Something is subject to luck if it is beyond our control. In Luck's Mischief, Haji argues that owing frequently to precluding our being able to otherwise, luck limits both the range of what is morally obligatory for us and things for which we are morally responsible.
Something is subject to luck if it is beyond our control. In Luck's Mischief, Haji argues that owing frequently to precluding our being able to otherwise, luck limits both the range of what is morally obligatory for us and things for which we are morally responsible.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Ish Haji is professor of philosophy at the University of Calgary. He has research interests in action theory, ethical theory, metaphysics, and philosophical psychology. His publications include Moral Appraisability (1998), Deontic Morality and Control (2002), Moral Responsibility, Authenticity, and Education (2008, with S. Cuypers), Freedom and Value (2009), and Incompatibilism's Allure (2009), and Reason's Debt to Freedom (2012).
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgments 1. Luck's Hijacking of Obligation and Responsibility 1.1. Luck's Threat to Obligation and Responsibility 1.2. Synopsis 2. Obligation and Alternative Possibilities 2.1. Luck 2.2. Obligation and Alternatives 2.3. Stage-Setting for Objections: Frankfurt Examples 3. Obligation Presupposes Alternatives: A Defense 3.1. Nelkin on a Novel Interpretation of OIC 3.2. An Argument from Frankfurt Examples 3.2.1. Frankfurt Examples and Kant's Law 3.2.2. Frankfurt Examples and Action 3.2.3. Frankfurt Examples and Specific versus General Abilities 3.2.4. Does Blameworthiness Require Impermissibility? 3.3. Truth and the Function of "Ought " Judgments 3.4. Graham on Kant's Law 3.5. Pereboom's Objections 4. Obligation under Threat 4.1. Frankfurt Examples, Luck, and Obligation 4.2. Principle Motivation/Ability 4.3. Diminished Obligation 4.4. Objections and Replies 4.5. Another Frankfurt Example 4.6. Obligation and Self-Control 5. Blameworthiness under Threat 5.1. Blameworthiness and Impermissibility 5.1.1. The Objective View 5.1.2. The Simple Subjective View 5.1.3. The Complex Subjective View 5.2. Respecting Subjective Views 5.2.1. Subjective Views Defended 5.2.2. Subjective Views and the Principle of Alternative Expectations 5.3. Diminished Blameworthiness 5.4. Changing Obligations, Blameworthiness, and Impermissibility 5.5. A Costly Way Out: Obligation and Blameworthiness Rescued 5.6. Semi-Compatibilism and Non-Moral Varieties of Blameworthiness 5.6.1. Semicompatibilism 5.6.2. Semicompatibilism's Domain 5.6.3. The Scope of Non-Moral Varieties of Blameworthiness 5.7. Teleological Theories, Obligation, and Blameworthiness 6. Ramifications 6.1 Character, Obligation, and Blameworthiness 6.2. On the Moral Aims of Education 6.3. Imperiled Aims 7. Some Thoughts on the Metaphysics of Free Will 7.1. Constrained Skepticism 7.2. Frankfurt Examples and Guidance Control 7.3. From the Frying Pan into the Fire: Frankfurt Examples Yet Again 7.4. The Traditional Dilemma 7.4.1. Determinism, Obligation, and Blameworthiness 7.4.2. Indeterminism, Obligation, and Blameworthiness 7.4.3. A Slight Digression: Compatibilism and Luck 7.5. Our Morally Messy World Bibliography Index
Acknowledgments 1. Luck's Hijacking of Obligation and Responsibility 1.1. Luck's Threat to Obligation and Responsibility 1.2. Synopsis 2. Obligation and Alternative Possibilities 2.1. Luck 2.2. Obligation and Alternatives 2.3. Stage-Setting for Objections: Frankfurt Examples 3. Obligation Presupposes Alternatives: A Defense 3.1. Nelkin on a Novel Interpretation of OIC 3.2. An Argument from Frankfurt Examples 3.2.1. Frankfurt Examples and Kant's Law 3.2.2. Frankfurt Examples and Action 3.2.3. Frankfurt Examples and Specific versus General Abilities 3.2.4. Does Blameworthiness Require Impermissibility? 3.3. Truth and the Function of "Ought " Judgments 3.4. Graham on Kant's Law 3.5. Pereboom's Objections 4. Obligation under Threat 4.1. Frankfurt Examples, Luck, and Obligation 4.2. Principle Motivation/Ability 4.3. Diminished Obligation 4.4. Objections and Replies 4.5. Another Frankfurt Example 4.6. Obligation and Self-Control 5. Blameworthiness under Threat 5.1. Blameworthiness and Impermissibility 5.1.1. The Objective View 5.1.2. The Simple Subjective View 5.1.3. The Complex Subjective View 5.2. Respecting Subjective Views 5.2.1. Subjective Views Defended 5.2.2. Subjective Views and the Principle of Alternative Expectations 5.3. Diminished Blameworthiness 5.4. Changing Obligations, Blameworthiness, and Impermissibility 5.5. A Costly Way Out: Obligation and Blameworthiness Rescued 5.6. Semi-Compatibilism and Non-Moral Varieties of Blameworthiness 5.6.1. Semicompatibilism 5.6.2. Semicompatibilism's Domain 5.6.3. The Scope of Non-Moral Varieties of Blameworthiness 5.7. Teleological Theories, Obligation, and Blameworthiness 6. Ramifications 6.1 Character, Obligation, and Blameworthiness 6.2. On the Moral Aims of Education 6.3. Imperiled Aims 7. Some Thoughts on the Metaphysics of Free Will 7.1. Constrained Skepticism 7.2. Frankfurt Examples and Guidance Control 7.3. From the Frying Pan into the Fire: Frankfurt Examples Yet Again 7.4. The Traditional Dilemma 7.4.1. Determinism, Obligation, and Blameworthiness 7.4.2. Indeterminism, Obligation, and Blameworthiness 7.4.3. A Slight Digression: Compatibilism and Luck 7.5. Our Morally Messy World Bibliography Index
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826
