Anthony Everett gives a philosophical defence of the common-sense view that there are no such things as fictional people, places, and things. He argues that our talk and thought about such fictional objects takes place within the scope of a pretense, and that we gain little but lose much by accepting fictional realism.
Anthony Everett gives a philosophical defence of the common-sense view that there are no such things as fictional people, places, and things. He argues that our talk and thought about such fictional objects takes place within the scope of a pretense, and that we gain little but lose much by accepting fictional realism.
Anthony Everett is a senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Bristol, having obtained his PhD from Stanford University in 2000. He works in the philosophy of language, and related areas in the philosophy of mind, philosophical logic, metaphysics, and aesthetics.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Introduction 2: Fiction and the imagination 3: Talking through the pretense 4: Truth, content, aboutness 5: Objections 6: Fictional realism 7: Contra fictional realism 8: Metaphysical problems Bibliography Index
1: Introduction 2: Fiction and the imagination 3: Talking through the pretense 4: Truth, content, aboutness 5: Objections 6: Fictional realism 7: Contra fictional realism 8: Metaphysical problems Bibliography Index
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