Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Ed. by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind.
An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of the mind in the natural world: its ontological status, how it fits into the causal fabric of the universe, and the nature of consciousness. The third section focuses on the much-debated subjects of content and intentionality. The fourth section examines a variety of mental capacities, including memory,
imagination, and emotion. The fifth section looks at epistemic issues, in particular regarding knowledge of one's own and other minds. The volume concludes with a section on self, personhood, and agency.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind will be an invaluable resource for advanced students and scholars of philosophy, and also for researchers in neighbouring disciplines seeking a high-level survey of the state of the art in this flourishing field.

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Produktdetails

• Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy
• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 832
• Erscheinungstermin: 20. Januar 2011
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 244mm x 170mm x 45mm
• Gewicht: 1425g
• ISBN-13: 9780199596317
• ISBN-10: 019959631X
• Artikelnr.: 32687562

Autorenporträt

Brian McLaughlin is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers Ansgar Beckermann is Professor of Philosophy at University of Bielefeld, Germany Sven Walter is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at University of Bielefeld, Germany

Inhaltsangabe

* I. The Place of Mind in Nature
* 1: Jaegwon Kim: Mental Causation
* 2: David Papineau: The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
* 3: E. J. Lowe: Dualism
* 4: Sven Walters: Epiphenomenalism
* 5: Julie Yoo: Anomalous Monism
* 6: Lynne Rudder Baker: Nonreductive Materialsim
* 7: Robert Van Gulick: Functionalism
* 8: Ansgar Beckermann: What Is Property Physicalism?
* 9: Barbara Montero: What Is the Physical?
* 10: Howard Robinson: Idealism
* 11: William Seager: Panpsychism
* II. The Nature of Consciousness and The Place of Consciousnes in
Nature
* 12: John Perry: Subjectivity
* 13: David Rosenthal: Higher-order Theories of Consciousness
* 14: Michael Tye: Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
* 15: Alex Byrne: Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational
Qualities
* 16: Joseph Levine: The Explanatory Gap
* 17: Kati Balog: Phenomenal Concepts
* 18: David Chalmers: The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
* III. Intentionality and Theories of Mental Content
* 19: Daniel Dennett: Intentional Systems Theory
* 20: Frances Egan: Wide Content
* 21: Gabriel Segal: Narrow Content
* 22: Fred Dretske: Information-theoretic Semantics
* 23: Ruth Millikan: Biosemantics
* 24: Robert Matthews: A Measurement-theoretic Account of Propositional
Attitudes
* 25: Ralph Wedgwood: The Normativity of the Intentional
* 26: Christopher Peacocke: Concepts and Possession Conditions
* 27: Jose Bermudez: The Distinction between Conceptual and
Nonconceptual Content
* 28: Tim Crane: Intentionalism
* 29: Michelle Montague: The Content of Perceptual Experience
* 30: George Graham, Terence Horgan, and John Tienson: Phenomenology,
Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind
* IV. Self, Unity of Consciousness, and Personal Identity
* 31: Galen Strawson: Selves
* 32: Paul Raymont and Andy Brook: Unity of Consciousness
* 33: Tamar Gendler: Personal Identity and Metaphysics
* V. Variety of Mental Abilities
* 34: Colin McGinn: Imagination
* 35: Louise Antony: Thinking
* 36: John Heil: Language and Thought
* 37: John Campbell: Consciousness and Reference
* 38: Krista Lawlor: Memory
* 39: Jesse Prinz: Emotions: Motivating Feelings
* 40: Alfred Mele: Intention and Intentional Action
* VI. Epistemic Issues
* 41: Adam Morton: Folk Psychology
* 42: Anita Avramides: Other Minds
* 43: Cynthia Macdonald: Introspection
* 44: Jessica Brown: Semantic Externalism and Self-knowledge
* 45: Kent Bach: Self-deception