Daniel Z. Korman defends a conservative and commonsense view of material-object metaphysics, and especially the question of which highly visible objects there are right before our eyes. He argues that our ordinary, natural judgments about what is there are more or less correct, and defends his claim against a variety of objections.
Daniel Z. Korman defends a conservative and commonsense view of material-object metaphysics, and especially the question of which highly visible objects there are right before our eyes. He argues that our ordinary, natural judgments about what is there are more or less correct, and defends his claim against a variety of objections.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Daniel Z. Korman is an associate professor in the philosophy department at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. He is co-editor of Metaphysics: An Anthology (with Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa) and maintains the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on ordinary objects. While much of his research has focused on the metaphysics of material objects, other research interests include the philosophy of perception, debunking arguments, the nature and status of intuition, Locke on substratum, and scientific essentialism. Korman's work has appeared in such journals as Noûs, The Journal of Philosophy, Philosophers' Imprint, Philosophical Studies, and Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
Inhaltsangabe
I: Introduction II: The Arguments III: The Positions IV: The Counterexamples V: Compatibilism VI: Ontologese VII: Debunking VIII: Arbitrariness IX: Vagueness X: Overdetermination XI: Constitution XII: The Many XIII: Conclusion