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Morality and Epistemic Judgement - Cowie, Christopher
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Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This troubling view is known as the moral error theory. Christopher Cowie defends it against the most compelling counter-argument, the argument from analogy: Cowie shows that moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments.

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Produktbeschreibung
Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This troubling view is known as the moral error theory. Christopher Cowie defends it against the most compelling counter-argument, the argument from analogy: Cowie shows that moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments.
Autorenporträt
Christopher Cowie obtained his PhD from the University of Cambridge in 2014. He subsequently worked as a Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. Cowie is currently Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Durham.