Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War]( "Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War")
Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War61,99 €![Wresting the Initiative: Ridgway as Operational Commander in the Korean War, December 1950 to April 1951]( "Wresting the Initiative: Ridgway as Operational Commander in the Korean War, December 1950 to April 1951")
Wresting the Initiative: Ridgway as Operational Commander in the Korean War, December 1950 to April 195162,99 €![The Korean War Armistice and The Islands]( "The Korean War Armistice and The Islands")
The Korean War Armistice and The Islands60,99 €![A Study of the Korean People]( "A Study of the Korean People")
A Study of the Korean People60,99 €![An Analysis of Class II Supplies Requisitions in the Korean Army's Organizational Supply]( "An Analysis of Class II Supplies Requisitions in the Korean Army's Organizational Supply")
An Analysis of Class II Supplies Requisitions in the Korean Army's Organizational Supply60,99 €![Gen Otto P. Weyland, USAF: Close Air Support in the Korean War]( "Gen Otto P. Weyland, USAF: Close Air Support in the Korean War")
Gen Otto P. Weyland, USAF: Close Air Support in the Korean War63,99 €![Dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: A Snapshot of the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century]( "Dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: A Snapshot of the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century")
Dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: A Snapshot of the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century60,99 €
Historical examples are an expedient way to develop an understanding of operational art theory and concepts. A historical illustration of both operational success and failure is the Korean War. Several aspects of the Korean War remain relevant to operational art in contemporary conflicts. It had a complex and evolving strategy, a dramatic interplay of tactical success and failures, uncertainty and miscalculation, shortages of means to accomplish ends, and the difficult challenge to set the conditions for a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict. America's full-scale involvement in the Korean War began on 25 June 1950, when the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) invaded the south intent on reunifying the country through force of arms. In little more than a month, aided by the element of surprise and superiority in almost every category of military performance, the NKPA captured nearly ninety percent of the Korean Peninsula. MacArthur's conceptualization and execution of Operation CHROMITE was a brilliant example of operational art. The amphibious assault at Inchon and subsequent breakout of the Pusan Perimeter by Eighth Army achieved the strategic objective--the preservation of the Republic of Korea. Then, after a hasty reassessment of strategic priorities, MacArthur led the U.N. forces in a disastrous attack into North Korea. During this period, operational art requirements were absent, and communist China intervened in the conflict. U.N. forces were nearly defeated. After a withdrawal from North Korea, U.N. forces were able to reorient and stabilize the conflict primarily due to the superb leadership and vision of General Matthew Ridgway. An examination of three distinct operational periods in the Korean War using the requirements of operational art as described in Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations will reveal whether operational art was a factor in success or failure. This monograph argues that the commander met the requirements for operation
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.