Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a forum for outstanding new work in an area of vigorous and broad-ranging debate in philosophy and beyond. What is involved in human action? Can philosophy and science illuminate debate about free will? How should we answer questions about responsibility for action?
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a forum for outstanding new work in an area of vigorous and broad-ranging debate in philosophy and beyond. What is involved in human action? Can philosophy and science illuminate debate about free will? How should we answer questions about responsibility for action?
David Shoemaker is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Murphy Institute at Tulane University. He is the author or co-author of two books and thirty-five articles, many of them having to do with the issues of agency, responsibility, and personal identity.
Inhaltsangabe
* 1: Introduction * 2: David Shoemaker: The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation * 3: Sarah Buss: The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation * 4: Michael E. Bratman: The Fecundity of Planning Agency * 5: Luca Ferrero: Can I Only Intend My Own Actions? Intentions and the Own Action Condition * 6: Daniel Jacobson: Regret, Agency, and Error * 7: Oisín Deery, Matt Bedke, and Shaun Nichols: Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency * 8: Michael McKenna: Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents and Mechanisms * 9: Paul Russell: Responsibility, Naturalism and 'the Morality System' * 10: Zac Cogley: The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions * 11: Matthew Talbert: Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame * 12: Tamler Sommers: Partial Desert * 13: Heidi L. Maibom: Values, Sanity, and Responsibility * 14: David O. Brink and Dana K. Nelkin: Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility * Index
* 1: Introduction * 2: David Shoemaker: The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation * 3: Sarah Buss: The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation * 4: Michael E. Bratman: The Fecundity of Planning Agency * 5: Luca Ferrero: Can I Only Intend My Own Actions? Intentions and the Own Action Condition * 6: Daniel Jacobson: Regret, Agency, and Error * 7: Oisín Deery, Matt Bedke, and Shaun Nichols: Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency * 8: Michael McKenna: Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents and Mechanisms * 9: Paul Russell: Responsibility, Naturalism and 'the Morality System' * 10: Zac Cogley: The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions * 11: Matthew Talbert: Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame * 12: Tamler Sommers: Partial Desert * 13: Heidi L. Maibom: Values, Sanity, and Responsibility * 14: David O. Brink and Dana K. Nelkin: Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility * Index
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Shop der buecher.de GmbH & Co. KG Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg Amtsgericht Augsburg HRA 13309