Noah Coburn

Losing Afghanistan

An Obituary for the Intervention

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Noah Coburn is Professor of Anthropology at Bennington College. He is the author of Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town (Stanford, 2011) and Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape (2014) with Anna Larson. He has been conducting ethnographic research in Afghanistan since 2005, as well as working for the United States Institute of Peace, Chatham House and the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit and as an election observer.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 264
• Erscheinungstermin: 3. Februar 2016
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 231mm x 157mm x 23mm
• Gewicht: 476g
• ISBN-13: 9780804796637
• ISBN-10: 0804796637
• Artikelnr.: 44383140

Autorenporträt

Noah Coburn is Professor of Anthropology at Bennington College. He is the author of Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town (Stanford, 2011) and Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape (2014) with Anna Larson. He has been conducting ethnographic research in Afghanistan since 2005, as well as working for the United States Institute of Peace, Chatham House and the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit and as an election observer.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1Surveying the Intervention from Above
chapter abstract
This chapter looks at the scale of the international intervention from some
of the biggest projects to some of the smallest. It introduces Bagram
Airbase, located in the center of Afghanistan, and one of the most
important international bases used during the intervention. The chapter
looks at some of the agricultural communities around the base and considers
the potential for conflict between these communities and the base. It also
introduces a company, owned in part by an American engineer, designed to
build small-scale wind projects across the country and asks why certain
projects receive funding, while others do not.
2Intervening
chapter abstract
This chapter charts the move of the anthropologist from a small town in the
mountains of Afghanistan to the busy diplomatic circles of Kabul. It
considers some of the literature that has been produced about the
intervention thus far and argues that much of the thinking about the
intervention had a circular nature that derived from the narrow views that
many people had. Thus, diplomats tended to support diplomatic solutions,
military officers, military ones and development workers were always
arguing for more funds. Thus, it suggest that a more holistic, ethnographic
approach is required to truly understand the multiple dimensions of the
intervention. In particular, it suggests an approach that focuses on
individual stories has much to offer and introduces the reader to a Navy
SEAL in charge of liaising with the Afghan National Army to demonstrate
such an approach.
3The Exotic Tribes of the Intervention
chapter abstract
This chapter considers whether the international community should be
considered a 'community' and what such a community would look like. It
argues that while incredibly diverse in origins and in jobs preformed, as
funds increasingly enter the country, the international community was
united by the language it used, the places they lived and their common
worldview. It also asks what many of the Afghans who worked specifically
with the international community had in common and introduces one young
merchant who owned a small logistics company that was expanding rapidly.
4Before the Invasion
chapter abstract
This chapter looks at the history of the area around Bagram Airbase, as
well as the history of the international community in Afghanistan more
generally. It begins by focusing on the invasion of Alexander the Great and
various other conflicts that shaped the complex ethnic and political
composition of the area. It then considers the period of jihad against the
Soviet backed government, when most of the international aid community was
based in Pakistan. It then considers how these elements have contributed to
the lasting conflict around Bagram. Through this period it also tracks the
life of Ronald Neumann, whose father was ambassador of Afghanistan, a
position his son would hold thirty years later.
5A New Era?
chapter abstract
This chapter looks at the recent history of the coalition airbase at Bagram
and the international project in Afghanistan more generally since the
US-led invasion in 2001. In particular it looks at the case of a Navy SEAL
to demonstrate the ways in which for many, despite the long history of
conflict in Afghanistan, the intervention really began with the September
11 attacks. Initial momentum in Afghanistan was lost, however, as the
international focus shifted to Iraq. With President Obama's announcement of
both a surge in troop levels and development spending, there was newfound
hope, particularly for small-scale development projects. This was
especially apparent in the attempts at electrifying much of the country,
which led to large wasteful projects, like the Kajaki Dam and generator
projects in Kandahar. The chapter concludes by outlining the history of one
small wind energy company and its struggle to secure funding.
6Contracting the Intervention
chapter abstract
This chapter looks at one particularly effective, small-scale, sustainable
energy project and asks why it failed during the surge years when so much
funding was available. It considers the contracting model that was the
basis for how much of the development money in the country was distributed
and argues that in many cases, smaller NGOs were simply not asking for
enough money. This led to a pattern of large scale, inefficient
contractors, with little on-the-ground knowledge often beat out small
competitors for international funds, creating patterns of waste and
corruption. In addition, it considers the ways in coalition soldiers
attempted to reach out to local communities using development funds,
particularly as the counterinsurgency approach called on soldiers to 'win
hearts and minds.'
7Climbing over the Wall
chapter abstract
This chapter focuses on ways that the airbase at Bagram attempted to reach
out to local communities. It begins by looking at why development was slow
in the area and how high risk made Afghan businessmen unlikely to invest in
long-term projects. These led to a boom in cheap construction projects,
which were an easy way to make money rapidly. As the base increasingly
failed to provide either services or security to the communities around it,
officials turn to hiring local labor. This proved more difficult than
expected, however, due to the complex logistics of contact labor on the
base.
8The Merchant-Warlord Alternative
chapter abstract
While many in the communities around Bagram were gaining little from the
international presence, there was a small group of young merchants who were
able to monopolize much of the easy money coming off the base through
contracts. This led to a new form of leader: the merchant-warlord. These
figures often relied on bribing lower level coalitions soldiers to falsify
bills of sale, steal fuel and countless other schemes. US government
auditors worked relentlessly to track down these schemes, but rarely ended
up prosecuting anyone but those on the lowest rung of the organizational
ladder. This led to some embarrassing cases, including an Afghan driver who
was lured to the United States and detained at great cost, despite the fact
that it was clear that he had no real knowledge of his company's
organization.
9Warlord Density and its Discontents
chapter abstract
This chapter looks at local communities' growing resentment of Bagram
Airbase. As the intervention went on, rumors spread about what was
happening inside the base and stories circulated about the lack of cultural
sensitivity of troops. All of this climax in a series of riots outside of
the base following the burning of several Korans confiscated from the
prison inside Bagram. These protests spread quickly across the country,
creating a major rift between the Afghan government and international
diplomats. Tensions between these two groups centered in particular on
control over detainees who were held often outside the Afghan legal system.
10How to Host Your Own Shura
chapter abstract
In response to the sense that the international military was not doing
enough to engage local communities, the military increasingly attempt to
hold community consultations based upon the tradition of Afghan elders
meeting on shuras or councils. The chapter recounts how this led to a
series of training programs that actually taught soldiers how to host
meetings of elders. The chapter studies one specific case of
internationally-sponsored shuras that were used to release Afghan
detainees. Another aspect of these types of programs was the Human Terrain
program made up of social scientists embedded with the military. All of
these projects ultimately had limited impact since, in part, none of them
actually built relationships between Afghan leaders and those in the
international community.
11The Pieces Left Behind
chapter abstract
This chapter looks at the question of whether the intervention in
Afghanistan was "worth it." It asks how we measure such a thing and argues
that the cross-purposes and constantly changing agenda of the international
community was what ultimately doomed it to waste and inefficiency. The
intervention was simultaneously a counterinsurgency, a counterterrorist
operation, a development project, a state-building enterprise and a human
rights mission. And, as a result, was ultimately none of these. The chapter
reflects on how the international community might learn lessons more
effectively and what this means both for Afghanistan and future potential
interventions.