Noted philosopher Timothy Williamson uses ideas from contemporary psychology and data-driven science to identify defects in how many philosophers arrive at their theories, because they rely on common sense ways of thinking that are correct most but not all the time. When those ways of thinking are pushed too far, what Williamson refers to as overfitting can result in philosophical paradoxes. He shows how philosophers have over-complicated their theories in futile attempts to accommodate erroneous 'data' and he documents these problems in detail through case studies of contemporary philosophy.…mehr
Noted philosopher Timothy Williamson uses ideas from contemporary psychology and data-driven science to identify defects in how many philosophers arrive at their theories, because they rely on common sense ways of thinking that are correct most but not all the time. When those ways of thinking are pushed too far, what Williamson refers to as overfitting can result in philosophical paradoxes. He shows how philosophers have over-complicated their theories in futile attempts to accommodate erroneous 'data' and he documents these problems in detail through case studies of contemporary philosophy. He also discusses what philosophers can do to avoid these problems. Williamson's important diagnosis and prescription will be of interest to a wide range of philosophers.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Timothy Williamson is Wykeham Professor of Logic Emeritus at the University of Oxford and Whitney Griswold Visiting Professor at Yale University. He has also taught at MIT, Princeton, Edinburgh, Trinity College Dublin, Chinese University of Hong Kong, and elsewhere. He works on logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and metaphilosophy. His books include Doing Philosophy, Tetralogue, Knowledge and its Limits, Vagueness, The Philosophy of Philosophy, and Suppose and Tell. He is a Fellow of the British Academy, Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Member of the Academia Europaea.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Chapter 1. Heuristics 1.1 Counterexamples 1.2 What are heuristics? 1.3 The persistence heuristic 1.4 The suppositional heuristic for conditionals 1.5 Disquotation and heuristics for belief ascription 1.6 The weighing heuristic for reasons 1.7 Implications for philosophical methodology Chapter 2. Overfitting and Degrees of Freedom 2.1 Error-fragility 2.2 Data fitting 2.3 Overfitting in philosophical analysis 2.4 Overfitting in semantics 2.5 Overfitting in logic 2.6 Overfitting in philosophical model-building 2.7 Summing up Chapter 3. Case Study: Hyperintensionalism 3.1 Two revolutions? 3.2 Extensional, intensional, hyperintensional 3.3 Hyperintensional semantics: impossible worlds 3.4 Hyperintensional semantics: truthmakers 3.5 Hyperintensional semantics: Russellian propositions 3.6 The 'why?' heuristic Chapter 4. Frege puzzles 4.1 Representational hyperintensionality 4.2 The Fregean consensus 4.3 The failure of the Fregean consensus 4.4 Frege puzzles and synonymy 4.5 Frege puzzles from the inside 4.6 The necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori 4.7 Heuristics for belief ascription 4.8 Heuristics for knowledge ascription 4.9 Evidence 4.10 Probability 4.11 Epistemic and doxastic logic 4.12 Drawing the threads together Chapter 5. Intensional metametaphysics 5.1 Semantic challenges to metaphysics 5.2 The coarse-grained challenge to metaphysics 5.3 Generalizing the problem 5.4 The metalinguistic strategy 5.5 Reconceiving the problem 5.6 In brief Bibliography Index
Preface Chapter 1. Heuristics 1.1 Counterexamples 1.2 What are heuristics? 1.3 The persistence heuristic 1.4 The suppositional heuristic for conditionals 1.5 Disquotation and heuristics for belief ascription 1.6 The weighing heuristic for reasons 1.7 Implications for philosophical methodology Chapter 2. Overfitting and Degrees of Freedom 2.1 Error-fragility 2.2 Data fitting 2.3 Overfitting in philosophical analysis 2.4 Overfitting in semantics 2.5 Overfitting in logic 2.6 Overfitting in philosophical model-building 2.7 Summing up Chapter 3. Case Study: Hyperintensionalism 3.1 Two revolutions? 3.2 Extensional, intensional, hyperintensional 3.3 Hyperintensional semantics: impossible worlds 3.4 Hyperintensional semantics: truthmakers 3.5 Hyperintensional semantics: Russellian propositions 3.6 The 'why?' heuristic Chapter 4. Frege puzzles 4.1 Representational hyperintensionality 4.2 The Fregean consensus 4.3 The failure of the Fregean consensus 4.4 Frege puzzles and synonymy 4.5 Frege puzzles from the inside 4.6 The necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori 4.7 Heuristics for belief ascription 4.8 Heuristics for knowledge ascription 4.9 Evidence 4.10 Probability 4.11 Epistemic and doxastic logic 4.12 Drawing the threads together Chapter 5. Intensional metametaphysics 5.1 Semantic challenges to metaphysics 5.2 The coarse-grained challenge to metaphysics 5.3 Generalizing the problem 5.4 The metalinguistic strategy 5.5 Reconceiving the problem 5.6 In brief Bibliography Index
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