The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. This Element discusses the latest arguments in ethical theory in an accessible manner, with many examples and cases.
The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. This Element discusses the latest arguments in ethical theory in an accessible manner, with many examples and cases.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
1. Why are people so exercised about moral relativism?; 2. How should theses about moral relativism be framed?; 3. Relationship and community, autonomy and rights; 4. Epistemic reasons to delve further into the conflict between relationship-centered and rights-centered moralities; 5. An ethical argument for extended inquiry into rivals to one's own ethical views; 6. Overcoming stereotypes of relationship-centered moralities; 7. Complicating the contrast between relationship and autonomy -centered moralities; 8. The underdiscussed question of what morality is; 9. A naturalistic approach to understanding why human beings have moralities; 10. Putting together moral ambivalence and a naturalistic conception of morality; 11. Constraints on the range of viable moralities; 12. The social construction of morality: by the individual or group?; 13. When people differ in their moral beliefs about an issue, when do they actually disagree?; 14. Why we have different beliefs in metaethics; 15. How moral reasons enter into the truth conditions of moral judgments help shape our moral motivations; 16. Summary of the argument for a pluralistic form of metaethical moral relativism; 17. Confused reasoning that is sometimes attributed to those who believe in normative moral relativism; 18. An argument for normative moral relativism that is contingent upon the acceptance of certain values and the adoption of metaethical moral relativism; 19. Why normative moral relativism cannot be a simple matter of letting others be; 20. What is female genital cutting?; 21. Accommodation and the fraught issue of abortion; 22. Undermining stereotypes of the other side; 23. Fostering pluralistic encounters; 24. Summary of normative moral relativism.
1. Why are people so exercised about moral relativism?; 2. How should theses about moral relativism be framed?; 3. Relationship and community, autonomy and rights; 4. Epistemic reasons to delve further into the conflict between relationship-centered and rights-centered moralities; 5. An ethical argument for extended inquiry into rivals to one's own ethical views; 6. Overcoming stereotypes of relationship-centered moralities; 7. Complicating the contrast between relationship and autonomy -centered moralities; 8. The underdiscussed question of what morality is; 9. A naturalistic approach to understanding why human beings have moralities; 10. Putting together moral ambivalence and a naturalistic conception of morality; 11. Constraints on the range of viable moralities; 12. The social construction of morality: by the individual or group?; 13. When people differ in their moral beliefs about an issue, when do they actually disagree?; 14. Why we have different beliefs in metaethics; 15. How moral reasons enter into the truth conditions of moral judgments help shape our moral motivations; 16. Summary of the argument for a pluralistic form of metaethical moral relativism; 17. Confused reasoning that is sometimes attributed to those who believe in normative moral relativism; 18. An argument for normative moral relativism that is contingent upon the acceptance of certain values and the adoption of metaethical moral relativism; 19. Why normative moral relativism cannot be a simple matter of letting others be; 20. What is female genital cutting?; 21. Accommodation and the fraught issue of abortion; 22. Undermining stereotypes of the other side; 23. Fostering pluralistic encounters; 24. Summary of normative moral relativism.
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