State crackdowns on drug cartels often backfire, producing entrenched 'cartel-state conflict'; deterrence approaches have curbed violence but proven fragile. This book explains why.
State crackdowns on drug cartels often backfire, producing entrenched 'cartel-state conflict'; deterrence approaches have curbed violence but proven fragile. This book explains why.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Benjamin Lessing studies criminal conflict - organized armed violence involving non-state actors who do not seek formal state power. Prior to beginning graduate work at University of California, Berkeley in 2005, Lessing lived in Rio de Janeiro for five years, conducting field research on arms trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean for international organizations including Amnesty International, Oxfam, and Viva Rio, Brazil's largest NGO. He was a Fulbright Grantee in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. His Ph.D. dissertation, the basis of Making Peace in Drug Wars, was awarded the 2012 UNODC/INEGI Best Dissertation Prize. He has received awards from the National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation. He is a contributor at The Monkey Cage, the Brookings Institution, the Inter-American Dialogue, among others.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction Part I. A Theory of Cartel-State Conflict: 2. What is cartel-state conflict? 3. Logics of violence in cartel-state conflict 4. Modeling violent corruption and lobbying Part II. Case Studies: 5. Colombia: conditionality to contain a killer 6. Rio de Janeiro: conditionality, one favela at a time 7. Mexico: conditionality abandoned Part III. Conditional Repression as Outcome: 8. The challenge of implementing conditionality 9. Explaining reform efforts' success: key factors and alternative hypotheses 10. The challenge of sustaining conditionality 11. Conclusion.
1. Introduction Part I. A Theory of Cartel-State Conflict: 2. What is cartel-state conflict? 3. Logics of violence in cartel-state conflict 4. Modeling violent corruption and lobbying Part II. Case Studies: 5. Colombia: conditionality to contain a killer 6. Rio de Janeiro: conditionality, one favela at a time 7. Mexico: conditionality abandoned Part III. Conditional Repression as Outcome: 8. The challenge of implementing conditionality 9. Explaining reform efforts' success: key factors and alternative hypotheses 10. The challenge of sustaining conditionality 11. Conclusion.
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