Meta-Theory of Law

Herausgegeben:Carpentier, Mathieu

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book is devoted to the theory of legal theory, also referred to as the "meta-theory of law".

The aim of this emerging discipline is to determine the objectives, aims and methods of legal theory, and to establish the conditions of possibility as well as the validity criteria for theoretical discourse on law. The contributions in this book provide an overview of these aspects through different perspectives and approaches.

The very purpose of legal theory has been disputed and the subject area is currently subject to increasing cross-fertilization between different, and sometimes diverging, traditions. Meta-theory of Law assesses these emerging trends by questioning two basic objects of legal theory, the "nature" and the "science" of law.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Wiley & Sons / Wiley-ISTE
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 1W789450740
• 1. Auflage
• Seitenzahl: 384
• Erscheinungstermin: 4. Oktober 2022
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 25mm
• Gewicht: 453g
• ISBN-13: 9781789450743
• ISBN-10: 1789450748
• Artikelnr.: 64539953

Autorenporträt

Mathieu Carpentier is Professor of Public Law at the University of Toulouse and the Director of the Institut Maurice Hauriou in France. His research focuses mainly on legal philosophy and constitutional law.

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction xiii
Mathieu CARPENTIER

Part 1 Legal Theory Methods 1

Chapter 1 Methodology in Legal Philosophy 3
Julie DICKSON

1.1 Introduction: methodology in legal philosophy 3

1.2 The nature of law? 5

1.3 Changing questions: diversity and development 13

1.4 Directly evaluative legal philosophy versus indirectly evaluative legal philosophy 19

1.5 Conclusion 28

Chapter 2 The Methodology of Analytic Jurisprudence 31
Pierluigi CHIASSONI

2.1 Foreword 31

2.2 The principles of an analytic approach to jurisprudence 32

2.3 The statute of analytic jurisprudence 38

2.4 Two sets of analytic tools 41

2.4.1 Tools for the analysis of legal discourses 42

2.4.2 Tools for the refinement of extant juridical terminological and conceptual apparatuses 48

2.4.3 The tools of analytic jurisprudence and conceptual analysis 52

2.5 Vindicating a modest and reconstructive variety of conceptual analysis 53

2.6 Vindicating the analytic approach (and the principle of simplicity) against "essentialist" jurisprudence 58

2.7 References 68

Chapter 3 Methodology for Theorizing About the Nature of Law and About Doctrinal Areas of Law 75
Brian H BIX

3.1 Introduction 75

3.2 Theories of the nature of law 75

3.2.1 Increasing philosophical sophistication 76

3.2.2 Hans Kelsen 77

3.2.3 H.L.A Hart 78

3.2.4 Ronald Dworkin 79

3.2.5 Joseph Raz 80

3.2.6 John Finnis 81

3.2.7 Frederick Schauer 81

3.2.8 Brian Leiter 82

3.2.9 Mark Greenberg 83

3.3 Theories of doctrinal areas 83

3.3.1 Descriptive, prescriptive and neutral 84

3.3.2 Purposes 85

3.3.3 Universal versus parochial 85

3.3.4 The subject of explanation (the data) 86

3.3.5 Justice and autonomy or efficiency 86

3.4 Conclusion 87

3.5 References 87

Chapter 4 Empirical Complexity as a Conceptual Claim: Reappraising Hart's Account of Law as a Complex Social Practice 93
Gregory BLIGH

4.1 Introduction 93

4.1.1 No place for empirical science in Hartian jurisprudence 94

4.1.2 Hart's object: "characterizing" the "complexity" of the legal system 96

4.1.3 Two key sources of influence: J.L Austin and P.F Strawson 99

4.1.4 Do the (linguistic) twist 101

4.2 Hart's Austinian account of the quotidian empirical statement 106

4.2.1 A critique of reductive sense-data empiricism 106

4.2.2 Accounting for the complexity of experience 112

4.3 Rejecting the descriptive fallacy 115

4.3.1 A critique of Russell's theory of meaning 116

4.3.2 A rejection of the descriptive fallacy carried over into Hart's jurisprudence 122

4.4 The empirical relevance of the conceptual scheme in The Concept of Law 126

4.4.1 "Descriptive metaphysics" and "linguistic phenomenology" 127

4.4.2 Empirical complexity and presupposition in The Concept of Law 135

4.5 Conclusion 140

4.6 References 142

Chapter 5 Authoritative Disagreement: Meta-Legal Theory and the Semantics of Adjudication 149
Andrej KRISTAN and Giulia PRAVATO

5.1 Introduction 149

5.2 Explananda 150

5.2.1 Authoritative disagreement in fact-oriented interpretation 150

5.2.2 Authoritative disagreement in text-oriented interpretation 151

5.3 Meta-theoretic demarcation 154

5.3.1 Rule-skeptical legal positivism 155

5.3.2 Conventionalist legal positivism 155

5.3.3 Interpretivist legal