Markets and Democracy
Herausgeber: Bowles, Samuel; Gustafsson, Bo; Gintis, Herbert
Markets and Democracy
Herausgeber: Bowles, Samuel; Gustafsson, Bo; Gintis, Herbert
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This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable.
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This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 360
- Erscheinungstermin: 23. Februar 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 22mm
- Gewicht: 584g
- ISBN-13: 9780521064118
- ISBN-10: 0521064112
- Artikelnr.: 23554880
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Books on Demand GmbH
- In de Tarpen 42
- 22848 Norderstedt
- info@bod.de
- 040 53433511
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 360
- Erscheinungstermin: 23. Februar 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 22mm
- Gewicht: 584g
- ISBN-13: 9780521064118
- ISBN-10: 0521064112
- Artikelnr.: 23554880
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Books on Demand GmbH
- In de Tarpen 42
- 22848 Norderstedt
- info@bod.de
- 040 53433511
List of figures; List of tables; Preface Bo Gustafsson; 1. Post-Walrasian
political economy Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; Part I. Agency,
Incentives, and Democratic Accountability: 2. The democratic firm: an
agency-theoretic evaluation Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; 3.
Alternative employment and payment systems D. M. Nuti; Part II.
Institutions and Institutional Change: 4. Toward a framework for analyzing
institutions and institutional change Leonid Hurwicz; 5. Imperfect choice
and rule-governed behaviour Ronald A. Heiner; 6. Organizational equilibria
and institutional stability Ugo Pagano; 7. Agency problems and the future
of comparative systems' theory Mieke Meurs; Part III. Conditions For the
Success of the Democratic Firm: 8. After the employment relation: problems
on the road to enterprise democracy Louis Putterman; 9. Unions versus
cooperatives Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein; 10. Demand variability
and work organization David I. Levine; 11. Democracy versus
appropriability: can labor-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world?
Gregory K. Dow; Part IV. Productivity, Distribution, and Power: 12.
Cooperation, conflict, and control in organizations Avner Ben-Ner; 13. Wage
bargaining and the choice of production technique in capitalist firms
Gilbert L. Skillmand and Harl E. Ryder; Part V. Ownership, Participation,
and Capital Markets: 14. The motivational role of an external agent in the
informationally-participatory firm Masahiko Aoki; 15. Unstable ownership
Tone Ogedal; 16. The simple analytics of a membership market in a
labor-managed economy Ernst Fehr; Part VI. Political Democracy and Economic
Democracy: 17. Investment planning in market socialism Ignacio
Ortuno-Ortin, John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre; 18. Capitalism and
Democracy: a summing up of the arguments Martin L. Weitzman; Bibliography;
Author Index; Subject index.
political economy Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; Part I. Agency,
Incentives, and Democratic Accountability: 2. The democratic firm: an
agency-theoretic evaluation Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; 3.
Alternative employment and payment systems D. M. Nuti; Part II.
Institutions and Institutional Change: 4. Toward a framework for analyzing
institutions and institutional change Leonid Hurwicz; 5. Imperfect choice
and rule-governed behaviour Ronald A. Heiner; 6. Organizational equilibria
and institutional stability Ugo Pagano; 7. Agency problems and the future
of comparative systems' theory Mieke Meurs; Part III. Conditions For the
Success of the Democratic Firm: 8. After the employment relation: problems
on the road to enterprise democracy Louis Putterman; 9. Unions versus
cooperatives Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein; 10. Demand variability
and work organization David I. Levine; 11. Democracy versus
appropriability: can labor-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world?
Gregory K. Dow; Part IV. Productivity, Distribution, and Power: 12.
Cooperation, conflict, and control in organizations Avner Ben-Ner; 13. Wage
bargaining and the choice of production technique in capitalist firms
Gilbert L. Skillmand and Harl E. Ryder; Part V. Ownership, Participation,
and Capital Markets: 14. The motivational role of an external agent in the
informationally-participatory firm Masahiko Aoki; 15. Unstable ownership
Tone Ogedal; 16. The simple analytics of a membership market in a
labor-managed economy Ernst Fehr; Part VI. Political Democracy and Economic
Democracy: 17. Investment planning in market socialism Ignacio
Ortuno-Ortin, John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre; 18. Capitalism and
Democracy: a summing up of the arguments Martin L. Weitzman; Bibliography;
Author Index; Subject index.
List of figures; List of tables; Preface Bo Gustafsson; 1. Post-Walrasian
political economy Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; Part I. Agency,
Incentives, and Democratic Accountability: 2. The democratic firm: an
agency-theoretic evaluation Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; 3.
Alternative employment and payment systems D. M. Nuti; Part II.
Institutions and Institutional Change: 4. Toward a framework for analyzing
institutions and institutional change Leonid Hurwicz; 5. Imperfect choice
and rule-governed behaviour Ronald A. Heiner; 6. Organizational equilibria
and institutional stability Ugo Pagano; 7. Agency problems and the future
of comparative systems' theory Mieke Meurs; Part III. Conditions For the
Success of the Democratic Firm: 8. After the employment relation: problems
on the road to enterprise democracy Louis Putterman; 9. Unions versus
cooperatives Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein; 10. Demand variability
and work organization David I. Levine; 11. Democracy versus
appropriability: can labor-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world?
Gregory K. Dow; Part IV. Productivity, Distribution, and Power: 12.
Cooperation, conflict, and control in organizations Avner Ben-Ner; 13. Wage
bargaining and the choice of production technique in capitalist firms
Gilbert L. Skillmand and Harl E. Ryder; Part V. Ownership, Participation,
and Capital Markets: 14. The motivational role of an external agent in the
informationally-participatory firm Masahiko Aoki; 15. Unstable ownership
Tone Ogedal; 16. The simple analytics of a membership market in a
labor-managed economy Ernst Fehr; Part VI. Political Democracy and Economic
Democracy: 17. Investment planning in market socialism Ignacio
Ortuno-Ortin, John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre; 18. Capitalism and
Democracy: a summing up of the arguments Martin L. Weitzman; Bibliography;
Author Index; Subject index.
political economy Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; Part I. Agency,
Incentives, and Democratic Accountability: 2. The democratic firm: an
agency-theoretic evaluation Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; 3.
Alternative employment and payment systems D. M. Nuti; Part II.
Institutions and Institutional Change: 4. Toward a framework for analyzing
institutions and institutional change Leonid Hurwicz; 5. Imperfect choice
and rule-governed behaviour Ronald A. Heiner; 6. Organizational equilibria
and institutional stability Ugo Pagano; 7. Agency problems and the future
of comparative systems' theory Mieke Meurs; Part III. Conditions For the
Success of the Democratic Firm: 8. After the employment relation: problems
on the road to enterprise democracy Louis Putterman; 9. Unions versus
cooperatives Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein; 10. Demand variability
and work organization David I. Levine; 11. Democracy versus
appropriability: can labor-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world?
Gregory K. Dow; Part IV. Productivity, Distribution, and Power: 12.
Cooperation, conflict, and control in organizations Avner Ben-Ner; 13. Wage
bargaining and the choice of production technique in capitalist firms
Gilbert L. Skillmand and Harl E. Ryder; Part V. Ownership, Participation,
and Capital Markets: 14. The motivational role of an external agent in the
informationally-participatory firm Masahiko Aoki; 15. Unstable ownership
Tone Ogedal; 16. The simple analytics of a membership market in a
labor-managed economy Ernst Fehr; Part VI. Political Democracy and Economic
Democracy: 17. Investment planning in market socialism Ignacio
Ortuno-Ortin, John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre; 18. Capitalism and
Democracy: a summing up of the arguments Martin L. Weitzman; Bibliography;
Author Index; Subject index.