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This monograph examines the nature of operational reconnaissance. It proposes a theory of operational reconnaissance compatible with the demands of the U.S. Army's Objective Force concepts. The paper opens with a discussion on the relationship of reconnaissance in the overall command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance system (C4ISR). It concludes that the ability to conduct reconnaissance is the limiting factor of the system and posits that existing doctrine fails to provide an adequate examination of reconnaissance at the operational level. The paper focuses the discussion based on three research criteria extracted from essential characteristics of the Objective Force as described in the Objective force Organizational and Operational Plan. These three criteria are the ability to gain reconnaissance superiority across multiple dimensions of conflict, the ability to generate tempo, and the ability to transition from one operation to the next.