Michael Laver

Making and Breaking Governments

Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
Herausgeber: Calvert, Randall; Shepsle, Kenneth A.

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary democracy works. The heart of a parliamentary regime is the process by which the elected representatives choose a government, consisting of a cabinet and ministers, to serve as the executive arm of the regime. Strategic interaction among parliamentary parties creates new governments and either maintains them in office or, after a resignation or vote of no confidence, replaces them with some alternative government. The authors formulate a theoretical model of this strategic interaction, derive consequences, formulate empirical hypotheses on the basis of these, and test the hypotheses with data drawn from the postwar European experience with parliamentary democracy.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 316
• Erscheinungstermin: 5. Januar 2004
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 19mm
• Gewicht: 515g
• ISBN-13: 9780521438360
• ISBN-10: 0521438365
• Artikelnr.: 21248367

Inhaltsangabe

Series editors' preface
Acknowledgements
Part I. The Context: 1. Theory, institutions, and government formation
2. The social context of government formation
3. The government formation process
Part II. The Model: 4. Government equilibrium
5. Strong parties
Part III. Empirical Investigations: 6. Two cases: Germany, 1987
Ireland, 1992-3
7. Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization
8. Exploring the model: a comparative perspective
9. A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation
Part IV. Applications, Extensions, and Conclusions: 10. Party systems and cabinet stability
11. Making the model more realistic
12. Party politics and administrative reform
13. Governments and parliaments
Bibliography.