Ernie Lepore and Barry Loewer present a series of papers in which they come to terms with three views that have loomed large in philosophy for several decades: that a theory of meaning for a language is best understood as a theory of truth for that language; that thought and language are best understood together via a theory of interpretation; and that the mental is irreducible to the physical. They aim both to offer critical assessment of the views and to develop them. They show that each of these views remains of great significance for current work in philosophy of language and mind.
Ernie Lepore and Barry Loewer present a series of papers in which they come to terms with three views that have loomed large in philosophy for several decades: that a theory of meaning for a language is best understood as a theory of truth for that language; that thought and language are best understood together via a theory of interpretation; and that the mental is irreducible to the physical. They aim both to offer critical assessment of the views and to develop them. They show that each of these views remains of great significance for current work in philosophy of language and mind.
Ernie Lepore is a Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and the Acting Director of the Rutgers Centre of Cognitive Science. He has authored numerous books and articles mostly in the philosophy of language and mind. Barry Loewer is a Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers. He has published many articles in philosophy of language, mind, philosophy of science, and philosophical logic.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1: Translational Semantics 2: Three Trivial Truth Theories 3: What Model Theoretic Semantics Cannot Do 4: The Role of 'Conceptual Role Semantics' 5: Dual Aspect Semantics 6: What Davidson Should Have Said 7: You Can Say That Again 8: Conditions on Understanding Language 9: Solipsistic Semantics 10: Putnam's Progress 11: Mind Matters 12: Making Mind Matter More 13: From Physics to Physicalism 14: Mental Causation or Something Close Enough
Introduction 1: Translational Semantics 2: Three Trivial Truth Theories 3: What Model Theoretic Semantics Cannot Do 4: The Role of 'Conceptual Role Semantics' 5: Dual Aspect Semantics 6: What Davidson Should Have Said 7: You Can Say That Again 8: Conditions on Understanding Language 9: Solipsistic Semantics 10: Putnam's Progress 11: Mind Matters 12: Making Mind Matter More 13: From Physics to Physicalism 14: Mental Causation or Something Close Enough
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