Metaethics, Volume 19
Herausgeber: Sosa, E David; Villanueva, Enrique
Metaethics, Volume 19
Herausgeber: Sosa, E David; Villanueva, Enrique
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This is a collection of papers on metaethics very broadly conceived, to include, for example, moral psychology. It contains cutting-edge work by some of the most important contributors to the field.
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This is a collection of papers on metaethics very broadly conceived, to include, for example, moral psychology. It contains cutting-edge work by some of the most important contributors to the field.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Wiley
- Seitenzahl: 200
- Erscheinungstermin: 26. Oktober 2009
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 226mm x 152mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 576g
- ISBN-13: 9781444333992
- ISBN-10: 1444333992
- Artikelnr.: 31689780
- Verlag: Wiley
- Seitenzahl: 200
- Erscheinungstermin: 26. Oktober 2009
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 226mm x 152mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 576g
- ISBN-13: 9781444333992
- ISBN-10: 1444333992
- Artikelnr.: 31689780
Ernest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, and has published extensively in epistemology, metaphysics, and other areas. Enrique Villanueva is a member of the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas at UNAM, and has published in the philosophy of mind.
Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action (Robert Audi).
Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity (DavidCopp).
Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism and the Problem of the Criterion(Michael DePaul).
Skepticism about Persons (John M. Doris).
Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation (TerryHorgan and Mark Timmons).
Values and Morals: Outline of a Skeptical Realism (MichaelHuemer).
The Ordinary Concept of Valuing (Joshua Knobe and EricaPreston Roedder).
Real Desires and Well-Being (Joseph Mendola).
Internalism for Externalists (Peter Railton).
Moral Assertion for Expressivists (Mike Ridge).
Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem (Connie S.Rosati).
Mixed-up Meta-Ethics (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong).
Two Kinds of Consequentialism (Michael Smith).
In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally CoherentEccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters (Sharon Street).
The Practical Role Essential to Value Judgments (Sigr ´UnSvavarsd´ Ottir).
Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action (Ralph Wedgwood).
Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral Motivation (DavidB. Wong).
Variations in Ethical Intuitions (Jennifer L. Zamzow andShaun Nichols).
Symposium
Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality (Wlodek Rabinowicz).
Reply to Rabinowicz (John Broome).
Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity (DavidCopp).
Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism and the Problem of the Criterion(Michael DePaul).
Skepticism about Persons (John M. Doris).
Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation (TerryHorgan and Mark Timmons).
Values and Morals: Outline of a Skeptical Realism (MichaelHuemer).
The Ordinary Concept of Valuing (Joshua Knobe and EricaPreston Roedder).
Real Desires and Well-Being (Joseph Mendola).
Internalism for Externalists (Peter Railton).
Moral Assertion for Expressivists (Mike Ridge).
Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem (Connie S.Rosati).
Mixed-up Meta-Ethics (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong).
Two Kinds of Consequentialism (Michael Smith).
In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally CoherentEccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters (Sharon Street).
The Practical Role Essential to Value Judgments (Sigr ´UnSvavarsd´ Ottir).
Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action (Ralph Wedgwood).
Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral Motivation (DavidB. Wong).
Variations in Ethical Intuitions (Jennifer L. Zamzow andShaun Nichols).
Symposium
Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality (Wlodek Rabinowicz).
Reply to Rabinowicz (John Broome).
Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action (Robert Audi).
Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity (DavidCopp).
Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism and the Problem of the Criterion(Michael DePaul).
Skepticism about Persons (John M. Doris).
Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation (TerryHorgan and Mark Timmons).
Values and Morals: Outline of a Skeptical Realism (MichaelHuemer).
The Ordinary Concept of Valuing (Joshua Knobe and EricaPreston Roedder).
Real Desires and Well-Being (Joseph Mendola).
Internalism for Externalists (Peter Railton).
Moral Assertion for Expressivists (Mike Ridge).
Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem (Connie S.Rosati).
Mixed-up Meta-Ethics (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong).
Two Kinds of Consequentialism (Michael Smith).
In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally CoherentEccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters (Sharon Street).
The Practical Role Essential to Value Judgments (Sigr ´UnSvavarsd´ Ottir).
Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action (Ralph Wedgwood).
Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral Motivation (DavidB. Wong).
Variations in Ethical Intuitions (Jennifer L. Zamzow andShaun Nichols).
Symposium
Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality (Wlodek Rabinowicz).
Reply to Rabinowicz (John Broome).
Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity (DavidCopp).
Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism and the Problem of the Criterion(Michael DePaul).
Skepticism about Persons (John M. Doris).
Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation (TerryHorgan and Mark Timmons).
Values and Morals: Outline of a Skeptical Realism (MichaelHuemer).
The Ordinary Concept of Valuing (Joshua Knobe and EricaPreston Roedder).
Real Desires and Well-Being (Joseph Mendola).
Internalism for Externalists (Peter Railton).
Moral Assertion for Expressivists (Mike Ridge).
Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem (Connie S.Rosati).
Mixed-up Meta-Ethics (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong).
Two Kinds of Consequentialism (Michael Smith).
In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally CoherentEccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters (Sharon Street).
The Practical Role Essential to Value Judgments (Sigr ´UnSvavarsd´ Ottir).
Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action (Ralph Wedgwood).
Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral Motivation (DavidB. Wong).
Variations in Ethical Intuitions (Jennifer L. Zamzow andShaun Nichols).
Symposium
Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality (Wlodek Rabinowicz).
Reply to Rabinowicz (John Broome).