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Russell's On Denoting and Frege's On Sense and Reference are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of twentieth century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn." The Metaphysicians of Meaning is the first book to challenge the accepted secondary work on these two seminal papers, forcing us to reconsider the interpretation of these two vitally important works on meaning.
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Russell's On Denoting and Frege's On Sense and Reference are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of twentieth century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn." The Metaphysicians of Meaning is the first book to challenge the accepted secondary work on these two seminal papers, forcing us to reconsider the interpretation of these two vitally important works on meaning.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 240
- Erscheinungstermin: 14. Dezember 2000
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 241mm x 162mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 644g
- ISBN-13: 9780415242257
- ISBN-10: 0415242258
- Artikelnr.: 21011128
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 240
- Erscheinungstermin: 14. Dezember 2000
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 241mm x 162mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 644g
- ISBN-13: 9780415242257
- ISBN-10: 0415242258
- Artikelnr.: 21011128
Gideon Makin is Lecturer of Philosophy at the Open University, Tel Aviv, and Research Fellow at Wolfson College, University of Oxford.
Part I: Russell Chapter 1: Russell's First Theory of Denoting I. The
Elements II. The Mathematical context III. Denoting, definition and
identity IV. Three essential elements V. Post PoM developments Chapter 2:
The Collapse of the First Theory and the Discovery of the Theory of
Descriptions I. Introduction: the obscure passage in 'On Denoting' II. The
argument: the 'substantial' round (i) C2 is a different entity from C1 (ii)
C1 cannot be a constituent of C2 (iii) 'But this cannot be an explanation'
I. (iv) The third charge III. The argument: the 'symbolic' round (i) The
twin phenomena (ii) Use and mention IV. 'But this cannot be an explanation
II (i) The burden of proof (ii) A survey of theoretical possibilities (iii)
C2 as a description of C1 (iv) Denoting and other logical relations V. The
Transition VI. The discovery of the Theory of Descriptions Chapter 3: The
Place of 'On Denoting' in Russell's Development I. 'On Denoting' and
Russell's ontological development: some preliminaries I. Russell's case
against Meinong III. Russell's ontology in PoM reconsidered IV.
Methodological developments: 'Every word must have some meaning' V.
Contextual definition VI. The Notion of an incomplete symbol VII. The role
of language VIII. Some positive remarks Part II: Frege Chapter 4: From
Begriffsschrift to sense and Reference I. Introduction II. The problem III.
Frege's solution in Bs IV. 'Sinn und Bedeutung': the collapse of the first
theory V. 'Sinn und Bedeutung': The new solution Chapter 5: Further
Considerations Regarding Sense and Reference I. The priority of the
distinction for proper names II. Sense and indirect speech III. Sense as a
route and empty senses IV. Sense determines reference I - The question of
relativization V. Sense determines reference II - The conceptual model VI.
The application of Russell's argument in OD to Frege's distinction Part
III: Russell and Frege Chapter 6: Russell and Frege Compared I.
Introduction: The
Elements II. The Mathematical context III. Denoting, definition and
identity IV. Three essential elements V. Post PoM developments Chapter 2:
The Collapse of the First Theory and the Discovery of the Theory of
Descriptions I. Introduction: the obscure passage in 'On Denoting' II. The
argument: the 'substantial' round (i) C2 is a different entity from C1 (ii)
C1 cannot be a constituent of C2 (iii) 'But this cannot be an explanation'
I. (iv) The third charge III. The argument: the 'symbolic' round (i) The
twin phenomena (ii) Use and mention IV. 'But this cannot be an explanation
II (i) The burden of proof (ii) A survey of theoretical possibilities (iii)
C2 as a description of C1 (iv) Denoting and other logical relations V. The
Transition VI. The discovery of the Theory of Descriptions Chapter 3: The
Place of 'On Denoting' in Russell's Development I. 'On Denoting' and
Russell's ontological development: some preliminaries I. Russell's case
against Meinong III. Russell's ontology in PoM reconsidered IV.
Methodological developments: 'Every word must have some meaning' V.
Contextual definition VI. The Notion of an incomplete symbol VII. The role
of language VIII. Some positive remarks Part II: Frege Chapter 4: From
Begriffsschrift to sense and Reference I. Introduction II. The problem III.
Frege's solution in Bs IV. 'Sinn und Bedeutung': the collapse of the first
theory V. 'Sinn und Bedeutung': The new solution Chapter 5: Further
Considerations Regarding Sense and Reference I. The priority of the
distinction for proper names II. Sense and indirect speech III. Sense as a
route and empty senses IV. Sense determines reference I - The question of
relativization V. Sense determines reference II - The conceptual model VI.
The application of Russell's argument in OD to Frege's distinction Part
III: Russell and Frege Chapter 6: Russell and Frege Compared I.
Introduction: The
Part I: Russell Chapter 1: Russell's First Theory of Denoting I. The
Elements II. The Mathematical context III. Denoting, definition and
identity IV. Three essential elements V. Post PoM developments Chapter 2:
The Collapse of the First Theory and the Discovery of the Theory of
Descriptions I. Introduction: the obscure passage in 'On Denoting' II. The
argument: the 'substantial' round (i) C2 is a different entity from C1 (ii)
C1 cannot be a constituent of C2 (iii) 'But this cannot be an explanation'
I. (iv) The third charge III. The argument: the 'symbolic' round (i) The
twin phenomena (ii) Use and mention IV. 'But this cannot be an explanation
II (i) The burden of proof (ii) A survey of theoretical possibilities (iii)
C2 as a description of C1 (iv) Denoting and other logical relations V. The
Transition VI. The discovery of the Theory of Descriptions Chapter 3: The
Place of 'On Denoting' in Russell's Development I. 'On Denoting' and
Russell's ontological development: some preliminaries I. Russell's case
against Meinong III. Russell's ontology in PoM reconsidered IV.
Methodological developments: 'Every word must have some meaning' V.
Contextual definition VI. The Notion of an incomplete symbol VII. The role
of language VIII. Some positive remarks Part II: Frege Chapter 4: From
Begriffsschrift to sense and Reference I. Introduction II. The problem III.
Frege's solution in Bs IV. 'Sinn und Bedeutung': the collapse of the first
theory V. 'Sinn und Bedeutung': The new solution Chapter 5: Further
Considerations Regarding Sense and Reference I. The priority of the
distinction for proper names II. Sense and indirect speech III. Sense as a
route and empty senses IV. Sense determines reference I - The question of
relativization V. Sense determines reference II - The conceptual model VI.
The application of Russell's argument in OD to Frege's distinction Part
III: Russell and Frege Chapter 6: Russell and Frege Compared I.
Introduction: The
Elements II. The Mathematical context III. Denoting, definition and
identity IV. Three essential elements V. Post PoM developments Chapter 2:
The Collapse of the First Theory and the Discovery of the Theory of
Descriptions I. Introduction: the obscure passage in 'On Denoting' II. The
argument: the 'substantial' round (i) C2 is a different entity from C1 (ii)
C1 cannot be a constituent of C2 (iii) 'But this cannot be an explanation'
I. (iv) The third charge III. The argument: the 'symbolic' round (i) The
twin phenomena (ii) Use and mention IV. 'But this cannot be an explanation
II (i) The burden of proof (ii) A survey of theoretical possibilities (iii)
C2 as a description of C1 (iv) Denoting and other logical relations V. The
Transition VI. The discovery of the Theory of Descriptions Chapter 3: The
Place of 'On Denoting' in Russell's Development I. 'On Denoting' and
Russell's ontological development: some preliminaries I. Russell's case
against Meinong III. Russell's ontology in PoM reconsidered IV.
Methodological developments: 'Every word must have some meaning' V.
Contextual definition VI. The Notion of an incomplete symbol VII. The role
of language VIII. Some positive remarks Part II: Frege Chapter 4: From
Begriffsschrift to sense and Reference I. Introduction II. The problem III.
Frege's solution in Bs IV. 'Sinn und Bedeutung': the collapse of the first
theory V. 'Sinn und Bedeutung': The new solution Chapter 5: Further
Considerations Regarding Sense and Reference I. The priority of the
distinction for proper names II. Sense and indirect speech III. Sense as a
route and empty senses IV. Sense determines reference I - The question of
relativization V. Sense determines reference II - The conceptual model VI.
The application of Russell's argument in OD to Frege's distinction Part
III: Russell and Frege Chapter 6: Russell and Frege Compared I.
Introduction: The