In Moral Disagreement Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.
In Moral Disagreement Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.
Folke Tersman is Professor of Philosophy at Stockholm University. The author of several books, written in Swedish, on moral philosophy, he has contributed articles to Erkenntnis, Sythese, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, and Theoria.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1. Realism and irrealism 2. The case for radical moral disagreement 3. Explaining and predicting disagreement 4. The argument from inaccessibility 5. The argument from ambiguity 6. Attributing moral judgments References Index.
Preface 1. Realism and irrealism 2. The case for radical moral disagreement 3. Explaining and predicting disagreement 4. The argument from inaccessibility 5. The argument from ambiguity 6. Attributing moral judgments References Index.
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