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Working at the intersection of monetary economics and political economy, the authors of this volume develop novel arguments for why discretionary central banking is hard to reconcile with liberal democracy and doesn't actually solve or prevent financial crises. For that, we need rules, not discretion.

Produktbeschreibung
Working at the intersection of monetary economics and political economy, the authors of this volume develop novel arguments for why discretionary central banking is hard to reconcile with liberal democracy and doesn't actually solve or prevent financial crises. For that, we need rules, not discretion.
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Autorenporträt
Christopher J. Coyne is the F. A. Harper Professor of Economics at George Mason University and the Associate Director of the F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the Mercatus Center.