Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 1
Herausgeber: Blair, Roger D; Sokol, D Daniel
Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 1
Herausgeber: Blair, Roger D; Sokol, D Daniel
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The Handbook examines the most important issues that arise in antitrust economics. Leading scholars in the field provide detailed critical analysis of developments across a number of different antitrust topics along with a detailed review of the literature. The Handbook is invaluable as a research and teaching tool.
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The Handbook examines the most important issues that arise in antitrust economics. Leading scholars in the field provide detailed critical analysis of developments across a number of different antitrust topics along with a detailed review of the literature. The Handbook is invaluable as a research and teaching tool.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Hurst & Co.
- Seitenzahl: 632
- Erscheinungstermin: 1. Dezember 2014
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 249mm x 175mm x 43mm
- Gewicht: 1202g
- ISBN-13: 9780199859191
- ISBN-10: 0199859191
- Artikelnr.: 47870683
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
- Verlag: Hurst & Co.
- Seitenzahl: 632
- Erscheinungstermin: 1. Dezember 2014
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 249mm x 175mm x 43mm
- Gewicht: 1202g
- ISBN-13: 9780199859191
- ISBN-10: 0199859191
- Artikelnr.: 47870683
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
Roger D. Blair is Walter J. Matherly Professor, Department of Economics at the University of Florida where he has taught for 40 years. His research interests center on antitrust economics and policy. In addition to numerous articles in economics journals and law reviews, he has published Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, Antitrust Economics, Monopsony in Law and Economics, and Antitrust Law, Volume II with Areeda and Hovenkamp. Dr. Blair has also served as an expert witness in over 50 cases. D. Daniel Sokol is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. He is co-editor of the Global Competition Law and Economics book series (Stanford University Press) and of the Oxford Handbook of Antitrust Compliance (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). He also is editor of the Antitrust and Competition Policy Blog. Professor Sokol has provided technical assistance and capacity building to antitrust agencies and utilities regulators from around the world.
* INTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
* 1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases
* Daniel A. Crane
* 2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences
* Keith N. Hylton
* 3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions
* Peter Carstensen
* 4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets
* Cory S. Capps and David Dranove
* 5. International Antitrust Institutions
* Oliver Budzinski
* 6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective
* Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II
* 7. Antitrust Settlements
* Daniel L. Rubinfeld
* 8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions
* Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance
* 9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust
* Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck
* 10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust
* Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann
* 11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis
* William H. Page
* 12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the
European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury
* Jeffrey L. Harrison
* 13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process
* Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell
* II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
* 14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy
Approaches
* Lawrence J. White
* 15. Market Definition
* Louis Kaplow
* 16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy
* Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale
* 17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks
* Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo
* 18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses
* David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee
* III. MERGERS
* 19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement
* Howard Shelanski
* 20. Unilateral Effects
* Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig
* 21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory
* Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover
* 22. Buyer Power in Merger Review
* Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel
* 23. Vertical Mergers
* Michael A. Salinger
* 1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases
* Daniel A. Crane
* 2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences
* Keith N. Hylton
* 3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions
* Peter Carstensen
* 4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets
* Cory S. Capps and David Dranove
* 5. International Antitrust Institutions
* Oliver Budzinski
* 6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective
* Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II
* 7. Antitrust Settlements
* Daniel L. Rubinfeld
* 8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions
* Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance
* 9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust
* Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck
* 10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust
* Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann
* 11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis
* William H. Page
* 12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the
European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury
* Jeffrey L. Harrison
* 13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process
* Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell
* II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
* 14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy
Approaches
* Lawrence J. White
* 15. Market Definition
* Louis Kaplow
* 16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy
* Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale
* 17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks
* Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo
* 18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses
* David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee
* III. MERGERS
* 19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement
* Howard Shelanski
* 20. Unilateral Effects
* Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig
* 21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory
* Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover
* 22. Buyer Power in Merger Review
* Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel
* 23. Vertical Mergers
* Michael A. Salinger
* INTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
* 1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases
* Daniel A. Crane
* 2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences
* Keith N. Hylton
* 3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions
* Peter Carstensen
* 4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets
* Cory S. Capps and David Dranove
* 5. International Antitrust Institutions
* Oliver Budzinski
* 6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective
* Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II
* 7. Antitrust Settlements
* Daniel L. Rubinfeld
* 8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions
* Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance
* 9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust
* Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck
* 10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust
* Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann
* 11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis
* William H. Page
* 12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the
European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury
* Jeffrey L. Harrison
* 13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process
* Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell
* II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
* 14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy
Approaches
* Lawrence J. White
* 15. Market Definition
* Louis Kaplow
* 16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy
* Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale
* 17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks
* Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo
* 18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses
* David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee
* III. MERGERS
* 19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement
* Howard Shelanski
* 20. Unilateral Effects
* Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig
* 21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory
* Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover
* 22. Buyer Power in Merger Review
* Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel
* 23. Vertical Mergers
* Michael A. Salinger
* 1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases
* Daniel A. Crane
* 2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences
* Keith N. Hylton
* 3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions
* Peter Carstensen
* 4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets
* Cory S. Capps and David Dranove
* 5. International Antitrust Institutions
* Oliver Budzinski
* 6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective
* Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II
* 7. Antitrust Settlements
* Daniel L. Rubinfeld
* 8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions
* Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance
* 9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust
* Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck
* 10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust
* Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann
* 11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis
* William H. Page
* 12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the
European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury
* Jeffrey L. Harrison
* 13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process
* Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell
* II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
* 14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy
Approaches
* Lawrence J. White
* 15. Market Definition
* Louis Kaplow
* 16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy
* Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale
* 17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks
* Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo
* 18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses
* David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee
* III. MERGERS
* 19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement
* Howard Shelanski
* 20. Unilateral Effects
* Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig
* 21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory
* Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover
* 22. Buyer Power in Merger Review
* Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel
* 23. Vertical Mergers
* Michael A. Salinger