One of the most fundamental issues in health care delivery is who should decide which items of medical care are not worth their cost. This book is a fresh and comprehensive exploration of how health care rationing decisions are made. Unlike prior works, its focus is not on the specific criteria for rationing, like age or quality of life.
One of the most fundamental issues in health care delivery is who should decide which items of medical care are not worth their cost. This book is a fresh and comprehensive exploration of how health care rationing decisions are made. Unlike prior works, its focus is not on the specific criteria for rationing, like age or quality of life.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Mark A. Hall is Professor of Law and Public Health at the Bowman Gray School of Medicine at Wake Forest University.
Inhaltsangabe
I. Introduction: Who Decides? The Inevitability of Medical Spending Decisions Asking the Right Questions The Plan of this Book II. Patient Spending Decisions The Case in Favor of Market Reforms Increasing Patient Sensitivity to Medical Costs The Case Against Patient Cost Sharing Conclusion III. Third-Party Rules Bureaucratic and Legalistic Mechanisms Technocratic Resource Allocation and the Emerging Role of Science The Flaws of Rule-Based Rationing Ideal Democratic Processes Physician Overseers IV. Physician Bedside Discretion Opposition to Physician Bedside Rationing The Nature and Extent of Bedside Rationing The Moral and Political Status of Mainstream Medical Ethics Beneficence and Autonomy Conclusion and Further Inquiries Appendix V. Motivating Physicians With Financial Incentives Fiduciary Law Agency Cost Theory VI. Informed Consent to Rationing Disclosing Rationing Mechanisms During Insurance Enrollment Disclosure at the Time of Treatment A Theory of Economic Informed Consent Conclusion VII. Conclusion: Deciding Who Decides Comparing Decision Makers Choosing Decision Makers The Political Morality of Insurance Selection Bibliography Index
I. Introduction: Who Decides? The Inevitability of Medical Spending Decisions Asking the Right Questions The Plan of this Book II. Patient Spending Decisions The Case in Favor of Market Reforms Increasing Patient Sensitivity to Medical Costs The Case Against Patient Cost Sharing Conclusion III. Third-Party Rules Bureaucratic and Legalistic Mechanisms Technocratic Resource Allocation and the Emerging Role of Science The Flaws of Rule-Based Rationing Ideal Democratic Processes Physician Overseers IV. Physician Bedside Discretion Opposition to Physician Bedside Rationing The Nature and Extent of Bedside Rationing The Moral and Political Status of Mainstream Medical Ethics Beneficence and Autonomy Conclusion and Further Inquiries Appendix V. Motivating Physicians With Financial Incentives Fiduciary Law Agency Cost Theory VI. Informed Consent to Rationing Disclosing Rationing Mechanisms During Insurance Enrollment Disclosure at the Time of Treatment A Theory of Economic Informed Consent Conclusion VII. Conclusion: Deciding Who Decides Comparing Decision Makers Choosing Decision Makers The Political Morality of Insurance Selection Bibliography Index
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497