Metaepistemology
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This edited volume advances the new subdiscipline of metaepistemology by drawing on the sophisticated frameworks that have been developed in metaethics concerning practical normativity. Chapters examine whether these theories can be applied to epistemic normativity and consider what this may tell us about both epistemic and practical normaitivity.

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Produktbeschreibung
This edited volume advances the new subdiscipline of metaepistemology by drawing on the sophisticated frameworks that have been developed in metaethics concerning practical normativity. Chapters examine whether these theories can be applied to epistemic normativity and consider what this may tell us about both epistemic and practical normaitivity.
Autorenporträt
Conor McHugh is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics broadly construed. These include the nature of belief and of attitudes more generally, normativity, reasons and reasoning, mental agency, doxastic non-voluntarism and self-knowledge. He has published in ^iEthics, Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Issues, Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Analytic Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Thought, Synthese, the European Journal of Philosophy, Pacific PhilosophicalN Quarterly^r, and collections published by OUP and Ithaque, among other places. Jonathan Way is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in ethics and epistemology, broadly construed. These include the nature of reasons, rationality, value, normativity, and reasoning. He has published papers in Ethics, Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Philosophical Quarterly, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Philosophical Issues, the Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, and Analysis, among other places. Daniel Whiting is Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a wide range of subjects, including epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and the history of philosophy. Recent topics include: reasons and rationality; the norms of belief, assertion, and practical reasoning; normative testimony; and epistemic value. He has published numerous papers in journals such as Noûs, Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Erkenntnis, British Journal of Aesthetics, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.