence in a Multipolar World")
Theater Nuclear Forces and Extended Deterrence in a Multipolar World60,99 €![Deterrence Requirements and Arms Control Responsibilities: The United State's Obligation to Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty]( "Deterrence Requirements and Arms Control Responsibilities: The United State's Obligation to Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty")
Deterrence Requirements and Arms Control Responsibilities: The United State's Obligation to Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty60,99 €![Miscalculated Ambiguity: The Effects of US Nuclear Declaratory Policy on Deterrence and Nonproliferation]( "Miscalculated Ambiguity: The Effects of US Nuclear Declaratory Policy on Deterrence and Nonproliferation")
Miscalculated Ambiguity: The Effects of US Nuclear Declaratory Policy on Deterrence and Nonproliferation60,99 €![The Erosion of US Nuclear Deterrence Credibility in the 21st Century]( "The Erosion of US Nuclear Deterrence Credibility in the 21st Century")
The Erosion of US Nuclear Deterrence Credibility in the 21st Century60,99 €![The Credibility of America's Extended Nuclear Deterrent: The Case of the Republic of Turkey]( "The Credibility of America's Extended Nuclear Deterrent: The Case of the Republic of Turkey")
The Credibility of America's Extended Nuclear Deterrent: The Case of the Republic of Turkey60,99 €![Maximizing Deterrence with Respect to a Nuclear Weapons Capable Iran: An Effects Based Approach to Policy and Strategy]( "Maximizing Deterrence with Respect to a Nuclear Weapons Capable Iran: An Effects Based Approach to Policy and Strategy")
Maximizing Deterrence with Respect to a Nuclear Weapons Capable Iran: An Effects Based Approach to Policy and Strategy60,99 €
America appears poised to redefine its extended deterrent commitment to NATO. This paper evaluates a selection of U.S. signals surrounding the slow-burning debate on the future of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW) in Europe to determine a prevailing European understanding of the American NSNW policy preference. Despite the conspicuous silence in American intellectual and foreign policy circles defining what President Obama?s Global Nuclear Zero commitment means to the future of NATOs NSNW, the most consistent thread among U.S. actions and rhetoric is an American perception of a changed threat environment. The result is a deliberate policy vector that reinterprets deterrence and intellectually relegates NSNW to the dustbin of history as a dangerous Cold War relic. This intent is interpreted by European allies through the prism of flexible response strategy resulting in a loss of commitment perception, linked to historical perceptions of graduated deterrence. The U.S. has had difficulty communicating and convincing our NATO allies to accept and adopt this strategic recasting because American policy elites have thus far failed to offer a compelling theoretical construct that continues to extend historically understood security assurances. This has caused the beginning of a reexamination of core alliance functions, potentially undermining the strength of consultative norms and shared purpose.