These previously unpublished essays present the newest developments in the thought of philosophers working on action and its explanation, focusing on a wide range of interlocking issues relating to agency, deliberation, motivation, mental causation, teleology, interpretive explanation and the ontology of actions and their reasons.
These previously unpublished essays present the newest developments in the thought of philosophers working on action and its explanation, focusing on a wide range of interlocking issues relating to agency, deliberation, motivation, mental causation, teleology, interpretive explanation and the ontology of actions and their reasons.
MARIA ALVAREZ is a philosophy lecturer at the University of Southampton, UK ANNETTE BAIER (retired) taught at the universities of Aberdeen, Auckland, Sydney, Carnegie-Mellon, and Pittsburgh, and held visiting appointments at Florida Gainesville, City University of New York, and Michigan, USA STEPHEN BOULTER is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University, UK JONATHAN DANCY is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading, UK, and at the University of Texas at Austin, USA FRED DRETSKE is Professor Emeritus at both Stanford University and University of Wisconsin. He is currently a senior research professor (no teaching) at Duke University, USA STEPHEN EVERSON is a lecturer at the University of York, UK PETER HACKER is Emeritus Research Fellow of St John's College, Oxford, UK SEAN DORRANCE KELLY is Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, USA JOSHUA KNOBE works primarily in experimental philosophy at UNC-Chapel Hill, USA E. J. LOWE is Professor of Philosophy at Durham University, UK RICHARD MORAN is the Brian D. Young Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, USA CHARLES PIGDEN teaches philosophy at Otago University, Dunedin, New Zealand A. W. PRICE is Reader in Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London, UK JOSEPH RAZ is professor at Columbia Law School, USA and a Research Professor University of Oxford, UK DAVID-HILLEL RUBEN is Director of NYU in London and Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck, University of London, UK G. F. SCHUELER is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Delaware, USA HELEN STEWARD is working on topics in the philosophy of action, specifically as they relate to the free will debate at University of Leeds, UK RALF STOECKER is professor for philosophy, particularly applied ethics, at the University of Potsdam, Germany MARTIN STONE teaches Law at Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University and Philosophy at the New School Graduate Faculty in New York, USA ROWLAND STOUT is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at University College Dublin, Ireland FREDERICK STOUTLAND is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at St. Olaf College, Minnesota, USA and Permanent Visiting Professor at Uppsala University, Sweden JULIA TANNEY is a Senior Lecturer (and presently Head of Philosophy) at the University of Kent, UK NICK ZANGWILL is Professor of Philosophy at Durham University, UK
Inhaltsangabe
Notes on Contributors Introduction PART I: REASONS AND CAUSES What Must Actions be for Reasons to Explain Them?; F.Dretske What Kind of Things are Reasons for Action?; S.Everson Was Sally's Reason for Running From the Bear that She Thought it was Chasing Her?; R.Stout Con-reasons as Causes; D.H. Ruben Agential Reasons and the Explanation of Human Behaviour; P.M.S.Hacker Reasons as Non-causal, Context-placing Explanations; J.Tanney Interpretive Explanations; G.F.Schueler Anscombe on the Expression of Intention: An Exegesis; R.Moran & M.J.Stone Can One Act for a Reason Without Acting Intentionally? ; J.Knobe & S.D.Kelly Reasons: Explanatory and Normative; J.Raz Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions; M.Alvarez A Niggle at Nagel: Causally Active Desires and the Explanation of Action; C.Pigden Acting in Character; A.Baier Aquinas on the Explanation of Action; S.Boulter Acting for Reasons - A Grass Root Approach; R.Stoecker PART II: AGENCY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Sub-Intentional Actions and the Over-Mentalization of Agency; H.Steward Determinism, Intentional Action, and Bodily Movements; F.Stoutland Free Agency, Causation, and Action Explanation; E.J.Lowe Gods and Mental States: The Causation of Action in Ancient Tragedy and Modern Philosophy of Mind; C.Sandis Aristotle's Conception of Practical Thinking; A.W.Price Action in Moral Metaphysics; J.Dancy Non-cognitivism and Motivation; N.Zangwill Index
Notes on Contributors Introduction PART I: REASONS AND CAUSES What Must Actions be for Reasons to Explain Them?; F.Dretske What Kind of Things are Reasons for Action?; S.Everson Was Sally's Reason for Running From the Bear that She Thought it was Chasing Her?; R.Stout Con-reasons as Causes; D.H. Ruben Agential Reasons and the Explanation of Human Behaviour; P.M.S.Hacker Reasons as Non-causal, Context-placing Explanations; J.Tanney Interpretive Explanations; G.F.Schueler Anscombe on the Expression of Intention: An Exegesis; R.Moran & M.J.Stone Can One Act for a Reason Without Acting Intentionally? ; J.Knobe & S.D.Kelly Reasons: Explanatory and Normative; J.Raz Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions; M.Alvarez A Niggle at Nagel: Causally Active Desires and the Explanation of Action; C.Pigden Acting in Character; A.Baier Aquinas on the Explanation of Action; S.Boulter Acting for Reasons – A Grass Root Approach; R.Stoecker PART II: AGENCY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Sub-Intentional Actions and the Over-Mentalization of Agency; H.Steward Determinism, Intentional Action, and Bodily Movements; F.Stoutland Free Agency, Causation, and Action Explanation; E.J.Lowe Gods and Mental States: The Causation of Action in Ancient Tragedy and Modern Philosophy of Mind; C.Sandis Aristotle's Conception of Practical Thinking; A.W.Price Action in Moral Metaphysics; J.Dancy Non-cognitivism and Motivation; N.Zangwill Index
Notes on Contributors Introduction PART I: REASONS AND CAUSES What Must Actions be for Reasons to Explain Them?; F.Dretske What Kind of Things are Reasons for Action?; S.Everson Was Sally's Reason for Running From the Bear that She Thought it was Chasing Her?; R.Stout Con-reasons as Causes; D.H. Ruben Agential Reasons and the Explanation of Human Behaviour; P.M.S.Hacker Reasons as Non-causal, Context-placing Explanations; J.Tanney Interpretive Explanations; G.F.Schueler Anscombe on the Expression of Intention: An Exegesis; R.Moran & M.J.Stone Can One Act for a Reason Without Acting Intentionally? ; J.Knobe & S.D.Kelly Reasons: Explanatory and Normative; J.Raz Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions; M.Alvarez A Niggle at Nagel: Causally Active Desires and the Explanation of Action; C.Pigden Acting in Character; A.Baier Aquinas on the Explanation of Action; S.Boulter Acting for Reasons - A Grass Root Approach; R.Stoecker PART II: AGENCY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Sub-Intentional Actions and the Over-Mentalization of Agency; H.Steward Determinism, Intentional Action, and Bodily Movements; F.Stoutland Free Agency, Causation, and Action Explanation; E.J.Lowe Gods and Mental States: The Causation of Action in Ancient Tragedy and Modern Philosophy of Mind; C.Sandis Aristotle's Conception of Practical Thinking; A.W.Price Action in Moral Metaphysics; J.Dancy Non-cognitivism and Motivation; N.Zangwill Index
Notes on Contributors Introduction PART I: REASONS AND CAUSES What Must Actions be for Reasons to Explain Them?; F.Dretske What Kind of Things are Reasons for Action?; S.Everson Was Sally's Reason for Running From the Bear that She Thought it was Chasing Her?; R.Stout Con-reasons as Causes; D.H. Ruben Agential Reasons and the Explanation of Human Behaviour; P.M.S.Hacker Reasons as Non-causal, Context-placing Explanations; J.Tanney Interpretive Explanations; G.F.Schueler Anscombe on the Expression of Intention: An Exegesis; R.Moran & M.J.Stone Can One Act for a Reason Without Acting Intentionally? ; J.Knobe & S.D.Kelly Reasons: Explanatory and Normative; J.Raz Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions; M.Alvarez A Niggle at Nagel: Causally Active Desires and the Explanation of Action; C.Pigden Acting in Character; A.Baier Aquinas on the Explanation of Action; S.Boulter Acting for Reasons – A Grass Root Approach; R.Stoecker PART II: AGENCY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY Sub-Intentional Actions and the Over-Mentalization of Agency; H.Steward Determinism, Intentional Action, and Bodily Movements; F.Stoutland Free Agency, Causation, and Action Explanation; E.J.Lowe Gods and Mental States: The Causation of Action in Ancient Tragedy and Modern Philosophy of Mind; C.Sandis Aristotle's Conception of Practical Thinking; A.W.Price Action in Moral Metaphysics; J.Dancy Non-cognitivism and Motivation; N.Zangwill Index
Rezensionen
'This is the most interesting collection of new articles in the philosophy of action for several years, and a clear signal that the orthodoxies of the last forty years are at last giving way to more plausible and fruitful philosophical ideas.'
- John Hyman, University of Oxford, UK
'Constantine Sandis has done a remarkable job of collecting some of the best essays on explanation of action Sandis' anthology is a wonderfully informative collection of essays on action explanation.' Joseph Ulatowski, University of Nevada, Metapsychology
'The discussions in this collection helpfully locate central issues that are up for re-thinking in the re-assessment of contemporary philosophy of action.' Robert Dunn, University of Sidney, Analysis
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