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Lavelle argues that the political sources of instability in finance derive from the intersection of market innovation and regulatory arbitrage.

Produktbeschreibung
Lavelle argues that the political sources of instability in finance derive from the intersection of market innovation and regulatory arbitrage.
Autorenporträt
Kathryn C. Lavelle is Ellen and Dixon Long Professor of World Affairs in the Department of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University. She is the author of Legislating International Organization: The US Congress, the IMF, and the World Bank (2011) and The Politics of Equity Finance in Emerging Markets (2004). She served as the William A. Steiger fellow in the American Political Science Association's congressional fellowship program, where she worked on the staff of the House Committee on Financial Services.
Rezensionen
'Why are banks politically powerful in the United States? The novel argument of Lavelle's important book is that banks are powerful because they have allies within the American political system that need banks in order to further their own bureaucratic objectives. For example, the Federal Reserve needs banks to help preserve its independence from the Congress, Congress needs banks to help allocate resources to favored constituents (e.g., homeowners), and financial regulators need banks to help preserve their jurisdictions and budgets. Lavelle's exploration of the bureaucratic politics of financial policy making provides a new understanding of regulation, deregulation, innovation, and crises in American finance.' J. Lawrence Broz, University of California, San Diego