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The Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was established two months after the signing of the Paris Agreement in January 1973. The purpose of the FPJMT was to negotiate the implementation of Article 8(b) of the Agreement which called for repatriation of the remains of the dead and an exchange of information concerning the missing in action. Each of the governments signatory to the Paris Agreement was represented on the Team, the United States, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
The Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was established two months after the signing of the Paris Agreement in January 1973. The purpose of the FPJMT was to negotiate the implementation of Article 8(b) of the Agreement which called for repatriation of the remains of the dead and an exchange of information concerning the missing in action. Each of the governments signatory to the Paris Agreement was represented on the Team, the United States, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG). After almost a year and a half, the negotiations ended when the DRV and PRG announced their decision to permanently cease their participation at the conference table. This study describes the various activities of the FPJMT and analyzes the negotiations to determine the negotiating tactics and strategy used by the US and DRV negotiators. The results achieved by the US Delegation are noted. Based on the evidence available, a conclusion is made that the DRV Delegation was relatively unsuccessful in achieving their apparent objectives. A suggestion is made, however, that more information is necessary before the true success or failure of the DRV Delegation can be accurately measured. A comparison is made of the tactics used by the US Delegation with some suggested tactics developed by Gerald L. Steibel who is a noted author on the matter of negotiating with Communists. The comparison revealed that some of Steibel's tactics were followed by the US Delegation, others were not, and one of Steibel's suggestions proved to be inappropriate when applied to the DRV negotiators. The thesis concludes with an observation that the US Delegation was unable to fully accomplish its mission primarily because continued US support of the RVN Government was of higher priority than recovering America's dead and missing.