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Rosemary R. Corbett is Visiting Professor at the Bard Prison Initiative.
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Rosemary R. Corbett is Visiting Professor at the Bard Prison Initiative.
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Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 304
- Erscheinungstermin: 23. November 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 231mm x 157mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 544g
- ISBN-13: 9780804791281
- ISBN-10: 0804791287
- Artikelnr.: 45000667
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 304
- Erscheinungstermin: 23. November 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 231mm x 157mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 544g
- ISBN-13: 9780804791281
- ISBN-10: 0804791287
- Artikelnr.: 45000667
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
Rosemary R. Corbett is Visiting Professor at the Bard Prison Initiative.
Contents and Abstracts
Introduction: Debating Moderate Islam
chapter abstract
In December 2009, Feisal Abdul Rauf announced plans to open a
thirteen-story Islamic community center in Manhattan. A prominent imam,
Sufi shaykh, and the internationally recognized leader of the Cordoba
Initiative (founded in 2004 to "heal" the divide between "Islam and the
West"), Rauf designed Cordoba House to educate Americans about the truths
Islam shares with other faiths and to exemplify the "moderate Islam" he had
spent nearly a decade promoting-most notably in his 2004 book. This chapter
briefly introduces Rauf's organizations and his primary message of
moderation, outlining the political, economic, racial, and gendered
components of his philosophy that will be further explored in the rest of
the book. Additionally, it discusses how Rauf's narrative of immigrant
assimilation both replicates and obscures the racialized tactics previous
religious minorities and immigrants used to claim belonging in the U.S.
1Islamic Traditions and Conservative Liberalisms
chapter abstract
This chapter parses the central components of Rauf's narrative of moderate
Islam in order to reveal the political, economic, and philosophical
similarities between Rauf's thought and that of some of his detractors-in
particular, Newt Gingrich. These similarities, derived from Rauf's father's
work with Gingrich's mentor (American Enterprise Institute neoliberal
pundit, Michael Novak) during an era in which white ethnic religious
minorities tried to prove their commitments to capitalism, illuminate the
racialized tropes of assimilation and inevitable upward mobility many
marginalized religious groups have echoed and adapted while explaining
their own traditions in ways that demonstrate compatibility with American
free-market capitalism and Protestant-derived secularism.
2Service, Anti-socialism, and Contests to Represent American Muslims
chapter abstract
Chapter Two reveals how Feisal Abdul Rauf's father, a high-profile
immigrant imam from whom Rauf derived much of his material, worked with
Catholic and Jewish neoliberals in the 1970s while competing with other
Muslim leaders-particularly, black Americans-to serve as a spokesperson for
Muslims in the U.S. The chapter covers the political and economic
developments that have given rise to tensions between many black American
Muslims and American Muslims of Arab and South Asian ancestry. These
tensions, which involve contests since the 1960s over political
representation, religious authority, and economic resources, have inspired
both black American and immigrant Muslims to emphasize their embrace of
free-market capitalism and their participation in community service as they
jockey for influence with American elites.
3Sufism and the Moderate Islam of the New Millennium
chapter abstract
Locating Rauf's Sufi order within the history of Sufism in the U.S., this
chapter tracks Rauf's change from a real estate agent and part-time imam
into the leader of the ASMA Society, an organization devoted to promoting
Sufism in America. It examines the thinkers and leaders who most influenced
Rauf, charts Rauf's journey in co-founding the ASMA Society with Daisy Khan
(his wife) and Faiz Khan (no relation), then illuminates how and why Rauf
and Khan, like Rauf's Jerrahi shaykh decades earlier, shifted from
describing their organization as Sufi in orientation to one devoted to
cultural appreciation. This is a strategy (entirely sincere) that Rauf's
shaykh had followed when Sufi orders where banned in Turkey, and one Rauf
and Khan pursued after 9/11, once Americans began to broadly fear
"political Islam."
4From Sufism Without Politics to Politics without Sufism
chapter abstract
This chapter maps the creation and evolution of Rauf's and Khan's
organizations, the ASMA Society and Cordoba Initiative, discussing Rauf's
and Khan's shift from describing their work as Sufi, American, and cultural
in orientation to interreligious, international, and policy-oriented. In
the process, it shows how Rauf's and Khan's goals and self-presentations
changed as they attempted to accomplish their objectives while
simultaneously meeting different non-Muslim elites' shifting demands for
particular kinds of moderate spokespersons. Initially promoting cultural
programs and the aesthetic beauty of Islam as a means of building bridges
with other Americans, Rauf and Khan increasingly emphasized political goals
as they established relationships with national and international leaders
and government officials. In the meantime, they also de-emphasized Sufism,
which could pose problems for Rauf's status as a Muslim legal authority in
some of the countries where he spoke on behalf of the U.S. State
Department.
5The Micro-politics of Moderation
chapter abstract
Chapter Five describes some of the racial and ethnic assumptions underlying
Rauf's cultural, sociological, and historical writings and explores how
Muslims at Rauf's mosque responded to his teachings. It shows how Rauf
positioned Sufism as the bridge between a multitude of differences,
including those separating immigrant Muslims from black American Muslims,
rich Muslims from poor, Sunni from Shi'a, and (in his words) Islam from the
West. It focuses, though, on how Rauf's dervishes struggled with aspects of
his definition of moderation-particularly Rauf's insistence that Muslims
overcome their own limited cultural traditions so as to align their
practice of Islam with American democracy and capitalism. Examining some of
the issues New York Sufis faced in trying to live this moderate Islam after
2001, I focus on the ways they adopted and altered such arguments so as to
deal with the racial, economic, and political disparities they confronted.
6"The Prophet's Feminism": Women's Labor and Women's Leadership
chapter abstract
Chapter Six examines how Muslims dealt with the gaps between Rauf's and
Khan's idea of America and the gendered realities of their daily lives.
Promoting women's rights was a central component of Rauf's and Khan's work
during the decade after 9/11, and they made the same assertions about
women's equality as they did about religious and racial equality,
presenting it as a fait accompli. For many women who attended Masjid
al-Farah, though, gender equality was more elusive-not because they were
Muslim, but because social gains for women in the U.S. failed to meet the
hopes and promises of liberal feminists. Chapter Six also looks at how
attitudes at the mosque toward women's rights activists and toward female
religious leaders who were part of the community varied not just in
relation to religious doctrine, but in relation to how much these women
engaged in various kinds of community service.
7Islam in the Age of Obama: "What's More American than Service?"
chapter abstract
As Rauf and Khan spent increasing amounts of time away over the years in
order to pursue their ASMA and Cordoba projects, Rauf enjoined his
dervishes to take up greater responsibilities of service to their Sufi
order and community. As I discuss in this chapter-which includes a larger
examination of the politics, hopes, and fears animating the emphasis on
community service among American Muslims since the Islamic center
controversy-some of Rauf's dervishes interpreted his instructions to serve
and to model moderation in ways other than he intended, leading to
disagreements over the nature of the Islamic center project, a split within
Rauf's group, and to the ultimate demise of Cordoba House as Rauf
envisioned it. Charting the controversy over the "Ground Zero Mosque," this
chapter concludes with the state of Rauf's organizations five years later.
Conclusion: Community Service and the Limits of Inclusion
chapter abstract
Examining larger Muslim American efforts to prove their patriotism through
community service since 2009, the final segment of the book reminds readers
of the racism built into dominant U.S. understandings of Muslim moderation
and immigrant assimilation. Not only does this account reveal the painful
choices that many spokespersons for Muslim Americans face and the gaps
between high-minded ideals and the lived experiences of Muslims in the
U.S., it also reemphasizes that marginalized groups in America have often
gained provisional acceptance (though not always equality) at the expense
of others. In so doing, the conclusion to Making Moderate Islam both
exposes the power dynamics Muslim Americans are caught in at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, as well as calls into question the larger
limits of liberal inclusion for religious and racial minorities in the
United States and the longer histories of provisional tolerance that have
masqueraded as "acceptance."
Introduction: Debating Moderate Islam
chapter abstract
In December 2009, Feisal Abdul Rauf announced plans to open a
thirteen-story Islamic community center in Manhattan. A prominent imam,
Sufi shaykh, and the internationally recognized leader of the Cordoba
Initiative (founded in 2004 to "heal" the divide between "Islam and the
West"), Rauf designed Cordoba House to educate Americans about the truths
Islam shares with other faiths and to exemplify the "moderate Islam" he had
spent nearly a decade promoting-most notably in his 2004 book. This chapter
briefly introduces Rauf's organizations and his primary message of
moderation, outlining the political, economic, racial, and gendered
components of his philosophy that will be further explored in the rest of
the book. Additionally, it discusses how Rauf's narrative of immigrant
assimilation both replicates and obscures the racialized tactics previous
religious minorities and immigrants used to claim belonging in the U.S.
1Islamic Traditions and Conservative Liberalisms
chapter abstract
This chapter parses the central components of Rauf's narrative of moderate
Islam in order to reveal the political, economic, and philosophical
similarities between Rauf's thought and that of some of his detractors-in
particular, Newt Gingrich. These similarities, derived from Rauf's father's
work with Gingrich's mentor (American Enterprise Institute neoliberal
pundit, Michael Novak) during an era in which white ethnic religious
minorities tried to prove their commitments to capitalism, illuminate the
racialized tropes of assimilation and inevitable upward mobility many
marginalized religious groups have echoed and adapted while explaining
their own traditions in ways that demonstrate compatibility with American
free-market capitalism and Protestant-derived secularism.
2Service, Anti-socialism, and Contests to Represent American Muslims
chapter abstract
Chapter Two reveals how Feisal Abdul Rauf's father, a high-profile
immigrant imam from whom Rauf derived much of his material, worked with
Catholic and Jewish neoliberals in the 1970s while competing with other
Muslim leaders-particularly, black Americans-to serve as a spokesperson for
Muslims in the U.S. The chapter covers the political and economic
developments that have given rise to tensions between many black American
Muslims and American Muslims of Arab and South Asian ancestry. These
tensions, which involve contests since the 1960s over political
representation, religious authority, and economic resources, have inspired
both black American and immigrant Muslims to emphasize their embrace of
free-market capitalism and their participation in community service as they
jockey for influence with American elites.
3Sufism and the Moderate Islam of the New Millennium
chapter abstract
Locating Rauf's Sufi order within the history of Sufism in the U.S., this
chapter tracks Rauf's change from a real estate agent and part-time imam
into the leader of the ASMA Society, an organization devoted to promoting
Sufism in America. It examines the thinkers and leaders who most influenced
Rauf, charts Rauf's journey in co-founding the ASMA Society with Daisy Khan
(his wife) and Faiz Khan (no relation), then illuminates how and why Rauf
and Khan, like Rauf's Jerrahi shaykh decades earlier, shifted from
describing their organization as Sufi in orientation to one devoted to
cultural appreciation. This is a strategy (entirely sincere) that Rauf's
shaykh had followed when Sufi orders where banned in Turkey, and one Rauf
and Khan pursued after 9/11, once Americans began to broadly fear
"political Islam."
4From Sufism Without Politics to Politics without Sufism
chapter abstract
This chapter maps the creation and evolution of Rauf's and Khan's
organizations, the ASMA Society and Cordoba Initiative, discussing Rauf's
and Khan's shift from describing their work as Sufi, American, and cultural
in orientation to interreligious, international, and policy-oriented. In
the process, it shows how Rauf's and Khan's goals and self-presentations
changed as they attempted to accomplish their objectives while
simultaneously meeting different non-Muslim elites' shifting demands for
particular kinds of moderate spokespersons. Initially promoting cultural
programs and the aesthetic beauty of Islam as a means of building bridges
with other Americans, Rauf and Khan increasingly emphasized political goals
as they established relationships with national and international leaders
and government officials. In the meantime, they also de-emphasized Sufism,
which could pose problems for Rauf's status as a Muslim legal authority in
some of the countries where he spoke on behalf of the U.S. State
Department.
5The Micro-politics of Moderation
chapter abstract
Chapter Five describes some of the racial and ethnic assumptions underlying
Rauf's cultural, sociological, and historical writings and explores how
Muslims at Rauf's mosque responded to his teachings. It shows how Rauf
positioned Sufism as the bridge between a multitude of differences,
including those separating immigrant Muslims from black American Muslims,
rich Muslims from poor, Sunni from Shi'a, and (in his words) Islam from the
West. It focuses, though, on how Rauf's dervishes struggled with aspects of
his definition of moderation-particularly Rauf's insistence that Muslims
overcome their own limited cultural traditions so as to align their
practice of Islam with American democracy and capitalism. Examining some of
the issues New York Sufis faced in trying to live this moderate Islam after
2001, I focus on the ways they adopted and altered such arguments so as to
deal with the racial, economic, and political disparities they confronted.
6"The Prophet's Feminism": Women's Labor and Women's Leadership
chapter abstract
Chapter Six examines how Muslims dealt with the gaps between Rauf's and
Khan's idea of America and the gendered realities of their daily lives.
Promoting women's rights was a central component of Rauf's and Khan's work
during the decade after 9/11, and they made the same assertions about
women's equality as they did about religious and racial equality,
presenting it as a fait accompli. For many women who attended Masjid
al-Farah, though, gender equality was more elusive-not because they were
Muslim, but because social gains for women in the U.S. failed to meet the
hopes and promises of liberal feminists. Chapter Six also looks at how
attitudes at the mosque toward women's rights activists and toward female
religious leaders who were part of the community varied not just in
relation to religious doctrine, but in relation to how much these women
engaged in various kinds of community service.
7Islam in the Age of Obama: "What's More American than Service?"
chapter abstract
As Rauf and Khan spent increasing amounts of time away over the years in
order to pursue their ASMA and Cordoba projects, Rauf enjoined his
dervishes to take up greater responsibilities of service to their Sufi
order and community. As I discuss in this chapter-which includes a larger
examination of the politics, hopes, and fears animating the emphasis on
community service among American Muslims since the Islamic center
controversy-some of Rauf's dervishes interpreted his instructions to serve
and to model moderation in ways other than he intended, leading to
disagreements over the nature of the Islamic center project, a split within
Rauf's group, and to the ultimate demise of Cordoba House as Rauf
envisioned it. Charting the controversy over the "Ground Zero Mosque," this
chapter concludes with the state of Rauf's organizations five years later.
Conclusion: Community Service and the Limits of Inclusion
chapter abstract
Examining larger Muslim American efforts to prove their patriotism through
community service since 2009, the final segment of the book reminds readers
of the racism built into dominant U.S. understandings of Muslim moderation
and immigrant assimilation. Not only does this account reveal the painful
choices that many spokespersons for Muslim Americans face and the gaps
between high-minded ideals and the lived experiences of Muslims in the
U.S., it also reemphasizes that marginalized groups in America have often
gained provisional acceptance (though not always equality) at the expense
of others. In so doing, the conclusion to Making Moderate Islam both
exposes the power dynamics Muslim Americans are caught in at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, as well as calls into question the larger
limits of liberal inclusion for religious and racial minorities in the
United States and the longer histories of provisional tolerance that have
masqueraded as "acceptance."
Contents and Abstracts
Introduction: Debating Moderate Islam
chapter abstract
In December 2009, Feisal Abdul Rauf announced plans to open a
thirteen-story Islamic community center in Manhattan. A prominent imam,
Sufi shaykh, and the internationally recognized leader of the Cordoba
Initiative (founded in 2004 to "heal" the divide between "Islam and the
West"), Rauf designed Cordoba House to educate Americans about the truths
Islam shares with other faiths and to exemplify the "moderate Islam" he had
spent nearly a decade promoting-most notably in his 2004 book. This chapter
briefly introduces Rauf's organizations and his primary message of
moderation, outlining the political, economic, racial, and gendered
components of his philosophy that will be further explored in the rest of
the book. Additionally, it discusses how Rauf's narrative of immigrant
assimilation both replicates and obscures the racialized tactics previous
religious minorities and immigrants used to claim belonging in the U.S.
1Islamic Traditions and Conservative Liberalisms
chapter abstract
This chapter parses the central components of Rauf's narrative of moderate
Islam in order to reveal the political, economic, and philosophical
similarities between Rauf's thought and that of some of his detractors-in
particular, Newt Gingrich. These similarities, derived from Rauf's father's
work with Gingrich's mentor (American Enterprise Institute neoliberal
pundit, Michael Novak) during an era in which white ethnic religious
minorities tried to prove their commitments to capitalism, illuminate the
racialized tropes of assimilation and inevitable upward mobility many
marginalized religious groups have echoed and adapted while explaining
their own traditions in ways that demonstrate compatibility with American
free-market capitalism and Protestant-derived secularism.
2Service, Anti-socialism, and Contests to Represent American Muslims
chapter abstract
Chapter Two reveals how Feisal Abdul Rauf's father, a high-profile
immigrant imam from whom Rauf derived much of his material, worked with
Catholic and Jewish neoliberals in the 1970s while competing with other
Muslim leaders-particularly, black Americans-to serve as a spokesperson for
Muslims in the U.S. The chapter covers the political and economic
developments that have given rise to tensions between many black American
Muslims and American Muslims of Arab and South Asian ancestry. These
tensions, which involve contests since the 1960s over political
representation, religious authority, and economic resources, have inspired
both black American and immigrant Muslims to emphasize their embrace of
free-market capitalism and their participation in community service as they
jockey for influence with American elites.
3Sufism and the Moderate Islam of the New Millennium
chapter abstract
Locating Rauf's Sufi order within the history of Sufism in the U.S., this
chapter tracks Rauf's change from a real estate agent and part-time imam
into the leader of the ASMA Society, an organization devoted to promoting
Sufism in America. It examines the thinkers and leaders who most influenced
Rauf, charts Rauf's journey in co-founding the ASMA Society with Daisy Khan
(his wife) and Faiz Khan (no relation), then illuminates how and why Rauf
and Khan, like Rauf's Jerrahi shaykh decades earlier, shifted from
describing their organization as Sufi in orientation to one devoted to
cultural appreciation. This is a strategy (entirely sincere) that Rauf's
shaykh had followed when Sufi orders where banned in Turkey, and one Rauf
and Khan pursued after 9/11, once Americans began to broadly fear
"political Islam."
4From Sufism Without Politics to Politics without Sufism
chapter abstract
This chapter maps the creation and evolution of Rauf's and Khan's
organizations, the ASMA Society and Cordoba Initiative, discussing Rauf's
and Khan's shift from describing their work as Sufi, American, and cultural
in orientation to interreligious, international, and policy-oriented. In
the process, it shows how Rauf's and Khan's goals and self-presentations
changed as they attempted to accomplish their objectives while
simultaneously meeting different non-Muslim elites' shifting demands for
particular kinds of moderate spokespersons. Initially promoting cultural
programs and the aesthetic beauty of Islam as a means of building bridges
with other Americans, Rauf and Khan increasingly emphasized political goals
as they established relationships with national and international leaders
and government officials. In the meantime, they also de-emphasized Sufism,
which could pose problems for Rauf's status as a Muslim legal authority in
some of the countries where he spoke on behalf of the U.S. State
Department.
5The Micro-politics of Moderation
chapter abstract
Chapter Five describes some of the racial and ethnic assumptions underlying
Rauf's cultural, sociological, and historical writings and explores how
Muslims at Rauf's mosque responded to his teachings. It shows how Rauf
positioned Sufism as the bridge between a multitude of differences,
including those separating immigrant Muslims from black American Muslims,
rich Muslims from poor, Sunni from Shi'a, and (in his words) Islam from the
West. It focuses, though, on how Rauf's dervishes struggled with aspects of
his definition of moderation-particularly Rauf's insistence that Muslims
overcome their own limited cultural traditions so as to align their
practice of Islam with American democracy and capitalism. Examining some of
the issues New York Sufis faced in trying to live this moderate Islam after
2001, I focus on the ways they adopted and altered such arguments so as to
deal with the racial, economic, and political disparities they confronted.
6"The Prophet's Feminism": Women's Labor and Women's Leadership
chapter abstract
Chapter Six examines how Muslims dealt with the gaps between Rauf's and
Khan's idea of America and the gendered realities of their daily lives.
Promoting women's rights was a central component of Rauf's and Khan's work
during the decade after 9/11, and they made the same assertions about
women's equality as they did about religious and racial equality,
presenting it as a fait accompli. For many women who attended Masjid
al-Farah, though, gender equality was more elusive-not because they were
Muslim, but because social gains for women in the U.S. failed to meet the
hopes and promises of liberal feminists. Chapter Six also looks at how
attitudes at the mosque toward women's rights activists and toward female
religious leaders who were part of the community varied not just in
relation to religious doctrine, but in relation to how much these women
engaged in various kinds of community service.
7Islam in the Age of Obama: "What's More American than Service?"
chapter abstract
As Rauf and Khan spent increasing amounts of time away over the years in
order to pursue their ASMA and Cordoba projects, Rauf enjoined his
dervishes to take up greater responsibilities of service to their Sufi
order and community. As I discuss in this chapter-which includes a larger
examination of the politics, hopes, and fears animating the emphasis on
community service among American Muslims since the Islamic center
controversy-some of Rauf's dervishes interpreted his instructions to serve
and to model moderation in ways other than he intended, leading to
disagreements over the nature of the Islamic center project, a split within
Rauf's group, and to the ultimate demise of Cordoba House as Rauf
envisioned it. Charting the controversy over the "Ground Zero Mosque," this
chapter concludes with the state of Rauf's organizations five years later.
Conclusion: Community Service and the Limits of Inclusion
chapter abstract
Examining larger Muslim American efforts to prove their patriotism through
community service since 2009, the final segment of the book reminds readers
of the racism built into dominant U.S. understandings of Muslim moderation
and immigrant assimilation. Not only does this account reveal the painful
choices that many spokespersons for Muslim Americans face and the gaps
between high-minded ideals and the lived experiences of Muslims in the
U.S., it also reemphasizes that marginalized groups in America have often
gained provisional acceptance (though not always equality) at the expense
of others. In so doing, the conclusion to Making Moderate Islam both
exposes the power dynamics Muslim Americans are caught in at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, as well as calls into question the larger
limits of liberal inclusion for religious and racial minorities in the
United States and the longer histories of provisional tolerance that have
masqueraded as "acceptance."
Introduction: Debating Moderate Islam
chapter abstract
In December 2009, Feisal Abdul Rauf announced plans to open a
thirteen-story Islamic community center in Manhattan. A prominent imam,
Sufi shaykh, and the internationally recognized leader of the Cordoba
Initiative (founded in 2004 to "heal" the divide between "Islam and the
West"), Rauf designed Cordoba House to educate Americans about the truths
Islam shares with other faiths and to exemplify the "moderate Islam" he had
spent nearly a decade promoting-most notably in his 2004 book. This chapter
briefly introduces Rauf's organizations and his primary message of
moderation, outlining the political, economic, racial, and gendered
components of his philosophy that will be further explored in the rest of
the book. Additionally, it discusses how Rauf's narrative of immigrant
assimilation both replicates and obscures the racialized tactics previous
religious minorities and immigrants used to claim belonging in the U.S.
1Islamic Traditions and Conservative Liberalisms
chapter abstract
This chapter parses the central components of Rauf's narrative of moderate
Islam in order to reveal the political, economic, and philosophical
similarities between Rauf's thought and that of some of his detractors-in
particular, Newt Gingrich. These similarities, derived from Rauf's father's
work with Gingrich's mentor (American Enterprise Institute neoliberal
pundit, Michael Novak) during an era in which white ethnic religious
minorities tried to prove their commitments to capitalism, illuminate the
racialized tropes of assimilation and inevitable upward mobility many
marginalized religious groups have echoed and adapted while explaining
their own traditions in ways that demonstrate compatibility with American
free-market capitalism and Protestant-derived secularism.
2Service, Anti-socialism, and Contests to Represent American Muslims
chapter abstract
Chapter Two reveals how Feisal Abdul Rauf's father, a high-profile
immigrant imam from whom Rauf derived much of his material, worked with
Catholic and Jewish neoliberals in the 1970s while competing with other
Muslim leaders-particularly, black Americans-to serve as a spokesperson for
Muslims in the U.S. The chapter covers the political and economic
developments that have given rise to tensions between many black American
Muslims and American Muslims of Arab and South Asian ancestry. These
tensions, which involve contests since the 1960s over political
representation, religious authority, and economic resources, have inspired
both black American and immigrant Muslims to emphasize their embrace of
free-market capitalism and their participation in community service as they
jockey for influence with American elites.
3Sufism and the Moderate Islam of the New Millennium
chapter abstract
Locating Rauf's Sufi order within the history of Sufism in the U.S., this
chapter tracks Rauf's change from a real estate agent and part-time imam
into the leader of the ASMA Society, an organization devoted to promoting
Sufism in America. It examines the thinkers and leaders who most influenced
Rauf, charts Rauf's journey in co-founding the ASMA Society with Daisy Khan
(his wife) and Faiz Khan (no relation), then illuminates how and why Rauf
and Khan, like Rauf's Jerrahi shaykh decades earlier, shifted from
describing their organization as Sufi in orientation to one devoted to
cultural appreciation. This is a strategy (entirely sincere) that Rauf's
shaykh had followed when Sufi orders where banned in Turkey, and one Rauf
and Khan pursued after 9/11, once Americans began to broadly fear
"political Islam."
4From Sufism Without Politics to Politics without Sufism
chapter abstract
This chapter maps the creation and evolution of Rauf's and Khan's
organizations, the ASMA Society and Cordoba Initiative, discussing Rauf's
and Khan's shift from describing their work as Sufi, American, and cultural
in orientation to interreligious, international, and policy-oriented. In
the process, it shows how Rauf's and Khan's goals and self-presentations
changed as they attempted to accomplish their objectives while
simultaneously meeting different non-Muslim elites' shifting demands for
particular kinds of moderate spokespersons. Initially promoting cultural
programs and the aesthetic beauty of Islam as a means of building bridges
with other Americans, Rauf and Khan increasingly emphasized political goals
as they established relationships with national and international leaders
and government officials. In the meantime, they also de-emphasized Sufism,
which could pose problems for Rauf's status as a Muslim legal authority in
some of the countries where he spoke on behalf of the U.S. State
Department.
5The Micro-politics of Moderation
chapter abstract
Chapter Five describes some of the racial and ethnic assumptions underlying
Rauf's cultural, sociological, and historical writings and explores how
Muslims at Rauf's mosque responded to his teachings. It shows how Rauf
positioned Sufism as the bridge between a multitude of differences,
including those separating immigrant Muslims from black American Muslims,
rich Muslims from poor, Sunni from Shi'a, and (in his words) Islam from the
West. It focuses, though, on how Rauf's dervishes struggled with aspects of
his definition of moderation-particularly Rauf's insistence that Muslims
overcome their own limited cultural traditions so as to align their
practice of Islam with American democracy and capitalism. Examining some of
the issues New York Sufis faced in trying to live this moderate Islam after
2001, I focus on the ways they adopted and altered such arguments so as to
deal with the racial, economic, and political disparities they confronted.
6"The Prophet's Feminism": Women's Labor and Women's Leadership
chapter abstract
Chapter Six examines how Muslims dealt with the gaps between Rauf's and
Khan's idea of America and the gendered realities of their daily lives.
Promoting women's rights was a central component of Rauf's and Khan's work
during the decade after 9/11, and they made the same assertions about
women's equality as they did about religious and racial equality,
presenting it as a fait accompli. For many women who attended Masjid
al-Farah, though, gender equality was more elusive-not because they were
Muslim, but because social gains for women in the U.S. failed to meet the
hopes and promises of liberal feminists. Chapter Six also looks at how
attitudes at the mosque toward women's rights activists and toward female
religious leaders who were part of the community varied not just in
relation to religious doctrine, but in relation to how much these women
engaged in various kinds of community service.
7Islam in the Age of Obama: "What's More American than Service?"
chapter abstract
As Rauf and Khan spent increasing amounts of time away over the years in
order to pursue their ASMA and Cordoba projects, Rauf enjoined his
dervishes to take up greater responsibilities of service to their Sufi
order and community. As I discuss in this chapter-which includes a larger
examination of the politics, hopes, and fears animating the emphasis on
community service among American Muslims since the Islamic center
controversy-some of Rauf's dervishes interpreted his instructions to serve
and to model moderation in ways other than he intended, leading to
disagreements over the nature of the Islamic center project, a split within
Rauf's group, and to the ultimate demise of Cordoba House as Rauf
envisioned it. Charting the controversy over the "Ground Zero Mosque," this
chapter concludes with the state of Rauf's organizations five years later.
Conclusion: Community Service and the Limits of Inclusion
chapter abstract
Examining larger Muslim American efforts to prove their patriotism through
community service since 2009, the final segment of the book reminds readers
of the racism built into dominant U.S. understandings of Muslim moderation
and immigrant assimilation. Not only does this account reveal the painful
choices that many spokespersons for Muslim Americans face and the gaps
between high-minded ideals and the lived experiences of Muslims in the
U.S., it also reemphasizes that marginalized groups in America have often
gained provisional acceptance (though not always equality) at the expense
of others. In so doing, the conclusion to Making Moderate Islam both
exposes the power dynamics Muslim Americans are caught in at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, as well as calls into question the larger
limits of liberal inclusion for religious and racial minorities in the
United States and the longer histories of provisional tolerance that have
masqueraded as "acceptance."