21,99 €
inkl. MwSt.
Versandfertig in über 4 Wochen
11 °P sammeln
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Future U.S. Peacetime Policy Toward Russia]( "Future U.S. Peacetime Policy Toward Russia")
Future U.S. Peacetime Policy Toward Russia51,99 €![China's Evolving Approach to "e;Integrated Strategic Deterrence"e;]( "China's Evolving Approach to "e;Integrated Strategic Deterrence"e;")
China's Evolving Approach to "e;Integrated Strategic Deterrence"e;17,99 €![America's Security Deficit]( "America's Security Deficit")
America's Security Deficit12,99 €![Disarmament in the Time of Perestroika: Arms Control and the End of the Soviet Union]( "Disarmament in the Time of Perestroika: Arms Control and the End of the Soviet Union")
Disarmament in the Time of Perestroika: Arms Control and the End of the Soviet Union34,99 €![Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War: The Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race]( "Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War: The Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race")
Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War: The Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race31,99 €![Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States]( "Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States")
Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States31,99 €![From Frozen Ties to Strategic Engagement: U.S.-Iranian Relationship in 2030: U.S.-Iranian Relationship in 2030]( "From Frozen Ties to Strategic Engagement: U.S.-Iranian Relationship in 2030: U.S.-Iranian Relationship in 2030")
From Frozen Ties to Strategic Engagement: U.S.-Iranian Relationship in 2030: U.S.-Iranian Relationship in 203021,99 €
![China's Evolving Approach to "e;Integrated Strategic Deterrence"e;](https://bilder.buecher.de/produkte/44/44825/44825973m.jpg "China's Evolving Approach to "e;Integrated Strategic Deterrence"e;")
"The U.S.-Russia strategic stability paradigm rests on the shared confidence that one side's preemptive counterforce strike would fail to disarm the other side. Both sides are mutually vulnerable to retaliation, and thus have no incentive to strike first. Yet the United States has developed significant prompt counterforce capabilities that Moscow fears could be used for a first strike. These threat perceptions have become a significant source of instability in recent years. The authors examine the historical origins of this dynamic and its impact on bilateral stability. They also evaluate possible policy changes that could mitigate that impact. The authors identify significant consequences for the United States that could arise from Russia's growing concerns about its ability to retaliate, such as Moscow's development of a suite of novel capabilities to address this issue and the potential crisis instability resulting from use-them-or-lose-them fears. Although these negative consequences are significant, they should be weighed against the benefits provided by current U.S. posture that are documented by the authors. The report outlines self-restraint measures--that the United States and Russia could take either together or unilaterally but in coordination--that would provide a degree of reassurance about the parties' lack of intention to execute a preemptive counterforce strike by complicating the ability to carry out such a strike on short notice. These modest steps could mitigate the negative consequences of current approaches without any dramatic changes in force structure, posture, or even employment policy. The stabilizing effect of these steps, however, could be significant."--Publisher's description.