Lynne Rudder Baker
Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective
Lynne Rudder Baker
Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective
- Broschiertes Buch
- Merkliste
- Auf die Merkliste
- Bewerten Bewerten
- Teilen
- Produkt teilen
- Produkterinnerung
- Produkterinnerung
This book investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: (1) to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; (2) to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; (3) to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions.
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
- GaneriSELF P39,99 €
- The Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism65,99 €
- Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism12,99 €
- John RyderThe Things in Heaven and Earth: An Essay in Pragmatic Naturalism38,99 €
- Andrew PinsentThe Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics76,99 €
- Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism65,99 €
- The Ethics Of Naturalism26,99 €
-
-
-
This book investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: (1) to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; (2) to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; (3) to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Hurst & Co.
- Seitenzahl: 272
- Erscheinungstermin: 16. Mai 2013
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 206mm x 137mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 295g
- ISBN-13: 9780199914746
- ISBN-10: 0199914745
- Artikelnr.: 36691633
- Verlag: Hurst & Co.
- Seitenzahl: 272
- Erscheinungstermin: 16. Mai 2013
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 206mm x 137mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 295g
- ISBN-13: 9780199914746
- ISBN-10: 0199914745
- Artikelnr.: 36691633
Lynne Rudder Baker is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Baker has written four books on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and has published many articles in philosophy journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and many more.
* Introduction: What is the Problem?
* The Claim of Naturalism
* A Challenge to Naturalism
* What is at Stake
* An Overview
* Part I: The Core Argument
* Ch. 1. Varieties of Naturalism
* What Counts As 'Science'?
* Reductive Naturalism
* Nonreductive Naturalism
* Disenchantment and Optimism
* Ch. 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective
* What is Naturalization?
* The Robust First-Person Perspective
* The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective
* Ch. 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
* John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self
* David Lewis on De Se Belief
* A Comment on John Searle
* Can Cognitive Science Save the Day?
* Ch. 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
* Daniel Dennett on Consciousness
* Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory
* My Recommendation
* Ch. 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization
* From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties
* A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person
Properties
* A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism
* Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective
* Ch. 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person
Perspective
* The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
* Language and the Acquisition of Concepts
* How to Acquire a Self-Concept
* Human Persons: Wrap Up
* Ch. 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent?
* Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach
* Objections and Replies
* Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory
* Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped
* Ch. 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective
* First-Person Properties
* Dispositional Properties
* Haecceitistic Implications
* Ch. 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of
the First-person Perspective
* Personhood
* Agency
* Artifacts
* Moral Responsibility
* Ch. 10. Natural Reality
* Near-Naturalism
* Property-Constitution and Causation
* Emergentism and Downward Causation
* How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism?
* Index
* The Claim of Naturalism
* A Challenge to Naturalism
* What is at Stake
* An Overview
* Part I: The Core Argument
* Ch. 1. Varieties of Naturalism
* What Counts As 'Science'?
* Reductive Naturalism
* Nonreductive Naturalism
* Disenchantment and Optimism
* Ch. 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective
* What is Naturalization?
* The Robust First-Person Perspective
* The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective
* Ch. 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
* John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self
* David Lewis on De Se Belief
* A Comment on John Searle
* Can Cognitive Science Save the Day?
* Ch. 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
* Daniel Dennett on Consciousness
* Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory
* My Recommendation
* Ch. 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization
* From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties
* A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person
Properties
* A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism
* Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective
* Ch. 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person
Perspective
* The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
* Language and the Acquisition of Concepts
* How to Acquire a Self-Concept
* Human Persons: Wrap Up
* Ch. 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent?
* Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach
* Objections and Replies
* Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory
* Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped
* Ch. 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective
* First-Person Properties
* Dispositional Properties
* Haecceitistic Implications
* Ch. 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of
the First-person Perspective
* Personhood
* Agency
* Artifacts
* Moral Responsibility
* Ch. 10. Natural Reality
* Near-Naturalism
* Property-Constitution and Causation
* Emergentism and Downward Causation
* How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism?
* Index
* Introduction: What is the Problem?
* The Claim of Naturalism
* A Challenge to Naturalism
* What is at Stake
* An Overview
* Part I: The Core Argument
* Ch. 1. Varieties of Naturalism
* What Counts As 'Science'?
* Reductive Naturalism
* Nonreductive Naturalism
* Disenchantment and Optimism
* Ch. 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective
* What is Naturalization?
* The Robust First-Person Perspective
* The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective
* Ch. 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
* John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self
* David Lewis on De Se Belief
* A Comment on John Searle
* Can Cognitive Science Save the Day?
* Ch. 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
* Daniel Dennett on Consciousness
* Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory
* My Recommendation
* Ch. 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization
* From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties
* A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person
Properties
* A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism
* Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective
* Ch. 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person
Perspective
* The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
* Language and the Acquisition of Concepts
* How to Acquire a Self-Concept
* Human Persons: Wrap Up
* Ch. 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent?
* Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach
* Objections and Replies
* Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory
* Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped
* Ch. 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective
* First-Person Properties
* Dispositional Properties
* Haecceitistic Implications
* Ch. 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of
the First-person Perspective
* Personhood
* Agency
* Artifacts
* Moral Responsibility
* Ch. 10. Natural Reality
* Near-Naturalism
* Property-Constitution and Causation
* Emergentism and Downward Causation
* How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism?
* Index
* The Claim of Naturalism
* A Challenge to Naturalism
* What is at Stake
* An Overview
* Part I: The Core Argument
* Ch. 1. Varieties of Naturalism
* What Counts As 'Science'?
* Reductive Naturalism
* Nonreductive Naturalism
* Disenchantment and Optimism
* Ch. 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective
* What is Naturalization?
* The Robust First-Person Perspective
* The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective
* Ch. 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
* John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self
* David Lewis on De Se Belief
* A Comment on John Searle
* Can Cognitive Science Save the Day?
* Ch. 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
* Daniel Dennett on Consciousness
* Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory
* My Recommendation
* Ch. 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization
* From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties
* A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person
Properties
* A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism
* Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective
* Ch. 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person
Perspective
* The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
* Language and the Acquisition of Concepts
* How to Acquire a Self-Concept
* Human Persons: Wrap Up
* Ch. 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent?
* Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach
* Objections and Replies
* Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory
* Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped
* Ch. 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective
* First-Person Properties
* Dispositional Properties
* Haecceitistic Implications
* Ch. 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of
the First-person Perspective
* Personhood
* Agency
* Artifacts
* Moral Responsibility
* Ch. 10. Natural Reality
* Near-Naturalism
* Property-Constitution and Causation
* Emergentism and Downward Causation
* How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism?
* Index