Imran Demir

Overconfidence and Risk Taking in Foreign Policy Decision Making

The Case of Turkey¿s Syria Policy

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book introduces a new perspective on risk seeking behaviour, developing a framework based on various cognitive theories, and applying it to the specific case-study of Turkey's foreign policy toward Syria. The author examines why policy makers commit themselves to polices that they do not have the capacity to deliver, and develops an alternative theoretical model to prospect theory in explaining risk taking behaviour based on the concept of overconfidence. The volume suggests that overconfident individuals exhibit risk seeking behaviour that contradicts the risk averse behaviour of individuals in the domain of gain, as predicted by prospect theory. Using a set of testable hypothesis deduced from the model, it presents an empirical investigation of the causes behind Turkish decision makers' unprecedented level of risk taking toward the uprising in Syria and the consequences of this policy.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer International Publishing / Springer, Berlin
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-3-319-84944-7
• Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2017
• Seitenzahl: 160
• Erscheinungstermin: 21. Juli 2018
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 210mm x 148mm x 9mm
• Gewicht: 217g
• ISBN-13: 9783319849447
• ISBN-10: 3319849441
• Artikelnr.: 53576102

Autorenporträt

Imran Demir is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations in the School of Political Science, Marmara University, Turkey. He earned his PhD from the Department of Political Science at the University of Missouri, USA, and holds a Master's degree in International Relations from the Middle East Technical University, Turkey.

Inhaltsangabe

1. Introduction .- 2. The Relevant Literature on Past Outcomes, Overconfidence and Risk Taking .- 3. Modeling the Relationship between Past Outcomes, Overconfidence and Risk Taking .- 4. The Turkish Policy to Remove Syrian President Assad: Overconfidence Obscures Risks and Magnifies Failure .- 5. Why Turkish Overconfidence Was Too Obvious .- 6. Conclusion.