Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Robert Powell has had a long career in social and market research. Robert spent many years in Canada before returning to Australia, and served as a national director for a number of international corporations prior to commencing his own market research business in 1990.In his professional career, Robert developed a particular interest in the impact of change on individuals, during the transitions between life stages and sought to provide a greater understanding of the sensitivities involved in what for many is a traumatic event.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1. Introduction 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age 6. Stability and the lack of control 7. The strategy of limited retaliation 8. An appraisal Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory References Index.
Preface 1. Introduction 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age 6. Stability and the lack of control 7. The strategy of limited retaliation 8. An appraisal Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory References Index.
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