Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge
Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright
Herausgeber: Coliva, Annalisa
Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge
Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright
Herausgeber: Coliva, Annalisa
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This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. The distinguished contributors address a variety of issues, including truth, realism, anti-realism, relativism, and scepticism, and testify to Wright's seminal work on language, mind, metaphysics, and epistemology.
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This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. The distinguished contributors address a variety of issues, including truth, realism, anti-realism, relativism, and scepticism, and testify to Wright's seminal work on language, mind, metaphysics, and epistemology.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 504
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. November 2012
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 27mm
- Gewicht: 875g
- ISBN-13: 9780199278053
- ISBN-10: 0199278059
- Artikelnr.: 62665285
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 504
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. November 2012
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 27mm
- Gewicht: 875g
- ISBN-13: 9780199278053
- ISBN-10: 0199278059
- Artikelnr.: 62665285
Annalisa Coliva is Associate Professor at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Italy) and Associate Director of COGITO Research Centre in Philosophy (Bologna). A Fulbright and Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, Coliva's main publications include Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (Palgrave, 2010) and, as editor, The Self and Self-Knowledge (OUP, 2012). She has published widely in Italian and English in epistemology, philosophy of mind and language, and history of analytic philosophy and is now working, with Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, on a collected volume titled Hinge Epistemology: Basic Beliefs After Moore and Wittgenstein.
* List of contributors
* Introduction
* Bio-bibliographical note
* Rule-Following and the Normativity of Meaning
* 1: Paul A. Boghossian: Blind rule-following
* 2: Christopher Peacocke: Understanding and rule-following
* 3: Paul Horwich: Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and
epistemic norms
* 4: Akeel Bilgrami: Why meaning intentions are degenerate
* Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
* 5: Barry C. Smith: The publicity of meaning and the interiority of
mind
* 6: Dorit Bar-On: Expression, truth, and reality: some variations on
themes from Wright
* Truth, Objectivity, and Relativism
* 7: Simon Blackburn: Some remarks about minimalism
* 8: Stewart Shapiro: Objectivity, explanation, and cognitive shortfall
* 9: Carol Rovane: How to formulate relativism
* Warrant, Transmission Failure, and Scepticism
* 10: Jim Pryor: When warrant transmits
* 11: José L. Zalabardo: Wright on Moore
* 12: Annalisa Coliva: Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives - is
there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?
* 13: Michael Williams: Wright against the sceptics
* Replies
* Part I: The Rule-Following Considerations and the Normativity of
Meaning
* Part II: Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
* Part III: Truth, Objectivity, Realism, and Relativism
* Part IV: Warrant Transmission and Entitlement
* Index
* Introduction
* Bio-bibliographical note
* Rule-Following and the Normativity of Meaning
* 1: Paul A. Boghossian: Blind rule-following
* 2: Christopher Peacocke: Understanding and rule-following
* 3: Paul Horwich: Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and
epistemic norms
* 4: Akeel Bilgrami: Why meaning intentions are degenerate
* Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
* 5: Barry C. Smith: The publicity of meaning and the interiority of
mind
* 6: Dorit Bar-On: Expression, truth, and reality: some variations on
themes from Wright
* Truth, Objectivity, and Relativism
* 7: Simon Blackburn: Some remarks about minimalism
* 8: Stewart Shapiro: Objectivity, explanation, and cognitive shortfall
* 9: Carol Rovane: How to formulate relativism
* Warrant, Transmission Failure, and Scepticism
* 10: Jim Pryor: When warrant transmits
* 11: José L. Zalabardo: Wright on Moore
* 12: Annalisa Coliva: Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives - is
there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?
* 13: Michael Williams: Wright against the sceptics
* Replies
* Part I: The Rule-Following Considerations and the Normativity of
Meaning
* Part II: Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
* Part III: Truth, Objectivity, Realism, and Relativism
* Part IV: Warrant Transmission and Entitlement
* Index
* List of contributors
* Introduction
* Bio-bibliographical note
* Rule-Following and the Normativity of Meaning
* 1: Paul A. Boghossian: Blind rule-following
* 2: Christopher Peacocke: Understanding and rule-following
* 3: Paul Horwich: Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and
epistemic norms
* 4: Akeel Bilgrami: Why meaning intentions are degenerate
* Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
* 5: Barry C. Smith: The publicity of meaning and the interiority of
mind
* 6: Dorit Bar-On: Expression, truth, and reality: some variations on
themes from Wright
* Truth, Objectivity, and Relativism
* 7: Simon Blackburn: Some remarks about minimalism
* 8: Stewart Shapiro: Objectivity, explanation, and cognitive shortfall
* 9: Carol Rovane: How to formulate relativism
* Warrant, Transmission Failure, and Scepticism
* 10: Jim Pryor: When warrant transmits
* 11: José L. Zalabardo: Wright on Moore
* 12: Annalisa Coliva: Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives - is
there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?
* 13: Michael Williams: Wright against the sceptics
* Replies
* Part I: The Rule-Following Considerations and the Normativity of
Meaning
* Part II: Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
* Part III: Truth, Objectivity, Realism, and Relativism
* Part IV: Warrant Transmission and Entitlement
* Index
* Introduction
* Bio-bibliographical note
* Rule-Following and the Normativity of Meaning
* 1: Paul A. Boghossian: Blind rule-following
* 2: Christopher Peacocke: Understanding and rule-following
* 3: Paul Horwich: Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and
epistemic norms
* 4: Akeel Bilgrami: Why meaning intentions are degenerate
* Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
* 5: Barry C. Smith: The publicity of meaning and the interiority of
mind
* 6: Dorit Bar-On: Expression, truth, and reality: some variations on
themes from Wright
* Truth, Objectivity, and Relativism
* 7: Simon Blackburn: Some remarks about minimalism
* 8: Stewart Shapiro: Objectivity, explanation, and cognitive shortfall
* 9: Carol Rovane: How to formulate relativism
* Warrant, Transmission Failure, and Scepticism
* 10: Jim Pryor: When warrant transmits
* 11: José L. Zalabardo: Wright on Moore
* 12: Annalisa Coliva: Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives - is
there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?
* 13: Michael Williams: Wright against the sceptics
* Replies
* Part I: The Rule-Following Considerations and the Normativity of
Meaning
* Part II: Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings
* Part III: Truth, Objectivity, Realism, and Relativism
* Part IV: Warrant Transmission and Entitlement
* Index