Adopting a broadly compatibilist approach, this volume's authors argue that the behavioral and mind sciences do not threaten the moral foundations of legal responsibility. Rather, these sciences provide fresh insight into human agency and updated criteria as well as powerful diagnostic and intervention tools for assessing and altering minds.
Adopting a broadly compatibilist approach, this volume's authors argue that the behavioral and mind sciences do not threaten the moral foundations of legal responsibility. Rather, these sciences provide fresh insight into human agency and updated criteria as well as powerful diagnostic and intervention tools for assessing and altering minds.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Research Fellow, Philosophy, Macquarie University Australia and Chief Investigator of the Enhancing Responsibility Project based at Delft University of Technology
Inhaltsangabe
* Chapter 1 * Introduction * Nicole A. Vincent * Chapter 2 * Criminal Common Law Compatibilism * Stephen J. Morse * Chapter 3 * What can neurosciences say about responsibility? Taking the distinction between theoretical and practical reason seriously * Anne Ruth Mackor * Chapter 4 * Irrationality, mental capacities and neuroscience * Jillian Craigie and Alicia Coram * Chapter 5 * Skepticism Concerning Human Agency: Sciences of the Self vs. 'Voluntariness' in the Law * Paul Sheldon Davies * Chapter 6 * The Implications of Heuristics and Biases Research on Moral and Legal Responsibility: A Case Against the Reasonable Person Standard * Leora Dahan-Katz * Chapter 7 * Moral Responsibility and Consciousness: Two Challenges, One Solution * Neil Levy * Chapter 8 * Translating Scientific Evidence into the Language of the 'Folk': Executive Function as Capacity-Responsibility * Katrina L. Sifferd * Chapter 9 * Neuroscience, deviant appetites and the criminal law * Colin Gavaghan * Chapter 10 * Is Psychopathy a Mental Disease? * Thomas Nadelhoffer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong * Chapter 11 * Addiction, choice, and disease: How voluntary is voluntary action in addiction? * Jeanette Kennett * Chapter 12 * How may neuroscience affect the way that the criminal courts deal with addicted offenders? * Wayne Hall and Adrian Carter * Chapter 13 * Enhancing Responsibility * Nicole A. Vincent * Chapter 14 * Guilty Minds in Washed Brains? * Manipulation Cases, Excuses and the Normative Prerequisites of Liberal Legal Orders * Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel
* Chapter 1 * Introduction * Nicole A. Vincent * Chapter 2 * Criminal Common Law Compatibilism * Stephen J. Morse * Chapter 3 * What can neurosciences say about responsibility? Taking the distinction between theoretical and practical reason seriously * Anne Ruth Mackor * Chapter 4 * Irrationality, mental capacities and neuroscience * Jillian Craigie and Alicia Coram * Chapter 5 * Skepticism Concerning Human Agency: Sciences of the Self vs. 'Voluntariness' in the Law * Paul Sheldon Davies * Chapter 6 * The Implications of Heuristics and Biases Research on Moral and Legal Responsibility: A Case Against the Reasonable Person Standard * Leora Dahan-Katz * Chapter 7 * Moral Responsibility and Consciousness: Two Challenges, One Solution * Neil Levy * Chapter 8 * Translating Scientific Evidence into the Language of the 'Folk': Executive Function as Capacity-Responsibility * Katrina L. Sifferd * Chapter 9 * Neuroscience, deviant appetites and the criminal law * Colin Gavaghan * Chapter 10 * Is Psychopathy a Mental Disease? * Thomas Nadelhoffer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong * Chapter 11 * Addiction, choice, and disease: How voluntary is voluntary action in addiction? * Jeanette Kennett * Chapter 12 * How may neuroscience affect the way that the criminal courts deal with addicted offenders? * Wayne Hall and Adrian Carter * Chapter 13 * Enhancing Responsibility * Nicole A. Vincent * Chapter 14 * Guilty Minds in Washed Brains? * Manipulation Cases, Excuses and the Normative Prerequisites of Liberal Legal Orders * Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826
