The view that America and Russia have burned their candles on security cooperation with respect to nuclear weapons is simply mistaken. This timely study identifies twelve themes or issue areas that must be addressed by the United States and Russia if they are to provide shared, successful leadership in the management of nuclear world order. Designed as supplementary reading in upper division and graduate courses in national security policy, defense, and nuclear arms control, it is also suitable for courses taught at military staff and command colleges and-or war colleges.
The view that America and Russia have burned their candles on security cooperation with respect to nuclear weapons is simply mistaken. This timely study identifies twelve themes or issue areas that must be addressed by the United States and Russia if they are to provide shared, successful leadership in the management of nuclear world order. Designed as supplementary reading in upper division and graduate courses in national security policy, defense, and nuclear arms control, it is also suitable for courses taught at military staff and command colleges and-or war colleges.
Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine. Dr Cimbala is an award winning Penn State teacher and the author of numerous works in the fields of national security studies, nuclear arms control and other topics.
Inhaltsangabe
Contents: Introduction Cyber deterrence and nuclear arms control Jumping the gun: prompt attacks and nuclear weapons Triads and tribulations: strategic nuclear arms reductions after new START Avoiding digital disaster: managing nuclear crises in the information age Controlling and ending a nuclear war Minimum deterrence: interim solution or strategic distraction? Missile defense and U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control: obstacles, options and opportunities Nonproliferation and nuclear arms control: optimistic prognosis or pessimistic premonition? Nuclear abolition: a bridge too far? Sub-strategic nuclear weapons, first use and deterrence: a NATO-Russian entanglement Armed persuasion and Vladimir Putin in Ukraine: a nuclear subtext? Conclusion Index.
Contents: Introduction Cyber deterrence and nuclear arms control Jumping the gun: prompt attacks and nuclear weapons Triads and tribulations: strategic nuclear arms reductions after new START Avoiding digital disaster: managing nuclear crises in the information age Controlling and ending a nuclear war Minimum deterrence: interim solution or strategic distraction? Missile defense and U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control: obstacles, options and opportunities Nonproliferation and nuclear arms control: optimistic prognosis or pessimistic premonition? Nuclear abolition: a bridge too far? Sub-strategic nuclear weapons, first use and deterrence: a NATO-Russian entanglement Armed persuasion and Vladimir Putin in Ukraine: a nuclear subtext? Conclusion Index.
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