Morality and Epistemic Judgement - Cowie, Christopher
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Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This troubling view is known as the moral error theory. Christopher Cowie defends it against the most compelling counter-argument, the argument from analogy: Cowie shows that moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments.

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Produktbeschreibung
Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This troubling view is known as the moral error theory. Christopher Cowie defends it against the most compelling counter-argument, the argument from analogy: Cowie shows that moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments.
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Autorenporträt
Christopher Cowie obtained his PhD from the University of Cambridge in 2014. He subsequently worked as a Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. Cowie is currently Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Durham.