Robert Buzzanco

Masters of War

Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Throughout the Vietnam War, military officials such as Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin, Maxwell Taylor, Harold K. Johnson, Wallace Greene, Victor Krulak, and John Paul Vann consistently warned against the peril of waging conventional war in Vietnam, while even advocates of U.S. involvement like William Westmoreland and Earle Wheeler recognized the political and military obstacles to American success. Within the armed forces, there was further division over the Army-devised strategy of attrition, as well as constant feuding with the White House to avoid blame for the likely failure in Indochina. Masters of War convincingly disproves the claim that America's defeat was the result of a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to "fight with one hand tied behind their backs". Robert Buzzanco demonstrates that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policy makers always understood the problems of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped draw the United States into the conflict. For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the U.S. role in Vietnam: Buzzanco proves that the war was lost on the ground in Vietnam, not because of politicians or antiwar movements at home.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 404
• Erscheinungstermin: 28. April 2005
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 28mm
• Gewicht: 804g
• ISBN-13: 9780521480468
• ISBN-10: 0521480469
• Artikelnr.: 22263526

Inhaltsangabe

1. Introduction; 2. Prologue to tragedy: US military opposition to
intervention in Vietnam, 1950-1954; 3. Preparing for and avoiding war:
military affairs and politics in Vietnam and the United States, 1955-1960;
4. Pinning down the president: JFK, the military, and political
manoeuvering over Vietnam, January-October 1961; 5. The best and worst of
times: the US war against Vietnam, October 1961-November 1963; 6. 'Seeing
things through Vietnam': LBJ, the military, and the growing U.S. commitment
to Vietnam, November 1963-December 1964; 7. Hope for the best, expect the
worst: US ground troops enter the war in Vietnam, January-July 1965; 8. War
on three fronts: US forces vs. the VC, Westmoreland vs. the marine, and the
military leaders vs. the White House, July 1965-December 1966; 9. 'The
platform of false prophets is crowded': public hope and private despair in
Vietnam, 1967; 10. The myth of the Tet: military failure and the politics
of war; 11. Conclusion: bringing it all back home; Epilogue; Notes;
Bibliography.