William Perry
My Journey at the Nuclear Brink
William Perry
My Journey at the Nuclear Brink
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William J. Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense for the United States from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1993¿1994) and as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (1977¿1981). He is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford University.
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William J. Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense for the United States from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1993¿1994) and as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (1977¿1981). He is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford University.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 276
- Erscheinungstermin: 11. November 2015
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 231mm x 155mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 544g
- ISBN-13: 9780804796811
- ISBN-10: 0804796815
- Artikelnr.: 42803838
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 276
- Erscheinungstermin: 11. November 2015
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 231mm x 155mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 544g
- ISBN-13: 9780804796811
- ISBN-10: 0804796815
- Artikelnr.: 42803838
William J. Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense for the United States from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1993-1994) and as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (1977-1981). He is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford University.
Contents and Abstracts
1The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Nuclear Nightmare
chapter abstract
This chapter underscores the enormous danger of nuclear weapons, especially
in conditions of hostility and noncooperation among nuclear powers, by
recounting the Cuban Missile Crisis. It shows that the world neared a
nuclear holocaust, threatening civilization itself. A member of the
analysis team providing daily crisis reports to President Kennedy and his
advisors, Perry, contrary to public post mortems on the crisis, reflects
that catastrophe was averted as much by luck as by successful crisis
management. US decision makers' knowledge was imperfect and sometimes
wrong. Some local commanders had discretion to begin armed conflict and
nearly did. Operational mistakes as well as normal military activities
elsewhere in the world could have been interpreted as a nuclear attack. It
is shown that there was no precedent for resolving the risk of history's
gravest war. Perry decides to pursue a career mitigating the nuclear
threat.
2A Fire in the Sky
chapter abstract
This chapter recounts Perry's experiences as a young soldier in the Army of
Occupation in Japan just after the end of World War II, and shows how he
began to change his thinking about national security in the era of nuclear
weapons as well as his thinking about his own calling. The devastation he
witnesses in Tokyo and Naha, together with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, "changed everything" and demands new modes of thinking about
national security. After discharge from the Army, Perry marries, begins a
family, and pursues degrees in mathematics, possibly as a prelude to an
academic career, but the Korean War and the onset of the Cold War with its
nuclear arsenals and "overkill" in increasingly destructive nuclear weapons
lead him into defense work, specifically the pioneering of a powerful new
reconnaissance capability to curtail miscalculations of Soviet nuclear
weapons and catastrophic decisions.
3The Rise of the Soviet Missile Threat and the Race for Data to Understand
It
chapter abstract
This chapter dramatizes the development of a sophisticated US
reconnaissance capability to monitor the secretive Soviet missile and space
program during the nuclear arms build-up in the Cold War. Although it could
not guarantee deterrence of a catastrophic war, knowledge of the size,
deployment, and performance characteristics of the USSR nuclear weapons
lent perspective and lessened the danger of miscalculation in an era of
concern over the threat of a Soviet nuclear first-strike. Perry begins work
at a defense company and studies countermeasures against Soviet missiles,
assesses that defense against an attacking nuclear force is ineffective,
and becomes a member of the high-ranking government Telemetry and Beacon
Analysis Committee (TEBAC) charged with determining the overall Soviet
nuclear threat and decides to start a new company, ESL, devoted exclusively
to the Cold War reconnaissance mission.
4An Original Silicon Valley Entrepreneur and the Advance of Spy Technology
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the formation and strong growth of ESL, Inc.
beginning in the 1960s in Silicon Valley, Perry's pioneering company in
developing sophisticated Cold War reconnaissance capabilities exploiting
new digital technology. Special lessons Perry learned about management and
cooperation in a successful enterprise of mitigating the danger from
nuclear weapons are analyzed, lessons that carried over to his later career
beyond the corporate in pursuing that quest. Of ESL's large base of
projects, emphasis is placed on intercepting telemetry of Soviet ICBM tests
and obtaining signals intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile defense
(BMD) systems together with data interpretation, including the often highly
innovative measures needed to intercept the data. The chapter also
describes Perry's involvement with the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency in its foundational work at the dawn of the crucial period of arms
reduction agreements with the Soviets.
5A Call to Serve
chapter abstract
This chapter chronicles Perry's move from corporate life to government
service in his journey at the nuclear brink. As undersecretary of defense
for research and engineering in the Carter administration, Perry now found
himself charged with revolutionizing US tactical battlefield capabilities
to offset the Soviet numerical advantage in conventional forces, an
advantage threatening nuclear deterrence now that the Soviets had reached
nuclear parity with the US. Perry's expertise in digital technology brought
him to this role, and he proceeded to assemble a powerful team, most
notably Air Force Lt. Col Paul Kaminski as his personal assistant, to meet
the immense challenge of upgrading US systems, a challenge that meant
exploiting state-of-the-art technology, performing innovations much more
quickly than ordinarily done in military weapon development, and "getting
things right the first time." Perry gained his initial experience in
international diplomacy, an experience crucial in his later career.
6Implementing the Offset Strategy and the Emergence of Stealth Technology
chapter abstract
This chapter describes implementation of the Offset Strategy to shore-up
and strengthen nuclear deterrence. A crucial US accomplishment in the age
of nuclear weapons, this development of the "system of systems"-stealth,
smart sensors, smart weapons-made the US battlefield performance superior
and remains the foundation of our premiere military forces, with the later
Desert Storm campaign serving as a convincing proving ground for its
success. The "force multiplier" effects of the new technology are immensely
efficient and economical: even when numerically inferior, US forces can
prevail by striking targets with great accuracy while experiencing
exceedingly low losses in their own forces and equipment. The Offset
Strategy showed the power of revolutionary technology to create conditions
of enhanced nuclear deterrence and to point the way to mitigating future
dangers, as well as the ability of smart and talented people to respond to
the issue of deterrence.
7Buildup of the US Nuclear Force
chapter abstract
This chapter recounts the buildup of US nuclear forces-bombers, SLBMs and
ICBMs-led by Perry as undersecretary of defense. Soviet nuclear forces had
improved, raising concerns of weakening deterrence and new US
vulnerability, especially with the aging of our deployed nuclear
triad.Perry rescued the faltering Trident submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) program to replace the aging US Polaris fleet and insured
deployment of a superb upgraded force. He extended the lifetime of the US
B-52 bomber force against the huge buildup in Soviet air defense by
introducing air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) fired from B-52s well
outside the reach of Soviet air defense systems. Improving the third leg of
the triad, essentially the creation of a basing scheme for the new MX ICBM,
a problem Perry inherited, was never resolved then or in future
administrations, after which the MX was retired.
8Nuclear Alerts, Arms Control, and Missed Opportunities in Nonproliferation
chapter abstract
This chapter shows an example of the awesome danger of nuclear
miscalculation and the need for arms control agreements as a means of
dialog between nuclear powers, thereby enhancing security through a context
of mutual understanding. Perry describes the sudden alert he received as
under secretary in the middle of the night on November 9, 1979, when the
watch officer at NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) reported his
warning computer showed 200 Soviet missiles approaching the US. Although it
was a false alarm caused by human error, Perry reflects on the fearsome
difficulties of making rational assessments under such duress. This chapter
also describes early US-Soviet strategic arms agreements-the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II), their politics and technical
evolution-and missed opportunities to limit proliferation to other
countries.
9The Undersecretary as Diplomat
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's activities in diplomacy as undersecretary,
experiences vital in his later career in seeking cooperative international
measures to mitigate the danger of nuclear weapons. Perry recounts his
diplomatic mission to China to implement President Carter's initiative to
improve China's conventional military forces as one of the means of
containment of the USSR, an initiative cancelled after the Tiananmen Square
massacre. The chapter also describes Perry's policy to improve the
battlefield capabilities of NATO, and thereby enhance deterrence of a
nuclear war, through cooperative defense acquisition programs and enhanced
interoperability of the weapons of NATO members and hence their ability to
operate jointly in combat operations. Perry also reflects on the lessons
learned about international cooperation through his exposure to, and
participation in aspects of, the Camp David Accords among Israel, Egypt,
and the US.
10Back in Civilian Life: The Cold War Ends But the Nuclear Journey
Continues
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's return to civilian life and his continuing
quest to reduce the nuclear danger. His work with the San Francisco
investment banker, Hambrecht & Quist, specializing in venture capital
support of entrepreneurial high technology companies, is recalled, together
with his professorship at Stanford University teaching a popular course on
the history of technology in defense. Perry becomes a prominent critic of
the Strategic Defense Initiative as unworkable. He undertakes Track 2
diplomacy, designed to open the way for formal government initiatives on
reducing the nuclear danger and which takes him to the USSR and other
nations, gaining him contacts valuable in his later diplomacy as secretary
of defense. As the Soviet Union breaks apart, Perry joins Senators Sam Nunn
and Richard Lugar, Harvard professor Ash Carter, and others to develop the
Nunn-Lugar legislation to remove "loose nukes" from former Soviet
republics.
11A Return to Washington: The New Challenge of "Loose Nukes" and the
Lurching Reform of Defense Acquisition
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's return to government service as deputy
defense secretary in the first term of the Clinton Administration. The
challenge of removing "loose nukes" from former Soviet republics was
paramount for Perry in his general quest to prevent the use of nuclear
weapons and was a prime motive in his return to the Pentagon. He also
considered defense acquisition reform essential to fielding a nimble
military, an imperative for maintaining nuclear deterrence in a volatile
and dangerous international order, and was determined to carry out a reform
program. The chapter relates Perry's successful efforts to fund the
Nunn-Lugar program to deal with "loose nukes" and his assembling of an
effective team to carry out the work, as well as his forming an experienced
and effective senior management team in the Pentagon to lead the defense
acquisition reforms.
12I Become Secretary of Defense
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the work of Perry and colleagues to develop
agreements to remove "loose nukes" in former Soviet republics, for example,
through the Trilateral Statement and the later agreement it foreshadowed,
the Budapest Memorandum, which addressed Ukrainian concerns about the
sanctity of its borders. The chapter then turns to events leading up to
Perry's confirmation as Secretary of Defense to succeed Les Aspin after he
had been asked to step down by President Clinton. Perry relates his
discussions with President Clinton and Vice President Gore, the latter
crucial in his decision to accept the position. The chapter describes the
press conference President Clinton held to announce Perry's appointment and
the resultant process of Perry's unanimous confirmation by the Senate.
Perry's swearing in ceremony is described.
13Dismantling Nuclear Weapons and the Legacy of Nunn-Lugar
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the dismantling of nuclear weapon systems under the
Nunn-Lugar initiative. First-hand accounts of the dismantling activity at
weapon sites such as Pervomaysk in Ukraine as well as at military bases in
the US are detailed. The broad reach of Nunn-Lugar to include control of
fissionable material is indicated together with the provisions for removal
of chemical weapons. Perry describes the technical aspects of the
dismantling and removal of ICBMs, ICBM silos, nuclear submarines, and
strategic bombers. More broadly, he reflects on the remarkable significance
of the Nunn-Lugar legislation as a signature development in the nuclear era
to support the reduction of the danger from nuclear weapons. Key
contributions to the success of Nunn-Lugar by the principal people in the
program are called out.
14The Crisis with North Korea: Containing a Nuclear State
chapter abstract
This chapter describes dealing with North Korea in a crisis brought on
during Perry's days as defense secretary by that country's move toward
nuclear weapons. North Korea was a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and had agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections to confirm compliance. Perry recounts how North Korea had
prospects of using spent fuel from its "peaceful" reactor at Yongbon in a
covert nuclear weapon program, and how the nation suspiciously was
threatening to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and was
blocking IAEA inspections. Perry describes his interaction with General
Luck, the US commander in South Korea, and his discussions with President
Clinton and US officials about US options. The chapter chronicles how the
crisis was averted through firm coercive diplomacy and the work of former
President Carter in meeting directly with the North Koreans in Pyongyang.
15Ratifying Start II and Battling Over the Test Ban Treaty
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the problems and prospects of ratifying the START II
arms control treaty with the Russians, a goal set by President Clinton.
Perry recounts the challenging processes in obtaining legislative approval
in both the US and Russia for ratification, including his unprecedented
address to the Russian Duma spelling out the advisability of ratification,
and discusses the lengthy process of ratification in Russia. The chapter
also describes the efforts of Perry and others to obtain ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and chronicles the ultimate failure to
do so in the US Senate. Perry reflects on the detriment to efforts to
reduce the danger of nuclear weapons by political failures to realize
successful arms control initiatives. He analyzes the problems in old modes
of thinking in the nuclear era with its demand for innovative, cooperative
solutions.
16NATO, Peacekeeping in Bosnia, and the Rise of Security Ties With Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter, pivotal in Perry's journey, dramatizes the failure to balance
competing interests among the Cold War foes in Europe in the postwar era of
reduced tensions and greater opportunities for cooperation. A natural pull
had arisen among NATO nations and the former Soviet republics and Warsaw
Pact for working together on regional interests such as peacekeeping in
Bosnia. The Partnership for Peace was instituted, a process for previous
enemies of NATO to join the alliance, all eager to do so. Perry chronicles
the unfortunate politics that ultimately rushed a premature enlargement of
NATO, an unenlightened outcome that insufficiently accounted for
traditional Russian concerns and soured what were becoming much improved
relations with Russia, to the detriment of prospects for greater
cooperation on nuclear issues.
17The "Immaculate Invasion" of Haiti and Forging Ties for Western
Hemispheric Unity
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the raising of concerns for Western Hemispheric
security in the post Cold War world when the danger from nuclear weapons
began to grow global and US national security concerns broadened, certainly
to include contingencies close to home. It was an enlargement of focus
beyond previous practices in the Defense Department. The need was
especially dramatized when a military junta overthrew the democratically
elected government in Haiti. Perry recounts the superb US military
intervention planning that convinced the coup leaders to step aside for a
peaceful resolution in Haiti and the restoration of the legitimate leader.
In addition, other initiatives by Perry to enhance Western hemispheric
security are described, such as regularly scheduled meetings of all
hemispheric defense ministers and establishment of a center for hemispheric
defense studies (later renamed the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric
Studies).
18The "Iron Logic" Between Military Capability and Quality of Life
chapter abstract
This chapter describes a major initiative of Perry: instituting policies
and procedures to enhance the quality of life of enlisted soldiers and
their families, the key principle being the "iron logic" linking a
successful quality of life to the superior military capability of our
forces. Perry recounts the very successful program he established to allow
him direct contact with enlisted personnel in all services at many bases
and installations to hear firsthand their concerns and suggestions. Perry
describes an innovative program to enlist commercial building contractors
to conduct successful business by building greatly improved base housing, a
program continuing today. Perry's wife, Lee, extended the humanitarian
philosophy to Albania by recommending that State National Guards take their
summer tour there to improve greatly an underfunded military hospital, for
which she received the Mother Teresa Medal from the president of Albania.
19A Farewell to Arms
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's transition from secretary of defense to
civilian life. After carefully considering the decision, Perry, now 70,
opted to return to California after one term in the cabinet role, satisfied
that he had met goals and objectives, certainly including the compliment
that he had been "the GI's general" as reflected by a touching special
personal award given for the first time to a departing secretary of defense
by senior NCOs. He resumed his teaching at Stanford, full-time and under an
endowed chair, the Michael and Barbara Berberian Chair. He and Ash Carter,
the latter at Harvard, resumed their collaboration, co-authoring a book
dramatizing their ideas on foreign policy in the nuclear era, Preventive
Defense, together with a joint study program. He began devoting most of his
time to a worldwide series of Track 2 diplomatic missions on national
security and the nuclear issue.
20The Fall of Security Ties with Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the deteriorating relationship with Russia in the
years after Perry had left the Pentagon. Social/political turmoil in Russia
is pivotal, fostering nostalgia for "the good old days." Perry recounts how
the transfer of power to Vladimir Putin increased hostility. The US
European BMD system heightened mistrust. Perry presents this chapter as a
parable of how fast relations can turn sour between great nations when they
operate in opposition to one another. Perry characterizes the downturn as
one of the most unfortunate blows to cooperative resolution of the nuclear
issue. He categorizes the issue as potentially a most dangerous one in the
nuclear era. His major Track 2 emphasis lies in improving the impasse.
21The Fall of Security Ties with Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter highlights one of the most profound insights into preventing
use of nuclear weapons, namely, MAED (Mutual Assured Economic Destruction),
which in our post Cold War time of a global economy with especially
critical regional economic relationships, has become an effective
deterrent. Perry describes and analyzes such initiatives as cultivating
major economic trade between such regional foes as India and Pakistan and
China and Taiwan, creating a deterrence of military conflict in the
interests of mutual prosperity. The chapter includes description of the
tension between China, Taiwan, and Japan over unpopulated islands located
between Taiwan and Okinawa, with insistent claims and counter claims.
Likewise, Perry recounts concerns over another Mumbai-like terrorist attack
by a Pakistani terror group against India. MAED is discussed as deterring
the arising of a dangerous military conflict between nuclear powers.
22The North Korean Policy Review: Triumph and Tragedy
chapter abstract
This chapter describes complex diplomacy surrounding the North Korean
nuclear crisis commencing in 1998, notably their threatening missile
developments. Although the Agreed Framework Perry established with North
Korea had earlier resolved nuclear issues, new risks appeared since he had
left the Pentagon. President Clinton asks Perry to lead a North Korean
Policy Review, Perry assembles a superb team to include Ash Carter, and
takes a collaborative approach by inviting major Japanese and South Korean
officials to join in the diplomacy. Perry chronicles how time overtook his
effort, a most promising one, with the end of the Clinton Administration.
Believed excellent during the work of the North Korean Policy Review,
prospects of success diminished under the Bush Administration until now we
face an angry and defiant North Korea expanding its nuclear weapons
capability. In Perry's words, it is "perhaps the most unsuccessful exercise
of diplomacy in our country's history."
23Fiasco in Iraq: Then and Now
chapter abstract
Asa member of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), Perry cites the invasion as a
prime example of how not to succeed in controlling the spread of nuclear
weapons. The chapter describes the twin failures of assuming Iraq (a)
possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and (b) was supporting Al Queda
to mount further terror strikes. The chapter recounts how the ISG's
recommendations provided a basis for the Bush Administration to change the
losing strategy in Iraq by adopting the Petraeus strategy stressing support
of Sunnis in Anwar Province. However, Perry points out that an overall turn
for the better in Iraq, notably a more inclusive politics, remains but a
remote possibility, most probably beyond accomplishing in the short run.
24Former Cold Warrior Offer New Vision
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the advocacy of an international program whose
sequence of steps could lead to a world without nuclear weapons. The
chapter chronicles how veteran national security experts George Schultz,
Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and Perry joined forces to raise international
awareness of the dynamics in which the US and Russia might take the lead in
reducing the nuclear threat. Measures include providing more time for
leaders to work through possible crises, accelerate nuclear reduction
through arms control agreements, and establish global systems to secure and
control fissionable material. The chapter recounts how op-eds by the four
experts attracted great attention, including in the Obama White House, and
led to promising further participation by other advocates for a safer
world. The chapter concludes with a call to further action to prevent a
decline in interest and a return to passivity on this crucial issue.
25The Way Forward: Hope for a World Without Nuclear Weapons
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the basis for hope that removing nuclear weapons
from the world becomes an idea whose time has come. The chapter indicates
that there are more than a few obstacles that may make that possibility
unlikely, the result eventually becoming dire. But Perry reviews the
considerable progress that has been made during the nuclear era from the
1940s to the present: significant reductions in weapon inventories, greater
awareness of the common good in reducing the threat, serious and growing
efforts to secure fissionable material from falling into the hands of
terror groups. In the final analysis, Perry points out that much comes down
to the faith in humans, in the words of William Faulkner, that "man will
not merely endure: he will prevail."
1The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Nuclear Nightmare
chapter abstract
This chapter underscores the enormous danger of nuclear weapons, especially
in conditions of hostility and noncooperation among nuclear powers, by
recounting the Cuban Missile Crisis. It shows that the world neared a
nuclear holocaust, threatening civilization itself. A member of the
analysis team providing daily crisis reports to President Kennedy and his
advisors, Perry, contrary to public post mortems on the crisis, reflects
that catastrophe was averted as much by luck as by successful crisis
management. US decision makers' knowledge was imperfect and sometimes
wrong. Some local commanders had discretion to begin armed conflict and
nearly did. Operational mistakes as well as normal military activities
elsewhere in the world could have been interpreted as a nuclear attack. It
is shown that there was no precedent for resolving the risk of history's
gravest war. Perry decides to pursue a career mitigating the nuclear
threat.
2A Fire in the Sky
chapter abstract
This chapter recounts Perry's experiences as a young soldier in the Army of
Occupation in Japan just after the end of World War II, and shows how he
began to change his thinking about national security in the era of nuclear
weapons as well as his thinking about his own calling. The devastation he
witnesses in Tokyo and Naha, together with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, "changed everything" and demands new modes of thinking about
national security. After discharge from the Army, Perry marries, begins a
family, and pursues degrees in mathematics, possibly as a prelude to an
academic career, but the Korean War and the onset of the Cold War with its
nuclear arsenals and "overkill" in increasingly destructive nuclear weapons
lead him into defense work, specifically the pioneering of a powerful new
reconnaissance capability to curtail miscalculations of Soviet nuclear
weapons and catastrophic decisions.
3The Rise of the Soviet Missile Threat and the Race for Data to Understand
It
chapter abstract
This chapter dramatizes the development of a sophisticated US
reconnaissance capability to monitor the secretive Soviet missile and space
program during the nuclear arms build-up in the Cold War. Although it could
not guarantee deterrence of a catastrophic war, knowledge of the size,
deployment, and performance characteristics of the USSR nuclear weapons
lent perspective and lessened the danger of miscalculation in an era of
concern over the threat of a Soviet nuclear first-strike. Perry begins work
at a defense company and studies countermeasures against Soviet missiles,
assesses that defense against an attacking nuclear force is ineffective,
and becomes a member of the high-ranking government Telemetry and Beacon
Analysis Committee (TEBAC) charged with determining the overall Soviet
nuclear threat and decides to start a new company, ESL, devoted exclusively
to the Cold War reconnaissance mission.
4An Original Silicon Valley Entrepreneur and the Advance of Spy Technology
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the formation and strong growth of ESL, Inc.
beginning in the 1960s in Silicon Valley, Perry's pioneering company in
developing sophisticated Cold War reconnaissance capabilities exploiting
new digital technology. Special lessons Perry learned about management and
cooperation in a successful enterprise of mitigating the danger from
nuclear weapons are analyzed, lessons that carried over to his later career
beyond the corporate in pursuing that quest. Of ESL's large base of
projects, emphasis is placed on intercepting telemetry of Soviet ICBM tests
and obtaining signals intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile defense
(BMD) systems together with data interpretation, including the often highly
innovative measures needed to intercept the data. The chapter also
describes Perry's involvement with the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency in its foundational work at the dawn of the crucial period of arms
reduction agreements with the Soviets.
5A Call to Serve
chapter abstract
This chapter chronicles Perry's move from corporate life to government
service in his journey at the nuclear brink. As undersecretary of defense
for research and engineering in the Carter administration, Perry now found
himself charged with revolutionizing US tactical battlefield capabilities
to offset the Soviet numerical advantage in conventional forces, an
advantage threatening nuclear deterrence now that the Soviets had reached
nuclear parity with the US. Perry's expertise in digital technology brought
him to this role, and he proceeded to assemble a powerful team, most
notably Air Force Lt. Col Paul Kaminski as his personal assistant, to meet
the immense challenge of upgrading US systems, a challenge that meant
exploiting state-of-the-art technology, performing innovations much more
quickly than ordinarily done in military weapon development, and "getting
things right the first time." Perry gained his initial experience in
international diplomacy, an experience crucial in his later career.
6Implementing the Offset Strategy and the Emergence of Stealth Technology
chapter abstract
This chapter describes implementation of the Offset Strategy to shore-up
and strengthen nuclear deterrence. A crucial US accomplishment in the age
of nuclear weapons, this development of the "system of systems"-stealth,
smart sensors, smart weapons-made the US battlefield performance superior
and remains the foundation of our premiere military forces, with the later
Desert Storm campaign serving as a convincing proving ground for its
success. The "force multiplier" effects of the new technology are immensely
efficient and economical: even when numerically inferior, US forces can
prevail by striking targets with great accuracy while experiencing
exceedingly low losses in their own forces and equipment. The Offset
Strategy showed the power of revolutionary technology to create conditions
of enhanced nuclear deterrence and to point the way to mitigating future
dangers, as well as the ability of smart and talented people to respond to
the issue of deterrence.
7Buildup of the US Nuclear Force
chapter abstract
This chapter recounts the buildup of US nuclear forces-bombers, SLBMs and
ICBMs-led by Perry as undersecretary of defense. Soviet nuclear forces had
improved, raising concerns of weakening deterrence and new US
vulnerability, especially with the aging of our deployed nuclear
triad.Perry rescued the faltering Trident submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) program to replace the aging US Polaris fleet and insured
deployment of a superb upgraded force. He extended the lifetime of the US
B-52 bomber force against the huge buildup in Soviet air defense by
introducing air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) fired from B-52s well
outside the reach of Soviet air defense systems. Improving the third leg of
the triad, essentially the creation of a basing scheme for the new MX ICBM,
a problem Perry inherited, was never resolved then or in future
administrations, after which the MX was retired.
8Nuclear Alerts, Arms Control, and Missed Opportunities in Nonproliferation
chapter abstract
This chapter shows an example of the awesome danger of nuclear
miscalculation and the need for arms control agreements as a means of
dialog between nuclear powers, thereby enhancing security through a context
of mutual understanding. Perry describes the sudden alert he received as
under secretary in the middle of the night on November 9, 1979, when the
watch officer at NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) reported his
warning computer showed 200 Soviet missiles approaching the US. Although it
was a false alarm caused by human error, Perry reflects on the fearsome
difficulties of making rational assessments under such duress. This chapter
also describes early US-Soviet strategic arms agreements-the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II), their politics and technical
evolution-and missed opportunities to limit proliferation to other
countries.
9The Undersecretary as Diplomat
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's activities in diplomacy as undersecretary,
experiences vital in his later career in seeking cooperative international
measures to mitigate the danger of nuclear weapons. Perry recounts his
diplomatic mission to China to implement President Carter's initiative to
improve China's conventional military forces as one of the means of
containment of the USSR, an initiative cancelled after the Tiananmen Square
massacre. The chapter also describes Perry's policy to improve the
battlefield capabilities of NATO, and thereby enhance deterrence of a
nuclear war, through cooperative defense acquisition programs and enhanced
interoperability of the weapons of NATO members and hence their ability to
operate jointly in combat operations. Perry also reflects on the lessons
learned about international cooperation through his exposure to, and
participation in aspects of, the Camp David Accords among Israel, Egypt,
and the US.
10Back in Civilian Life: The Cold War Ends But the Nuclear Journey
Continues
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's return to civilian life and his continuing
quest to reduce the nuclear danger. His work with the San Francisco
investment banker, Hambrecht & Quist, specializing in venture capital
support of entrepreneurial high technology companies, is recalled, together
with his professorship at Stanford University teaching a popular course on
the history of technology in defense. Perry becomes a prominent critic of
the Strategic Defense Initiative as unworkable. He undertakes Track 2
diplomacy, designed to open the way for formal government initiatives on
reducing the nuclear danger and which takes him to the USSR and other
nations, gaining him contacts valuable in his later diplomacy as secretary
of defense. As the Soviet Union breaks apart, Perry joins Senators Sam Nunn
and Richard Lugar, Harvard professor Ash Carter, and others to develop the
Nunn-Lugar legislation to remove "loose nukes" from former Soviet
republics.
11A Return to Washington: The New Challenge of "Loose Nukes" and the
Lurching Reform of Defense Acquisition
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's return to government service as deputy
defense secretary in the first term of the Clinton Administration. The
challenge of removing "loose nukes" from former Soviet republics was
paramount for Perry in his general quest to prevent the use of nuclear
weapons and was a prime motive in his return to the Pentagon. He also
considered defense acquisition reform essential to fielding a nimble
military, an imperative for maintaining nuclear deterrence in a volatile
and dangerous international order, and was determined to carry out a reform
program. The chapter relates Perry's successful efforts to fund the
Nunn-Lugar program to deal with "loose nukes" and his assembling of an
effective team to carry out the work, as well as his forming an experienced
and effective senior management team in the Pentagon to lead the defense
acquisition reforms.
12I Become Secretary of Defense
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the work of Perry and colleagues to develop
agreements to remove "loose nukes" in former Soviet republics, for example,
through the Trilateral Statement and the later agreement it foreshadowed,
the Budapest Memorandum, which addressed Ukrainian concerns about the
sanctity of its borders. The chapter then turns to events leading up to
Perry's confirmation as Secretary of Defense to succeed Les Aspin after he
had been asked to step down by President Clinton. Perry relates his
discussions with President Clinton and Vice President Gore, the latter
crucial in his decision to accept the position. The chapter describes the
press conference President Clinton held to announce Perry's appointment and
the resultant process of Perry's unanimous confirmation by the Senate.
Perry's swearing in ceremony is described.
13Dismantling Nuclear Weapons and the Legacy of Nunn-Lugar
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the dismantling of nuclear weapon systems under the
Nunn-Lugar initiative. First-hand accounts of the dismantling activity at
weapon sites such as Pervomaysk in Ukraine as well as at military bases in
the US are detailed. The broad reach of Nunn-Lugar to include control of
fissionable material is indicated together with the provisions for removal
of chemical weapons. Perry describes the technical aspects of the
dismantling and removal of ICBMs, ICBM silos, nuclear submarines, and
strategic bombers. More broadly, he reflects on the remarkable significance
of the Nunn-Lugar legislation as a signature development in the nuclear era
to support the reduction of the danger from nuclear weapons. Key
contributions to the success of Nunn-Lugar by the principal people in the
program are called out.
14The Crisis with North Korea: Containing a Nuclear State
chapter abstract
This chapter describes dealing with North Korea in a crisis brought on
during Perry's days as defense secretary by that country's move toward
nuclear weapons. North Korea was a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and had agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections to confirm compliance. Perry recounts how North Korea had
prospects of using spent fuel from its "peaceful" reactor at Yongbon in a
covert nuclear weapon program, and how the nation suspiciously was
threatening to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and was
blocking IAEA inspections. Perry describes his interaction with General
Luck, the US commander in South Korea, and his discussions with President
Clinton and US officials about US options. The chapter chronicles how the
crisis was averted through firm coercive diplomacy and the work of former
President Carter in meeting directly with the North Koreans in Pyongyang.
15Ratifying Start II and Battling Over the Test Ban Treaty
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the problems and prospects of ratifying the START II
arms control treaty with the Russians, a goal set by President Clinton.
Perry recounts the challenging processes in obtaining legislative approval
in both the US and Russia for ratification, including his unprecedented
address to the Russian Duma spelling out the advisability of ratification,
and discusses the lengthy process of ratification in Russia. The chapter
also describes the efforts of Perry and others to obtain ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and chronicles the ultimate failure to
do so in the US Senate. Perry reflects on the detriment to efforts to
reduce the danger of nuclear weapons by political failures to realize
successful arms control initiatives. He analyzes the problems in old modes
of thinking in the nuclear era with its demand for innovative, cooperative
solutions.
16NATO, Peacekeeping in Bosnia, and the Rise of Security Ties With Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter, pivotal in Perry's journey, dramatizes the failure to balance
competing interests among the Cold War foes in Europe in the postwar era of
reduced tensions and greater opportunities for cooperation. A natural pull
had arisen among NATO nations and the former Soviet republics and Warsaw
Pact for working together on regional interests such as peacekeeping in
Bosnia. The Partnership for Peace was instituted, a process for previous
enemies of NATO to join the alliance, all eager to do so. Perry chronicles
the unfortunate politics that ultimately rushed a premature enlargement of
NATO, an unenlightened outcome that insufficiently accounted for
traditional Russian concerns and soured what were becoming much improved
relations with Russia, to the detriment of prospects for greater
cooperation on nuclear issues.
17The "Immaculate Invasion" of Haiti and Forging Ties for Western
Hemispheric Unity
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the raising of concerns for Western Hemispheric
security in the post Cold War world when the danger from nuclear weapons
began to grow global and US national security concerns broadened, certainly
to include contingencies close to home. It was an enlargement of focus
beyond previous practices in the Defense Department. The need was
especially dramatized when a military junta overthrew the democratically
elected government in Haiti. Perry recounts the superb US military
intervention planning that convinced the coup leaders to step aside for a
peaceful resolution in Haiti and the restoration of the legitimate leader.
In addition, other initiatives by Perry to enhance Western hemispheric
security are described, such as regularly scheduled meetings of all
hemispheric defense ministers and establishment of a center for hemispheric
defense studies (later renamed the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric
Studies).
18The "Iron Logic" Between Military Capability and Quality of Life
chapter abstract
This chapter describes a major initiative of Perry: instituting policies
and procedures to enhance the quality of life of enlisted soldiers and
their families, the key principle being the "iron logic" linking a
successful quality of life to the superior military capability of our
forces. Perry recounts the very successful program he established to allow
him direct contact with enlisted personnel in all services at many bases
and installations to hear firsthand their concerns and suggestions. Perry
describes an innovative program to enlist commercial building contractors
to conduct successful business by building greatly improved base housing, a
program continuing today. Perry's wife, Lee, extended the humanitarian
philosophy to Albania by recommending that State National Guards take their
summer tour there to improve greatly an underfunded military hospital, for
which she received the Mother Teresa Medal from the president of Albania.
19A Farewell to Arms
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's transition from secretary of defense to
civilian life. After carefully considering the decision, Perry, now 70,
opted to return to California after one term in the cabinet role, satisfied
that he had met goals and objectives, certainly including the compliment
that he had been "the GI's general" as reflected by a touching special
personal award given for the first time to a departing secretary of defense
by senior NCOs. He resumed his teaching at Stanford, full-time and under an
endowed chair, the Michael and Barbara Berberian Chair. He and Ash Carter,
the latter at Harvard, resumed their collaboration, co-authoring a book
dramatizing their ideas on foreign policy in the nuclear era, Preventive
Defense, together with a joint study program. He began devoting most of his
time to a worldwide series of Track 2 diplomatic missions on national
security and the nuclear issue.
20The Fall of Security Ties with Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the deteriorating relationship with Russia in the
years after Perry had left the Pentagon. Social/political turmoil in Russia
is pivotal, fostering nostalgia for "the good old days." Perry recounts how
the transfer of power to Vladimir Putin increased hostility. The US
European BMD system heightened mistrust. Perry presents this chapter as a
parable of how fast relations can turn sour between great nations when they
operate in opposition to one another. Perry characterizes the downturn as
one of the most unfortunate blows to cooperative resolution of the nuclear
issue. He categorizes the issue as potentially a most dangerous one in the
nuclear era. His major Track 2 emphasis lies in improving the impasse.
21The Fall of Security Ties with Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter highlights one of the most profound insights into preventing
use of nuclear weapons, namely, MAED (Mutual Assured Economic Destruction),
which in our post Cold War time of a global economy with especially
critical regional economic relationships, has become an effective
deterrent. Perry describes and analyzes such initiatives as cultivating
major economic trade between such regional foes as India and Pakistan and
China and Taiwan, creating a deterrence of military conflict in the
interests of mutual prosperity. The chapter includes description of the
tension between China, Taiwan, and Japan over unpopulated islands located
between Taiwan and Okinawa, with insistent claims and counter claims.
Likewise, Perry recounts concerns over another Mumbai-like terrorist attack
by a Pakistani terror group against India. MAED is discussed as deterring
the arising of a dangerous military conflict between nuclear powers.
22The North Korean Policy Review: Triumph and Tragedy
chapter abstract
This chapter describes complex diplomacy surrounding the North Korean
nuclear crisis commencing in 1998, notably their threatening missile
developments. Although the Agreed Framework Perry established with North
Korea had earlier resolved nuclear issues, new risks appeared since he had
left the Pentagon. President Clinton asks Perry to lead a North Korean
Policy Review, Perry assembles a superb team to include Ash Carter, and
takes a collaborative approach by inviting major Japanese and South Korean
officials to join in the diplomacy. Perry chronicles how time overtook his
effort, a most promising one, with the end of the Clinton Administration.
Believed excellent during the work of the North Korean Policy Review,
prospects of success diminished under the Bush Administration until now we
face an angry and defiant North Korea expanding its nuclear weapons
capability. In Perry's words, it is "perhaps the most unsuccessful exercise
of diplomacy in our country's history."
23Fiasco in Iraq: Then and Now
chapter abstract
Asa member of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), Perry cites the invasion as a
prime example of how not to succeed in controlling the spread of nuclear
weapons. The chapter describes the twin failures of assuming Iraq (a)
possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and (b) was supporting Al Queda
to mount further terror strikes. The chapter recounts how the ISG's
recommendations provided a basis for the Bush Administration to change the
losing strategy in Iraq by adopting the Petraeus strategy stressing support
of Sunnis in Anwar Province. However, Perry points out that an overall turn
for the better in Iraq, notably a more inclusive politics, remains but a
remote possibility, most probably beyond accomplishing in the short run.
24Former Cold Warrior Offer New Vision
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the advocacy of an international program whose
sequence of steps could lead to a world without nuclear weapons. The
chapter chronicles how veteran national security experts George Schultz,
Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and Perry joined forces to raise international
awareness of the dynamics in which the US and Russia might take the lead in
reducing the nuclear threat. Measures include providing more time for
leaders to work through possible crises, accelerate nuclear reduction
through arms control agreements, and establish global systems to secure and
control fissionable material. The chapter recounts how op-eds by the four
experts attracted great attention, including in the Obama White House, and
led to promising further participation by other advocates for a safer
world. The chapter concludes with a call to further action to prevent a
decline in interest and a return to passivity on this crucial issue.
25The Way Forward: Hope for a World Without Nuclear Weapons
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the basis for hope that removing nuclear weapons
from the world becomes an idea whose time has come. The chapter indicates
that there are more than a few obstacles that may make that possibility
unlikely, the result eventually becoming dire. But Perry reviews the
considerable progress that has been made during the nuclear era from the
1940s to the present: significant reductions in weapon inventories, greater
awareness of the common good in reducing the threat, serious and growing
efforts to secure fissionable material from falling into the hands of
terror groups. In the final analysis, Perry points out that much comes down
to the faith in humans, in the words of William Faulkner, that "man will
not merely endure: he will prevail."
Contents and Abstracts
1The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Nuclear Nightmare
chapter abstract
This chapter underscores the enormous danger of nuclear weapons, especially
in conditions of hostility and noncooperation among nuclear powers, by
recounting the Cuban Missile Crisis. It shows that the world neared a
nuclear holocaust, threatening civilization itself. A member of the
analysis team providing daily crisis reports to President Kennedy and his
advisors, Perry, contrary to public post mortems on the crisis, reflects
that catastrophe was averted as much by luck as by successful crisis
management. US decision makers' knowledge was imperfect and sometimes
wrong. Some local commanders had discretion to begin armed conflict and
nearly did. Operational mistakes as well as normal military activities
elsewhere in the world could have been interpreted as a nuclear attack. It
is shown that there was no precedent for resolving the risk of history's
gravest war. Perry decides to pursue a career mitigating the nuclear
threat.
2A Fire in the Sky
chapter abstract
This chapter recounts Perry's experiences as a young soldier in the Army of
Occupation in Japan just after the end of World War II, and shows how he
began to change his thinking about national security in the era of nuclear
weapons as well as his thinking about his own calling. The devastation he
witnesses in Tokyo and Naha, together with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, "changed everything" and demands new modes of thinking about
national security. After discharge from the Army, Perry marries, begins a
family, and pursues degrees in mathematics, possibly as a prelude to an
academic career, but the Korean War and the onset of the Cold War with its
nuclear arsenals and "overkill" in increasingly destructive nuclear weapons
lead him into defense work, specifically the pioneering of a powerful new
reconnaissance capability to curtail miscalculations of Soviet nuclear
weapons and catastrophic decisions.
3The Rise of the Soviet Missile Threat and the Race for Data to Understand
It
chapter abstract
This chapter dramatizes the development of a sophisticated US
reconnaissance capability to monitor the secretive Soviet missile and space
program during the nuclear arms build-up in the Cold War. Although it could
not guarantee deterrence of a catastrophic war, knowledge of the size,
deployment, and performance characteristics of the USSR nuclear weapons
lent perspective and lessened the danger of miscalculation in an era of
concern over the threat of a Soviet nuclear first-strike. Perry begins work
at a defense company and studies countermeasures against Soviet missiles,
assesses that defense against an attacking nuclear force is ineffective,
and becomes a member of the high-ranking government Telemetry and Beacon
Analysis Committee (TEBAC) charged with determining the overall Soviet
nuclear threat and decides to start a new company, ESL, devoted exclusively
to the Cold War reconnaissance mission.
4An Original Silicon Valley Entrepreneur and the Advance of Spy Technology
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the formation and strong growth of ESL, Inc.
beginning in the 1960s in Silicon Valley, Perry's pioneering company in
developing sophisticated Cold War reconnaissance capabilities exploiting
new digital technology. Special lessons Perry learned about management and
cooperation in a successful enterprise of mitigating the danger from
nuclear weapons are analyzed, lessons that carried over to his later career
beyond the corporate in pursuing that quest. Of ESL's large base of
projects, emphasis is placed on intercepting telemetry of Soviet ICBM tests
and obtaining signals intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile defense
(BMD) systems together with data interpretation, including the often highly
innovative measures needed to intercept the data. The chapter also
describes Perry's involvement with the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency in its foundational work at the dawn of the crucial period of arms
reduction agreements with the Soviets.
5A Call to Serve
chapter abstract
This chapter chronicles Perry's move from corporate life to government
service in his journey at the nuclear brink. As undersecretary of defense
for research and engineering in the Carter administration, Perry now found
himself charged with revolutionizing US tactical battlefield capabilities
to offset the Soviet numerical advantage in conventional forces, an
advantage threatening nuclear deterrence now that the Soviets had reached
nuclear parity with the US. Perry's expertise in digital technology brought
him to this role, and he proceeded to assemble a powerful team, most
notably Air Force Lt. Col Paul Kaminski as his personal assistant, to meet
the immense challenge of upgrading US systems, a challenge that meant
exploiting state-of-the-art technology, performing innovations much more
quickly than ordinarily done in military weapon development, and "getting
things right the first time." Perry gained his initial experience in
international diplomacy, an experience crucial in his later career.
6Implementing the Offset Strategy and the Emergence of Stealth Technology
chapter abstract
This chapter describes implementation of the Offset Strategy to shore-up
and strengthen nuclear deterrence. A crucial US accomplishment in the age
of nuclear weapons, this development of the "system of systems"-stealth,
smart sensors, smart weapons-made the US battlefield performance superior
and remains the foundation of our premiere military forces, with the later
Desert Storm campaign serving as a convincing proving ground for its
success. The "force multiplier" effects of the new technology are immensely
efficient and economical: even when numerically inferior, US forces can
prevail by striking targets with great accuracy while experiencing
exceedingly low losses in their own forces and equipment. The Offset
Strategy showed the power of revolutionary technology to create conditions
of enhanced nuclear deterrence and to point the way to mitigating future
dangers, as well as the ability of smart and talented people to respond to
the issue of deterrence.
7Buildup of the US Nuclear Force
chapter abstract
This chapter recounts the buildup of US nuclear forces-bombers, SLBMs and
ICBMs-led by Perry as undersecretary of defense. Soviet nuclear forces had
improved, raising concerns of weakening deterrence and new US
vulnerability, especially with the aging of our deployed nuclear
triad.Perry rescued the faltering Trident submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) program to replace the aging US Polaris fleet and insured
deployment of a superb upgraded force. He extended the lifetime of the US
B-52 bomber force against the huge buildup in Soviet air defense by
introducing air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) fired from B-52s well
outside the reach of Soviet air defense systems. Improving the third leg of
the triad, essentially the creation of a basing scheme for the new MX ICBM,
a problem Perry inherited, was never resolved then or in future
administrations, after which the MX was retired.
8Nuclear Alerts, Arms Control, and Missed Opportunities in Nonproliferation
chapter abstract
This chapter shows an example of the awesome danger of nuclear
miscalculation and the need for arms control agreements as a means of
dialog between nuclear powers, thereby enhancing security through a context
of mutual understanding. Perry describes the sudden alert he received as
under secretary in the middle of the night on November 9, 1979, when the
watch officer at NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) reported his
warning computer showed 200 Soviet missiles approaching the US. Although it
was a false alarm caused by human error, Perry reflects on the fearsome
difficulties of making rational assessments under such duress. This chapter
also describes early US-Soviet strategic arms agreements-the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II), their politics and technical
evolution-and missed opportunities to limit proliferation to other
countries.
9The Undersecretary as Diplomat
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's activities in diplomacy as undersecretary,
experiences vital in his later career in seeking cooperative international
measures to mitigate the danger of nuclear weapons. Perry recounts his
diplomatic mission to China to implement President Carter's initiative to
improve China's conventional military forces as one of the means of
containment of the USSR, an initiative cancelled after the Tiananmen Square
massacre. The chapter also describes Perry's policy to improve the
battlefield capabilities of NATO, and thereby enhance deterrence of a
nuclear war, through cooperative defense acquisition programs and enhanced
interoperability of the weapons of NATO members and hence their ability to
operate jointly in combat operations. Perry also reflects on the lessons
learned about international cooperation through his exposure to, and
participation in aspects of, the Camp David Accords among Israel, Egypt,
and the US.
10Back in Civilian Life: The Cold War Ends But the Nuclear Journey
Continues
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's return to civilian life and his continuing
quest to reduce the nuclear danger. His work with the San Francisco
investment banker, Hambrecht & Quist, specializing in venture capital
support of entrepreneurial high technology companies, is recalled, together
with his professorship at Stanford University teaching a popular course on
the history of technology in defense. Perry becomes a prominent critic of
the Strategic Defense Initiative as unworkable. He undertakes Track 2
diplomacy, designed to open the way for formal government initiatives on
reducing the nuclear danger and which takes him to the USSR and other
nations, gaining him contacts valuable in his later diplomacy as secretary
of defense. As the Soviet Union breaks apart, Perry joins Senators Sam Nunn
and Richard Lugar, Harvard professor Ash Carter, and others to develop the
Nunn-Lugar legislation to remove "loose nukes" from former Soviet
republics.
11A Return to Washington: The New Challenge of "Loose Nukes" and the
Lurching Reform of Defense Acquisition
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's return to government service as deputy
defense secretary in the first term of the Clinton Administration. The
challenge of removing "loose nukes" from former Soviet republics was
paramount for Perry in his general quest to prevent the use of nuclear
weapons and was a prime motive in his return to the Pentagon. He also
considered defense acquisition reform essential to fielding a nimble
military, an imperative for maintaining nuclear deterrence in a volatile
and dangerous international order, and was determined to carry out a reform
program. The chapter relates Perry's successful efforts to fund the
Nunn-Lugar program to deal with "loose nukes" and his assembling of an
effective team to carry out the work, as well as his forming an experienced
and effective senior management team in the Pentagon to lead the defense
acquisition reforms.
12I Become Secretary of Defense
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the work of Perry and colleagues to develop
agreements to remove "loose nukes" in former Soviet republics, for example,
through the Trilateral Statement and the later agreement it foreshadowed,
the Budapest Memorandum, which addressed Ukrainian concerns about the
sanctity of its borders. The chapter then turns to events leading up to
Perry's confirmation as Secretary of Defense to succeed Les Aspin after he
had been asked to step down by President Clinton. Perry relates his
discussions with President Clinton and Vice President Gore, the latter
crucial in his decision to accept the position. The chapter describes the
press conference President Clinton held to announce Perry's appointment and
the resultant process of Perry's unanimous confirmation by the Senate.
Perry's swearing in ceremony is described.
13Dismantling Nuclear Weapons and the Legacy of Nunn-Lugar
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the dismantling of nuclear weapon systems under the
Nunn-Lugar initiative. First-hand accounts of the dismantling activity at
weapon sites such as Pervomaysk in Ukraine as well as at military bases in
the US are detailed. The broad reach of Nunn-Lugar to include control of
fissionable material is indicated together with the provisions for removal
of chemical weapons. Perry describes the technical aspects of the
dismantling and removal of ICBMs, ICBM silos, nuclear submarines, and
strategic bombers. More broadly, he reflects on the remarkable significance
of the Nunn-Lugar legislation as a signature development in the nuclear era
to support the reduction of the danger from nuclear weapons. Key
contributions to the success of Nunn-Lugar by the principal people in the
program are called out.
14The Crisis with North Korea: Containing a Nuclear State
chapter abstract
This chapter describes dealing with North Korea in a crisis brought on
during Perry's days as defense secretary by that country's move toward
nuclear weapons. North Korea was a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and had agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections to confirm compliance. Perry recounts how North Korea had
prospects of using spent fuel from its "peaceful" reactor at Yongbon in a
covert nuclear weapon program, and how the nation suspiciously was
threatening to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and was
blocking IAEA inspections. Perry describes his interaction with General
Luck, the US commander in South Korea, and his discussions with President
Clinton and US officials about US options. The chapter chronicles how the
crisis was averted through firm coercive diplomacy and the work of former
President Carter in meeting directly with the North Koreans in Pyongyang.
15Ratifying Start II and Battling Over the Test Ban Treaty
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the problems and prospects of ratifying the START II
arms control treaty with the Russians, a goal set by President Clinton.
Perry recounts the challenging processes in obtaining legislative approval
in both the US and Russia for ratification, including his unprecedented
address to the Russian Duma spelling out the advisability of ratification,
and discusses the lengthy process of ratification in Russia. The chapter
also describes the efforts of Perry and others to obtain ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and chronicles the ultimate failure to
do so in the US Senate. Perry reflects on the detriment to efforts to
reduce the danger of nuclear weapons by political failures to realize
successful arms control initiatives. He analyzes the problems in old modes
of thinking in the nuclear era with its demand for innovative, cooperative
solutions.
16NATO, Peacekeeping in Bosnia, and the Rise of Security Ties With Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter, pivotal in Perry's journey, dramatizes the failure to balance
competing interests among the Cold War foes in Europe in the postwar era of
reduced tensions and greater opportunities for cooperation. A natural pull
had arisen among NATO nations and the former Soviet republics and Warsaw
Pact for working together on regional interests such as peacekeeping in
Bosnia. The Partnership for Peace was instituted, a process for previous
enemies of NATO to join the alliance, all eager to do so. Perry chronicles
the unfortunate politics that ultimately rushed a premature enlargement of
NATO, an unenlightened outcome that insufficiently accounted for
traditional Russian concerns and soured what were becoming much improved
relations with Russia, to the detriment of prospects for greater
cooperation on nuclear issues.
17The "Immaculate Invasion" of Haiti and Forging Ties for Western
Hemispheric Unity
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the raising of concerns for Western Hemispheric
security in the post Cold War world when the danger from nuclear weapons
began to grow global and US national security concerns broadened, certainly
to include contingencies close to home. It was an enlargement of focus
beyond previous practices in the Defense Department. The need was
especially dramatized when a military junta overthrew the democratically
elected government in Haiti. Perry recounts the superb US military
intervention planning that convinced the coup leaders to step aside for a
peaceful resolution in Haiti and the restoration of the legitimate leader.
In addition, other initiatives by Perry to enhance Western hemispheric
security are described, such as regularly scheduled meetings of all
hemispheric defense ministers and establishment of a center for hemispheric
defense studies (later renamed the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric
Studies).
18The "Iron Logic" Between Military Capability and Quality of Life
chapter abstract
This chapter describes a major initiative of Perry: instituting policies
and procedures to enhance the quality of life of enlisted soldiers and
their families, the key principle being the "iron logic" linking a
successful quality of life to the superior military capability of our
forces. Perry recounts the very successful program he established to allow
him direct contact with enlisted personnel in all services at many bases
and installations to hear firsthand their concerns and suggestions. Perry
describes an innovative program to enlist commercial building contractors
to conduct successful business by building greatly improved base housing, a
program continuing today. Perry's wife, Lee, extended the humanitarian
philosophy to Albania by recommending that State National Guards take their
summer tour there to improve greatly an underfunded military hospital, for
which she received the Mother Teresa Medal from the president of Albania.
19A Farewell to Arms
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's transition from secretary of defense to
civilian life. After carefully considering the decision, Perry, now 70,
opted to return to California after one term in the cabinet role, satisfied
that he had met goals and objectives, certainly including the compliment
that he had been "the GI's general" as reflected by a touching special
personal award given for the first time to a departing secretary of defense
by senior NCOs. He resumed his teaching at Stanford, full-time and under an
endowed chair, the Michael and Barbara Berberian Chair. He and Ash Carter,
the latter at Harvard, resumed their collaboration, co-authoring a book
dramatizing their ideas on foreign policy in the nuclear era, Preventive
Defense, together with a joint study program. He began devoting most of his
time to a worldwide series of Track 2 diplomatic missions on national
security and the nuclear issue.
20The Fall of Security Ties with Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the deteriorating relationship with Russia in the
years after Perry had left the Pentagon. Social/political turmoil in Russia
is pivotal, fostering nostalgia for "the good old days." Perry recounts how
the transfer of power to Vladimir Putin increased hostility. The US
European BMD system heightened mistrust. Perry presents this chapter as a
parable of how fast relations can turn sour between great nations when they
operate in opposition to one another. Perry characterizes the downturn as
one of the most unfortunate blows to cooperative resolution of the nuclear
issue. He categorizes the issue as potentially a most dangerous one in the
nuclear era. His major Track 2 emphasis lies in improving the impasse.
21The Fall of Security Ties with Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter highlights one of the most profound insights into preventing
use of nuclear weapons, namely, MAED (Mutual Assured Economic Destruction),
which in our post Cold War time of a global economy with especially
critical regional economic relationships, has become an effective
deterrent. Perry describes and analyzes such initiatives as cultivating
major economic trade between such regional foes as India and Pakistan and
China and Taiwan, creating a deterrence of military conflict in the
interests of mutual prosperity. The chapter includes description of the
tension between China, Taiwan, and Japan over unpopulated islands located
between Taiwan and Okinawa, with insistent claims and counter claims.
Likewise, Perry recounts concerns over another Mumbai-like terrorist attack
by a Pakistani terror group against India. MAED is discussed as deterring
the arising of a dangerous military conflict between nuclear powers.
22The North Korean Policy Review: Triumph and Tragedy
chapter abstract
This chapter describes complex diplomacy surrounding the North Korean
nuclear crisis commencing in 1998, notably their threatening missile
developments. Although the Agreed Framework Perry established with North
Korea had earlier resolved nuclear issues, new risks appeared since he had
left the Pentagon. President Clinton asks Perry to lead a North Korean
Policy Review, Perry assembles a superb team to include Ash Carter, and
takes a collaborative approach by inviting major Japanese and South Korean
officials to join in the diplomacy. Perry chronicles how time overtook his
effort, a most promising one, with the end of the Clinton Administration.
Believed excellent during the work of the North Korean Policy Review,
prospects of success diminished under the Bush Administration until now we
face an angry and defiant North Korea expanding its nuclear weapons
capability. In Perry's words, it is "perhaps the most unsuccessful exercise
of diplomacy in our country's history."
23Fiasco in Iraq: Then and Now
chapter abstract
Asa member of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), Perry cites the invasion as a
prime example of how not to succeed in controlling the spread of nuclear
weapons. The chapter describes the twin failures of assuming Iraq (a)
possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and (b) was supporting Al Queda
to mount further terror strikes. The chapter recounts how the ISG's
recommendations provided a basis for the Bush Administration to change the
losing strategy in Iraq by adopting the Petraeus strategy stressing support
of Sunnis in Anwar Province. However, Perry points out that an overall turn
for the better in Iraq, notably a more inclusive politics, remains but a
remote possibility, most probably beyond accomplishing in the short run.
24Former Cold Warrior Offer New Vision
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the advocacy of an international program whose
sequence of steps could lead to a world without nuclear weapons. The
chapter chronicles how veteran national security experts George Schultz,
Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and Perry joined forces to raise international
awareness of the dynamics in which the US and Russia might take the lead in
reducing the nuclear threat. Measures include providing more time for
leaders to work through possible crises, accelerate nuclear reduction
through arms control agreements, and establish global systems to secure and
control fissionable material. The chapter recounts how op-eds by the four
experts attracted great attention, including in the Obama White House, and
led to promising further participation by other advocates for a safer
world. The chapter concludes with a call to further action to prevent a
decline in interest and a return to passivity on this crucial issue.
25The Way Forward: Hope for a World Without Nuclear Weapons
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the basis for hope that removing nuclear weapons
from the world becomes an idea whose time has come. The chapter indicates
that there are more than a few obstacles that may make that possibility
unlikely, the result eventually becoming dire. But Perry reviews the
considerable progress that has been made during the nuclear era from the
1940s to the present: significant reductions in weapon inventories, greater
awareness of the common good in reducing the threat, serious and growing
efforts to secure fissionable material from falling into the hands of
terror groups. In the final analysis, Perry points out that much comes down
to the faith in humans, in the words of William Faulkner, that "man will
not merely endure: he will prevail."
1The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Nuclear Nightmare
chapter abstract
This chapter underscores the enormous danger of nuclear weapons, especially
in conditions of hostility and noncooperation among nuclear powers, by
recounting the Cuban Missile Crisis. It shows that the world neared a
nuclear holocaust, threatening civilization itself. A member of the
analysis team providing daily crisis reports to President Kennedy and his
advisors, Perry, contrary to public post mortems on the crisis, reflects
that catastrophe was averted as much by luck as by successful crisis
management. US decision makers' knowledge was imperfect and sometimes
wrong. Some local commanders had discretion to begin armed conflict and
nearly did. Operational mistakes as well as normal military activities
elsewhere in the world could have been interpreted as a nuclear attack. It
is shown that there was no precedent for resolving the risk of history's
gravest war. Perry decides to pursue a career mitigating the nuclear
threat.
2A Fire in the Sky
chapter abstract
This chapter recounts Perry's experiences as a young soldier in the Army of
Occupation in Japan just after the end of World War II, and shows how he
began to change his thinking about national security in the era of nuclear
weapons as well as his thinking about his own calling. The devastation he
witnesses in Tokyo and Naha, together with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, "changed everything" and demands new modes of thinking about
national security. After discharge from the Army, Perry marries, begins a
family, and pursues degrees in mathematics, possibly as a prelude to an
academic career, but the Korean War and the onset of the Cold War with its
nuclear arsenals and "overkill" in increasingly destructive nuclear weapons
lead him into defense work, specifically the pioneering of a powerful new
reconnaissance capability to curtail miscalculations of Soviet nuclear
weapons and catastrophic decisions.
3The Rise of the Soviet Missile Threat and the Race for Data to Understand
It
chapter abstract
This chapter dramatizes the development of a sophisticated US
reconnaissance capability to monitor the secretive Soviet missile and space
program during the nuclear arms build-up in the Cold War. Although it could
not guarantee deterrence of a catastrophic war, knowledge of the size,
deployment, and performance characteristics of the USSR nuclear weapons
lent perspective and lessened the danger of miscalculation in an era of
concern over the threat of a Soviet nuclear first-strike. Perry begins work
at a defense company and studies countermeasures against Soviet missiles,
assesses that defense against an attacking nuclear force is ineffective,
and becomes a member of the high-ranking government Telemetry and Beacon
Analysis Committee (TEBAC) charged with determining the overall Soviet
nuclear threat and decides to start a new company, ESL, devoted exclusively
to the Cold War reconnaissance mission.
4An Original Silicon Valley Entrepreneur and the Advance of Spy Technology
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the formation and strong growth of ESL, Inc.
beginning in the 1960s in Silicon Valley, Perry's pioneering company in
developing sophisticated Cold War reconnaissance capabilities exploiting
new digital technology. Special lessons Perry learned about management and
cooperation in a successful enterprise of mitigating the danger from
nuclear weapons are analyzed, lessons that carried over to his later career
beyond the corporate in pursuing that quest. Of ESL's large base of
projects, emphasis is placed on intercepting telemetry of Soviet ICBM tests
and obtaining signals intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile defense
(BMD) systems together with data interpretation, including the often highly
innovative measures needed to intercept the data. The chapter also
describes Perry's involvement with the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency in its foundational work at the dawn of the crucial period of arms
reduction agreements with the Soviets.
5A Call to Serve
chapter abstract
This chapter chronicles Perry's move from corporate life to government
service in his journey at the nuclear brink. As undersecretary of defense
for research and engineering in the Carter administration, Perry now found
himself charged with revolutionizing US tactical battlefield capabilities
to offset the Soviet numerical advantage in conventional forces, an
advantage threatening nuclear deterrence now that the Soviets had reached
nuclear parity with the US. Perry's expertise in digital technology brought
him to this role, and he proceeded to assemble a powerful team, most
notably Air Force Lt. Col Paul Kaminski as his personal assistant, to meet
the immense challenge of upgrading US systems, a challenge that meant
exploiting state-of-the-art technology, performing innovations much more
quickly than ordinarily done in military weapon development, and "getting
things right the first time." Perry gained his initial experience in
international diplomacy, an experience crucial in his later career.
6Implementing the Offset Strategy and the Emergence of Stealth Technology
chapter abstract
This chapter describes implementation of the Offset Strategy to shore-up
and strengthen nuclear deterrence. A crucial US accomplishment in the age
of nuclear weapons, this development of the "system of systems"-stealth,
smart sensors, smart weapons-made the US battlefield performance superior
and remains the foundation of our premiere military forces, with the later
Desert Storm campaign serving as a convincing proving ground for its
success. The "force multiplier" effects of the new technology are immensely
efficient and economical: even when numerically inferior, US forces can
prevail by striking targets with great accuracy while experiencing
exceedingly low losses in their own forces and equipment. The Offset
Strategy showed the power of revolutionary technology to create conditions
of enhanced nuclear deterrence and to point the way to mitigating future
dangers, as well as the ability of smart and talented people to respond to
the issue of deterrence.
7Buildup of the US Nuclear Force
chapter abstract
This chapter recounts the buildup of US nuclear forces-bombers, SLBMs and
ICBMs-led by Perry as undersecretary of defense. Soviet nuclear forces had
improved, raising concerns of weakening deterrence and new US
vulnerability, especially with the aging of our deployed nuclear
triad.Perry rescued the faltering Trident submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) program to replace the aging US Polaris fleet and insured
deployment of a superb upgraded force. He extended the lifetime of the US
B-52 bomber force against the huge buildup in Soviet air defense by
introducing air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) fired from B-52s well
outside the reach of Soviet air defense systems. Improving the third leg of
the triad, essentially the creation of a basing scheme for the new MX ICBM,
a problem Perry inherited, was never resolved then or in future
administrations, after which the MX was retired.
8Nuclear Alerts, Arms Control, and Missed Opportunities in Nonproliferation
chapter abstract
This chapter shows an example of the awesome danger of nuclear
miscalculation and the need for arms control agreements as a means of
dialog between nuclear powers, thereby enhancing security through a context
of mutual understanding. Perry describes the sudden alert he received as
under secretary in the middle of the night on November 9, 1979, when the
watch officer at NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) reported his
warning computer showed 200 Soviet missiles approaching the US. Although it
was a false alarm caused by human error, Perry reflects on the fearsome
difficulties of making rational assessments under such duress. This chapter
also describes early US-Soviet strategic arms agreements-the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II), their politics and technical
evolution-and missed opportunities to limit proliferation to other
countries.
9The Undersecretary as Diplomat
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's activities in diplomacy as undersecretary,
experiences vital in his later career in seeking cooperative international
measures to mitigate the danger of nuclear weapons. Perry recounts his
diplomatic mission to China to implement President Carter's initiative to
improve China's conventional military forces as one of the means of
containment of the USSR, an initiative cancelled after the Tiananmen Square
massacre. The chapter also describes Perry's policy to improve the
battlefield capabilities of NATO, and thereby enhance deterrence of a
nuclear war, through cooperative defense acquisition programs and enhanced
interoperability of the weapons of NATO members and hence their ability to
operate jointly in combat operations. Perry also reflects on the lessons
learned about international cooperation through his exposure to, and
participation in aspects of, the Camp David Accords among Israel, Egypt,
and the US.
10Back in Civilian Life: The Cold War Ends But the Nuclear Journey
Continues
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's return to civilian life and his continuing
quest to reduce the nuclear danger. His work with the San Francisco
investment banker, Hambrecht & Quist, specializing in venture capital
support of entrepreneurial high technology companies, is recalled, together
with his professorship at Stanford University teaching a popular course on
the history of technology in defense. Perry becomes a prominent critic of
the Strategic Defense Initiative as unworkable. He undertakes Track 2
diplomacy, designed to open the way for formal government initiatives on
reducing the nuclear danger and which takes him to the USSR and other
nations, gaining him contacts valuable in his later diplomacy as secretary
of defense. As the Soviet Union breaks apart, Perry joins Senators Sam Nunn
and Richard Lugar, Harvard professor Ash Carter, and others to develop the
Nunn-Lugar legislation to remove "loose nukes" from former Soviet
republics.
11A Return to Washington: The New Challenge of "Loose Nukes" and the
Lurching Reform of Defense Acquisition
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's return to government service as deputy
defense secretary in the first term of the Clinton Administration. The
challenge of removing "loose nukes" from former Soviet republics was
paramount for Perry in his general quest to prevent the use of nuclear
weapons and was a prime motive in his return to the Pentagon. He also
considered defense acquisition reform essential to fielding a nimble
military, an imperative for maintaining nuclear deterrence in a volatile
and dangerous international order, and was determined to carry out a reform
program. The chapter relates Perry's successful efforts to fund the
Nunn-Lugar program to deal with "loose nukes" and his assembling of an
effective team to carry out the work, as well as his forming an experienced
and effective senior management team in the Pentagon to lead the defense
acquisition reforms.
12I Become Secretary of Defense
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the work of Perry and colleagues to develop
agreements to remove "loose nukes" in former Soviet republics, for example,
through the Trilateral Statement and the later agreement it foreshadowed,
the Budapest Memorandum, which addressed Ukrainian concerns about the
sanctity of its borders. The chapter then turns to events leading up to
Perry's confirmation as Secretary of Defense to succeed Les Aspin after he
had been asked to step down by President Clinton. Perry relates his
discussions with President Clinton and Vice President Gore, the latter
crucial in his decision to accept the position. The chapter describes the
press conference President Clinton held to announce Perry's appointment and
the resultant process of Perry's unanimous confirmation by the Senate.
Perry's swearing in ceremony is described.
13Dismantling Nuclear Weapons and the Legacy of Nunn-Lugar
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the dismantling of nuclear weapon systems under the
Nunn-Lugar initiative. First-hand accounts of the dismantling activity at
weapon sites such as Pervomaysk in Ukraine as well as at military bases in
the US are detailed. The broad reach of Nunn-Lugar to include control of
fissionable material is indicated together with the provisions for removal
of chemical weapons. Perry describes the technical aspects of the
dismantling and removal of ICBMs, ICBM silos, nuclear submarines, and
strategic bombers. More broadly, he reflects on the remarkable significance
of the Nunn-Lugar legislation as a signature development in the nuclear era
to support the reduction of the danger from nuclear weapons. Key
contributions to the success of Nunn-Lugar by the principal people in the
program are called out.
14The Crisis with North Korea: Containing a Nuclear State
chapter abstract
This chapter describes dealing with North Korea in a crisis brought on
during Perry's days as defense secretary by that country's move toward
nuclear weapons. North Korea was a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and had agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections to confirm compliance. Perry recounts how North Korea had
prospects of using spent fuel from its "peaceful" reactor at Yongbon in a
covert nuclear weapon program, and how the nation suspiciously was
threatening to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and was
blocking IAEA inspections. Perry describes his interaction with General
Luck, the US commander in South Korea, and his discussions with President
Clinton and US officials about US options. The chapter chronicles how the
crisis was averted through firm coercive diplomacy and the work of former
President Carter in meeting directly with the North Koreans in Pyongyang.
15Ratifying Start II and Battling Over the Test Ban Treaty
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the problems and prospects of ratifying the START II
arms control treaty with the Russians, a goal set by President Clinton.
Perry recounts the challenging processes in obtaining legislative approval
in both the US and Russia for ratification, including his unprecedented
address to the Russian Duma spelling out the advisability of ratification,
and discusses the lengthy process of ratification in Russia. The chapter
also describes the efforts of Perry and others to obtain ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and chronicles the ultimate failure to
do so in the US Senate. Perry reflects on the detriment to efforts to
reduce the danger of nuclear weapons by political failures to realize
successful arms control initiatives. He analyzes the problems in old modes
of thinking in the nuclear era with its demand for innovative, cooperative
solutions.
16NATO, Peacekeeping in Bosnia, and the Rise of Security Ties With Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter, pivotal in Perry's journey, dramatizes the failure to balance
competing interests among the Cold War foes in Europe in the postwar era of
reduced tensions and greater opportunities for cooperation. A natural pull
had arisen among NATO nations and the former Soviet republics and Warsaw
Pact for working together on regional interests such as peacekeeping in
Bosnia. The Partnership for Peace was instituted, a process for previous
enemies of NATO to join the alliance, all eager to do so. Perry chronicles
the unfortunate politics that ultimately rushed a premature enlargement of
NATO, an unenlightened outcome that insufficiently accounted for
traditional Russian concerns and soured what were becoming much improved
relations with Russia, to the detriment of prospects for greater
cooperation on nuclear issues.
17The "Immaculate Invasion" of Haiti and Forging Ties for Western
Hemispheric Unity
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the raising of concerns for Western Hemispheric
security in the post Cold War world when the danger from nuclear weapons
began to grow global and US national security concerns broadened, certainly
to include contingencies close to home. It was an enlargement of focus
beyond previous practices in the Defense Department. The need was
especially dramatized when a military junta overthrew the democratically
elected government in Haiti. Perry recounts the superb US military
intervention planning that convinced the coup leaders to step aside for a
peaceful resolution in Haiti and the restoration of the legitimate leader.
In addition, other initiatives by Perry to enhance Western hemispheric
security are described, such as regularly scheduled meetings of all
hemispheric defense ministers and establishment of a center for hemispheric
defense studies (later renamed the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric
Studies).
18The "Iron Logic" Between Military Capability and Quality of Life
chapter abstract
This chapter describes a major initiative of Perry: instituting policies
and procedures to enhance the quality of life of enlisted soldiers and
their families, the key principle being the "iron logic" linking a
successful quality of life to the superior military capability of our
forces. Perry recounts the very successful program he established to allow
him direct contact with enlisted personnel in all services at many bases
and installations to hear firsthand their concerns and suggestions. Perry
describes an innovative program to enlist commercial building contractors
to conduct successful business by building greatly improved base housing, a
program continuing today. Perry's wife, Lee, extended the humanitarian
philosophy to Albania by recommending that State National Guards take their
summer tour there to improve greatly an underfunded military hospital, for
which she received the Mother Teresa Medal from the president of Albania.
19A Farewell to Arms
chapter abstract
This chapter describes Perry's transition from secretary of defense to
civilian life. After carefully considering the decision, Perry, now 70,
opted to return to California after one term in the cabinet role, satisfied
that he had met goals and objectives, certainly including the compliment
that he had been "the GI's general" as reflected by a touching special
personal award given for the first time to a departing secretary of defense
by senior NCOs. He resumed his teaching at Stanford, full-time and under an
endowed chair, the Michael and Barbara Berberian Chair. He and Ash Carter,
the latter at Harvard, resumed their collaboration, co-authoring a book
dramatizing their ideas on foreign policy in the nuclear era, Preventive
Defense, together with a joint study program. He began devoting most of his
time to a worldwide series of Track 2 diplomatic missions on national
security and the nuclear issue.
20The Fall of Security Ties with Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the deteriorating relationship with Russia in the
years after Perry had left the Pentagon. Social/political turmoil in Russia
is pivotal, fostering nostalgia for "the good old days." Perry recounts how
the transfer of power to Vladimir Putin increased hostility. The US
European BMD system heightened mistrust. Perry presents this chapter as a
parable of how fast relations can turn sour between great nations when they
operate in opposition to one another. Perry characterizes the downturn as
one of the most unfortunate blows to cooperative resolution of the nuclear
issue. He categorizes the issue as potentially a most dangerous one in the
nuclear era. His major Track 2 emphasis lies in improving the impasse.
21The Fall of Security Ties with Russia
chapter abstract
This chapter highlights one of the most profound insights into preventing
use of nuclear weapons, namely, MAED (Mutual Assured Economic Destruction),
which in our post Cold War time of a global economy with especially
critical regional economic relationships, has become an effective
deterrent. Perry describes and analyzes such initiatives as cultivating
major economic trade between such regional foes as India and Pakistan and
China and Taiwan, creating a deterrence of military conflict in the
interests of mutual prosperity. The chapter includes description of the
tension between China, Taiwan, and Japan over unpopulated islands located
between Taiwan and Okinawa, with insistent claims and counter claims.
Likewise, Perry recounts concerns over another Mumbai-like terrorist attack
by a Pakistani terror group against India. MAED is discussed as deterring
the arising of a dangerous military conflict between nuclear powers.
22The North Korean Policy Review: Triumph and Tragedy
chapter abstract
This chapter describes complex diplomacy surrounding the North Korean
nuclear crisis commencing in 1998, notably their threatening missile
developments. Although the Agreed Framework Perry established with North
Korea had earlier resolved nuclear issues, new risks appeared since he had
left the Pentagon. President Clinton asks Perry to lead a North Korean
Policy Review, Perry assembles a superb team to include Ash Carter, and
takes a collaborative approach by inviting major Japanese and South Korean
officials to join in the diplomacy. Perry chronicles how time overtook his
effort, a most promising one, with the end of the Clinton Administration.
Believed excellent during the work of the North Korean Policy Review,
prospects of success diminished under the Bush Administration until now we
face an angry and defiant North Korea expanding its nuclear weapons
capability. In Perry's words, it is "perhaps the most unsuccessful exercise
of diplomacy in our country's history."
23Fiasco in Iraq: Then and Now
chapter abstract
Asa member of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), Perry cites the invasion as a
prime example of how not to succeed in controlling the spread of nuclear
weapons. The chapter describes the twin failures of assuming Iraq (a)
possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and (b) was supporting Al Queda
to mount further terror strikes. The chapter recounts how the ISG's
recommendations provided a basis for the Bush Administration to change the
losing strategy in Iraq by adopting the Petraeus strategy stressing support
of Sunnis in Anwar Province. However, Perry points out that an overall turn
for the better in Iraq, notably a more inclusive politics, remains but a
remote possibility, most probably beyond accomplishing in the short run.
24Former Cold Warrior Offer New Vision
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the advocacy of an international program whose
sequence of steps could lead to a world without nuclear weapons. The
chapter chronicles how veteran national security experts George Schultz,
Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and Perry joined forces to raise international
awareness of the dynamics in which the US and Russia might take the lead in
reducing the nuclear threat. Measures include providing more time for
leaders to work through possible crises, accelerate nuclear reduction
through arms control agreements, and establish global systems to secure and
control fissionable material. The chapter recounts how op-eds by the four
experts attracted great attention, including in the Obama White House, and
led to promising further participation by other advocates for a safer
world. The chapter concludes with a call to further action to prevent a
decline in interest and a return to passivity on this crucial issue.
25The Way Forward: Hope for a World Without Nuclear Weapons
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the basis for hope that removing nuclear weapons
from the world becomes an idea whose time has come. The chapter indicates
that there are more than a few obstacles that may make that possibility
unlikely, the result eventually becoming dire. But Perry reviews the
considerable progress that has been made during the nuclear era from the
1940s to the present: significant reductions in weapon inventories, greater
awareness of the common good in reducing the threat, serious and growing
efforts to secure fissionable material from falling into the hands of
terror groups. In the final analysis, Perry points out that much comes down
to the faith in humans, in the words of William Faulkner, that "man will
not merely endure: he will prevail."